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Abstract
In this thesis, I study the effects of financial frictions and in particular, imperfect
banking competition, on different macroeconomic aspects. The thesis consists of a short
introductory chapter and three papers.
The first paper investigates the impact of imperfect banking competition on aggregate
fluctuations in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) framework. Following the
global financial crisis, there has been an increasing focus on incorporating financial frictions
into a DSGE model, often by introducing an agency problem which serves to amplify
macroeconomic shocks. This paper examines the impact of another important financial
friction, imperfect competition in banking, on aggregate fluctuations by incorporating
a Cournot banking sector into a DSGE model that features an agency problem that
gives rise to collateral constraints. In the presence of a binding collateral constraint,
imperfect banking competition is found to have an amplification effect on aggregate
fluctuations after a contractionary monetary policy shock and adverse collateral shocks.
Adverse shocks that make borrowers more financially constrained and their loan demand
more inelastic can induce banks with market power to raise the loan rate, resulting in a
countercyclical loan interest margin that amplifies aggregate fluctuations.
The second paper studies how imperfect competition in the banking sector affects
financial stability. By building a model of imperfect banking competition featuring the
accumulation of bank equity via retained earnings, I find that bank competition can
have different short-run and long-run effects on financial stability. In the short run, less
competition can jeopardize stability as it increases banks’ loan assets and thus lowers
their equity-to-assets ratios (equity ratios), making them more likely to default. In
the long run, less competition tends to enhance stability as banks make higher profits
and accumulate equity faster over time, resulting in higher equity ratios and hence
lower bank default probabilities. The extent of this long-run stability gain from less
competition and whether the stability gain outweighs the efficiency loss crucially depend
on banks’ dividend distribution or macroprudential policies. Empirically, I find two sets of
supporting evidence for the model predictions using a large bank-level panel from EU and
OECD countries spanning around 15 years. First, bank concentration, an inverse measure
for competition, has a significant positive effect on the change in bank equity. Second,
banks’ equity ratios are found to be negatively related to their default probabilities, which
are proxied by credit default swap spreads.
In the third paper, I study the impact of financial frictions in the form of borrowing
constraints on the efficient allocation of physical capital. While it is widely perceived
that financial frictions have adverse impact on capital allocation, the importance of this
impact is difficult to quantify. This paper presents a novel two-step approach to estimate
the importance of financial frictions on capital misallocation, measured by the dispersion
of the marginal revenue product of capital. First, based on the general theoretical result
that the capital investment of financially constrained firms is more sensitive to their
internal financing than for unconstrained firms, I use a switching regression approach to
jointly estimate the two different investment regimes and the probability of each firm
being constrained. Firms are classified as financially constrained or unconstrained based
on the estimated probabilities. Second, I provide a decomposition of capital misallocation
and estimate the fraction that can be explained by the presence of financially constrained
firms. Applying this method to large panels of manufacturing firms for 20 countries from
the 1990s to 2015, this paper finds that for most countries and two-digit industries, more
than a quarter of firms are classified as financially constrained. Furthermore, the presence
of these constrained firms accounts for more than half of capital misallocation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The global financial crisis has highlighted the impact of financial intermediaries on the
real economy. This suggests that the financial sector is not frictionless and it is important
to incorporate financial frictions in the study of aggregate fluctuations, because they can
cause shocks and affect the propagation of other macroeconomic shocks. So far, the most
commonly used financial frictions in the literature are agency problems between lenders
and borrowers (e.g., Gertler et al., 2012; Gertler and Karadi, 2011; Gertler et al., 2010;
Gilchrist et al., 2009; Iacoviello, 2005; Bernanke et al., 1999; Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1997;
Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). As agents’ balance sheet conditions worsen during bad times,
indicating more severe agency problems, the resulting increased difficulty in obtaining
external finance tends to amplify the initial shock that adversely affects balance sheet
conditions (Bernanke et al., 1996).
One special feature of the banking sector is that it tends to be imperfectly competitive
and highly concentrated. Despite a large empirical literature documenting the market
power of the banking sector (e.g., Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Ehrmann et al., 2001; De Bandt
and Davis, 2000; Oxenstierna, 1999; Berg and Kim, 1998), this financial friction is often
neglected in the study of macroeconomic fluctuations. Chapter 2 investigates whether
imperfect banking competition affects aggregate fluctuations. By incorporating both
imperfect banking competition and an agency problem into a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) framework, Chapter 2 addresses how imperfect banking competition
interacts with the agency problem and whether it can also amplify aggregate fluctuations
on top of the agency problem.
After the financial crisis, central banks around the world have taken actions to
safeguard financial stability to prevent future crises, such as implementing various
macroprudential policies. A natural question following from Chapter 2 is whether
imperfect banking competition also affects financial stability. The answer to this question
can provide crucial guidance on choosing the most effective macroprudential policy
tools. Despite its importance, the relationship between banking competition and financial
stability remains highly debated in the literature (e.g., Corbae and Levine, 2018; Martinez-
Miera and Repullo, 2010; Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005; Allen and Gale, 2000; Keeley, 1990).
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Chapter 3 investigates to what extent imperfect banking competition could enhance
financial stability by making banks less likely to default due to higher profits and how it
could lead to a trade-off between financial stability and macroeconomic efficiency.
Shifting the focus from macroeconomic efficiency to allocative efficiency, Chapter 4
studies the efficient allocation of physical capital across producers in the presence of
financial frictions. Since capital misallocation has adverse implications on aggregate
productivity, understanding the causes of it has become one of the central topics in the
recent literature (e.g., Bai et al., 2018; David and Venkateswaran, 2017; Gopinath et al.,
2017; Midrigan and Xu, 2014; Bartelsman et al., 2013; Gilchrist et al., 2013; Restuccia
and Rogerson, 2013). Financial frictions are often regarded as a contributing factor for
capital misallocation, but the magnitude of their impact is difficult to quantify. Chapter
4 focuses on financial frictions in the form of collateral constraints and provides a new
method to quantify the impact of financial frictions on capital misallocation by using large
firm-level datasets across countries. I then apply this method to estimate the fraction
of capital misallocation that can be explained by the presence of financially constrained
firms.
This thesis examines the macroeconomic effects of imperfect banking competition and
other financial frictions. The next two chapters study the effects of imperfect banking
competition on macroeconomic volatility and financial stability, respectively. I then focus
on the effect of other financial frictions on the efficient allocation of physical capital in
the final chapter.
In Chapter 2, I study how imperfect banking competition affects macroeconomic
fluctuations by incorporating a Cournot banking sector into a DSGE framework embedded
with an agency problem that gives rise to collateral constraints. I use the Cournot model
to characterise oligopolistic banking competition since the banking sector is highly
concentrated and is often dominated by a few large players. For instance, in most EU
and OECD countries, the largest five banks account for more than 60% of the market
share (using ECB and Bankscope data in 2007 and 2014).
I find that in the presence of a binding collateral constraint, imperfect banking
competition can amplify aggregate fluctuations via a countercyclical loan interest margin,
which refers to the difference between the loan rate and the deposit rate. For instance, after
a contractionary monetary policy shock, the binding constraint tightens and borrowers
are more financially constrained. As a result, loan demand becomes more inelastic, which
induces banks with market power to charge a higher loan rate, leading to a countercyclical
loan margin that is large enough to amplify aggregate fluctuations. The countercyclical
loan interest margin is documented in Chapter 2 using country-level data for EU countries
from 1980 to 2016.
Some papers have incorporated imperfect banking competition into a DSGE model,
typically using monopolistic competition within the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) framework
(Cuciniello and Signoretti, 2015; Hafstead and Smith, 2012; Dib, 2010; Gerali et al., 2010;
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Hülsewig et al., 2009). However, assuming agents demand a composite bundle of loan
and deposit contracts from many different banks is unrealistic, given that in reality,
households and firms tend to rely on only one bank or at most a few. Chapter 2 avoids
this assumption by using a Cournot banking sector. More importantly, the banking sector
tends to be very concentrated and dominated by a few large banks, which implies that
oligopolistic competition such as Cournot may be more appropriate. Another contribution
of Chapter 2 is that I find imperfect banking competition can amplify the response of
output via a countercyclical loan interest margin after a monetary policy shock, which
differs from the attenuation effect often found in the existing literature (Andrés and Arce,
2012; Hafstead and Smith, 2012; Dib, 2010; Gerali et al., 2010). Although Cuciniello and
Signoretti (2015) also find that imperfect banking competition can amplify aggregate
fluctuations after a monetary policy shock, their results rely on the strategic interaction
between banks with market power and the inflation-targeting central bank, which cannot
be applied to countries that have a fixed exchange rate regime or are part of a large
monetary union (such as the eurozone).
Chapter 3 studies how imperfect banking competition affects financial stability. Much
of the literature has focused on how banking competition affects banks’ or borrowers’
risk-taking (e.g., Corbae and Levine, 2018; Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005; Allen and Gale,
2000; Keeley, 1990). Instead, Chapter 3 studies how competition affects banks’ equity-
to-assets ratios (equity ratios) and thereby financial stability measured through banks’
default probabilities. By building a model of Cournot banking competition featuring the
accumulation of bank equity via retained earnings, I find that less banking competition
can lead to a large gain in financial stability provided that banks retain the greater profits
to build up their capital buffer.
Although imperfect banking competition can enhance financial stability, it leads
to a higher loan rate and thereby a lower demand for physical capital, which reduces
aggregate output and hence macroeconomic efficiency. Another contribution of Chapter
3 is to quantify the importance of the financial stability gain from imperfect banking
competition relative to the macroeconomic efficiency loss. In doing so, I find that
bank equity accumulation is important for understanding the trade-off between financial
stability and macroeconomic efficiency. In the absence of bank equity accumulation,
the financial stability gain from imperfect banking competition is very limited and is
outweighed by the macroeconomic efficiency loss. As a result, perfect banking competition
is the best in this case. However, when banks retain their profits to build up their capital
buffer over time, for instance, in response to macroprudential regulations, the financial
stability gain can become large enough to outweigh the macroeconomic efficiency loss.
Chapter 3 also provides new empirical evidence by assessing the model prediction that in
the presence of bank equity accumulation, less banking competition improves financial
stability, using a large bank-level panel of EU and OECD countries over the period from
1999 to 2016.
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In Chapter 4, I study the effect of other financial frictions in the form of collateral
constraints on capital misallocation measured by the dispersion of the marginal revenue
product of capital (MRPK). I provide a novel two-step approach to estimate the fraction
of the dispersion of MRPK that is caused by the presence of financially constrained firms,
which relies on few restrictive assumptions and can be readily applied to a large number of
countries. First, based on the theoretical result that the capital investment of financially
constrained firms is more sensitive to their internal financing than for unconstrained firms,
I use a switching regression approach to jointly estimate the two different investment
regimes and the probability of each firm being constrained. Firms are classified as
financially constrained or unconstrained based on the estimated probabilities. Second, I
decompose the dispersion of MRPK across all firms into the dispersions and means of
MRPK for the two types of firms. Using the firm classification and the decomposition,
the fraction of the dispersion of MRPK caused by the presence of financially constrained
firms can then be estimated.
Applying this method to large panels of manufacturing firms for 20 countries from
the 1990s to 2015, I find that the dispersions and means of MRPK for the financially
constrained types are much larger than those for the unconstrained firms. Furthermore,
for most countries and two-digit industries, more than a quarter of firms are classified
as financially constrained and the presence of these constrained firms accounts for more
than half of capital misallocation.
To conclude, the thesis has shown the importance of imperfect banking competition
for macroeconomic fluctuations and financial stability, and has quantified the impact of
financially constrained firms on the allocation of physical capital.
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Chapter 2
Imperfect Banking Competition and
Macroeconomic Volatility: A DSGE
Framework
2.1 Introduction
Following the global financial crisis, there has been an increasing focus on incorporating
financial frictions into a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. Most
of the existing literature studying the role of financial frictions in amplifying aggregate
fluctuations often models the financial friction using an agency problem and assumes a
perfectly competitive banking sector. However, the banking sector tends to be imperfectly
competitive in reality. For instance, in most EU and OECD countries, the largest five
banks account for more than 60% of the market share (using ECB and Bankscope data
in 2007 and 2014), suggesting that the banking sector tends to be dominated by a few
large players.1 Furthermore, neglecting imperfect banking competition may miss out an
important propagation mechanism of macroeconomic shocks.
This paper incorporates a Cournot banking sector into a DSGE model embedded with
an agency problem that gives rise to collateral constraints. I find that in the presence of a
binding collateral constraint, imperfect banking competition can lead to a countercyclical
loan interest margin (which rises during bad times) that amplifies aggregate fluctuations
after monetary policy shocks and collateral shocks. In this paper, the loan interest margin
refers to the difference between the loan rate and the deposit rate. With perfect banking
competition and no other frictions, this loan interest margin equals zero and thus the
loan rate moves one-to-one with the deposit rate. By contrast, with imperfect banking
competition, the loan interest margin is endogenously changing, which is consistent with
1See Oxenstierna (1999) and Berg and Kim (1998) for empirical evidence of oligopolistic banking
competition in Sweden and Norway respectively.
5
Figure 2.1: Bank Loan Interest Margin and Real GDP Growth in EU from 1980 to 2016
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Note: The annual bank loan interest margin (in percent points) from the World Bank is the difference
between the lending rate (charged by banks on loans to the private sector) and deposit rate (offered by
commercial banks on three-month deposits). The graph plots the unweighted average loan interest
margin across EU/Eurozone countries over time. The dotted line corresponds to the annual real GDP
growth rate for the EU. The shaded area represents the Euro area recessions (i.e., 1980Q2-1982Q3,
1992Q1-1993Q3, 2008Q2-2009Q2, 2011Q4-2013Q1) documented by the Center for Economic Policy
Research (https://cepr.org/content/euro-area-business-cycle-dating-committee).
Data sources: World Bank, IMF World Economic Outlook
empirical evidence. Figure 2.1 documents the countercyclical loan interest margin using
country-level data for EU countries from 1980 to 2016.
More specifically, how the loan margin changes in response to shocks crucially depends
on the elasticity of loan demand to the loan rate. Based on the model, the loan demand
becomes more inelastic when the expected future prices of capital and housing decrease
and/or the expected marginal products of capital and housing increase. Intuitively, in the
presence of a binding collateral constraint, lower expected asset prices indicate reduced
borrowing capacity and higher expected marginal products for the borrowers indicate
that they operate further below the optimal scale due to a more tightly binding borrowing
constraint.2 Hence, lower expected asset prices and higher expected marginal products
can both imply that the binding borrowing constraint tightens and hence borrowers are
more financially constrained, leading to a more inelastic loan demand. Furthermore, after
a negative shock to the fraction of the collateral value which the borrower can borrow
2The relation between the binding borrowing constraint and marginal products is further analysed in
Chapter 4.
6
against (i.e., a negative collateral shock), the reduction in this fraction can also reduce
the loan demand elasticity by making borrowers more financially constrained. The lower
elasticity of loan demand gives banks with market power an incentive to charge a higher
loan rate, leading to a greater loan interest margin for a given deposit rate.
This paper finds that after a contractionary monetary policy shock and negative
collateral shocks, borrowers are more financially constrained, implied by a lower leverage
ratio and a tightening of the binding collateral constraint. As a result, loan demand is
more inelastic, which leads to a rise in the loan margin that amplifies the loss in output.
After a negative productivity shock, however, the amplification effect is much weaker
in spite of a countercyclical real loan margin. This is because a negative productivity
shock is inflationary, so the real loan rate falls, which tends to reduce the tightness of the
binding constraint, ceteris paribus. In other words, since debt is denominated in nominal
terms, a higher price level reduces the real debt burden and this debt-deflation effect
tends to dampen the aggregate fluctuations.
This paper contributes to the literature on DSGE modelling with financial frictions.
This literature can be broadly divided into three different strands: agency problems,
time-varying loan spreads, and imperfect banking competition.
The first strand of the literature only incorporates an agency problem between
borrowers and lenders into a DSGE model to generate the financial accelerator effect
(Bernanke et al., 1996). As borrowers’ balance sheet conditions worsen during bad times,
agency problems become more severe, and the resulting increased difficulty in obtaining
external finance tends to amplify any shocks that adversely affect balance sheet conditions.
The agency problem is often modelled by costly debt enforcement (Gertler et al., 2012;
Gertler and Karadi, 2011; Gertler et al., 2010; Iacoviello, 2005; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997).
As borrowers cannot be forced to repay unsecured debt (Beck et al., 2014), creditors
would not lend an amount that exceeds the value of collateralized assets and hence
borrowers face a collateral constraint. Alternatively, the agency problem can be modelled
by the costly state verification of Townsend (1979) that leads to an endogenous external
finance premium (EFP), which then raises the cost of borrowing and amplifies business
cycle fluctuations (Agénor and Montiel, 2015; Gilchrist et al., 2009; Bernanke et al., 1999;
Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1997).
In all these papers where the financial intermediation is explicitly modelled, the
banking sector is assumed to be perfectly competitive. However, there is a large empirical
literature on banking competition and a common finding is that banks indeed have market
power, and that competition levels vary across countries and over time (Bikker and Haaf,
2002; Ehrmann et al., 2001; De Bandt and Davis, 2000). This paper incorporates an
imperfectly competitive banking sector into a DSGE model with collateral constraints.
The second strand of the literature focuses on the role of a time-varying loan spread
in understanding business cycle fluctuations (Cúrdia and Woodford, 2015; Gertler and
Karadi, 2011; Gertler et al., 2010; Gilchrist et al., 2009; Goodfriend and McCallum,
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2007; Bernanke and Gertler, 1989), using a variety of different assumptions (other
than imperfect banking competition) to generate the spread. For instance, Cúrdia and
Woodford (2015) introduce a time-varying spread by assuming that the loan-origination
process would consume real resources and that there is an exogenously varying loss rate
on loans. Similarly, Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) assume bank loans and deposits
are produced by a competitive banking sector according to a Cobb-Douglas production
function. The costly production process gives rise to an EFP, which can be procyclical
or countercyclical in response to a monetary shock depending on different parameter
calibrations. Instead, in this paper, I use imperfect banking competition to generate the
time-varying loan interest margin.
My paper is closely related to the third strand of the literature that focuses on
incorporating imperfect banking competition into a DSGE model. In the existing
literature, imperfect banking competition is often modelled via monopolistic competition
within the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) framework (Hafstead and Smith, 2012; Dib, 2010;
Gerali et al., 2010; Hülsewig et al., 2009). However, assuming that agents demand a
composite basket of loan and deposit contracts with constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) is unrealistic, given that in practice, firms and households tend to rely largely
on one bank or at most a few different banks. Furthermore, Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)’s
model of monopolistic competition results in a constant loan margin, which implies
that the loan rate moves one-to-one with the deposit rate set by the central bank.3
However, the loan margin is not a constant and it changes over the business cycle, as
shown in Figure 2.1. To generate an endogenously changing loan margin from imperfect
banking competition, Andrés and Arce (2012) use Salop’s (1979) model of monopolistic
competition and Cuciniello and Signoretti (2015) introduce large banks into the Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977) framework. Both papers find a countercyclical loan margin, but in the
former case, it is not large enough to amplify aggregate fluctuations after a contractionary
monetary policy shock. Although Cuciniello and Signoretti (2015) find that monopolistic
banking competition can amplify aggregate fluctuations after a contractionary monetary
policy shock, their result relies on the strategic interaction between banks with market
power and an inflation-targeting central bank, which cannot explain the empirically
observed countercyclical loan interest margin in countries that have a fixed exchange rate
regime or are part of a large monetary union (such as the eurozone).4
3In all these papers, changes in the loan margin over the business cycle are generated by introducing
exogenous shocks to the elasticity of substitution between different loan or deposit products (e.g., Gerali
et al., 2010) or bank’s marginal cost of producing loans (e.g., Hafstead and Smith, 2012), or modelling
interest rate stickiness à la Calvo (1983) or Rotemberg (1982) (e.g., Dib, 2010; Gerali et al., 2010;
Hülsewig et al., 2009), other than imperfect banking competition.
4Using the country-level loan interest margins from the World Bank and the real GDP growth rates
from the IMF for EU countries from 1980 to 2016, the countercyclical loan interest margin also holds
in small eurozone countries, such as Belgium, Estonia, Finland, and Netherlands. As a result, they do
not have independent monetary policy and since they are small, it is unlikely for them to influence the
monetary policy set by the ECB.
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This paper contributes to this third strand of the literature in two ways. First,
imperfect banking competition is modelled by a Cournot banking sector, which avoids the
unrealistic assumption on agents’ preferences for banking and the unrealistic fact that the
loan margin remains constant over the business cycle in the framework of monopolistic
competition à la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Furthermore, since banking sector tends to
be very concentrated and dominated by a few large banks, Cournot model captures the
oligopolistic competition, and at the same time, also nests perfect banking competition
as a special case (which is used as a benchmark in this paper). To the best of my
knowledge, this is the first paper that incorporates Cournot banking competition into a
DSGE framework.
Second, in this paper, the binding borrowing constraint is tied to the values of both
housing and physical capital collateral, while the existing studies in this strand of the
literature only model one type of collateral asset, using either housing or capital (e.g.,
Cuciniello and Signoretti, 2015; Andrés and Arce, 2012; Gerali et al., 2010). In doing
so, I find that imperfect banking competition can amplify aggregate fluctuations via a
countercyclical loan interest margin after a contractionary monetary policy shock, which
differs from the attenuation effect often found in the existing literature (Andrés and Arce,
2012; Hafstead and Smith, 2012; Dib, 2010; Gerali et al., 2010). This is because housing
is assumed to be in inelastic supply, thus any reduction in housing demand leads to a
large fall in its price, which in turn reduces borrowers’ value of housing collateral and
hence their borrowing capacity. As borrowers become more financially constrained, the
loan demand becomes more inelastic, inducing banks with market power to charge a
higher loan rate. In addition, the presence of capital collateral in the binding borrowing
constraint also contributes to the amplification effect since any reduction in its demand
and price will also reduce borrowers’ borrowing capacity and make them more financially
constrained. As a result, the countercyclical loan margin is large enough to amplify
aggregate fluctuations after a contractionary monetary policy shock in this paper.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the model
to analyse the effect of imperfect banking competition in a DSGE model embedded with a
collateral constraint. Section 2.3 explains the calibration of model parameters. Section 2.4
shows the impulse responses of some key variables after a contractionary monetary shock,
a negative productivity shock and collateral shocks. Section 2.5 discusses robustness
checks, and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The Model
The model aims to show the effect of imperfect banking competition relative to perfect
banking competition on aggregate fluctuations in a framework of collateral constraints.
Section 2.2.1 shows the model set-up for perfect banking competition and Section 2.2.2
replaces the perfectly competitive banking sector with a Cournot banking sector.
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2.2.1 Perfect Banking Competition Benchmark
There are six types of agents: households, entrepreneurs, retailers, capital producers,
banks, and a central bank. Each of the former five agent types has a unit mass. There is
a fixed housing supply that can be invested by households and entrepreneurs, following
Iacoviello (2005) and Andrés and Arce (2012). Households consume, supply labor to
the entrepreneurs, invest in housing and decide how much to save via one-period non-
state-contingent nominal bank deposit contracts or one-period risk-free nominal bonds.
Perfectly competitive entrepreneurs are born with some physical capital and housing in
the initial period and they have access to a Cobb-Douglas production technology. They
hire labor from households, purchase new capital from capital producers and purchase real
estate from the households to produce a wholesale good. The wholesale good produced
by entrepreneurs cannot be consumed directly and is sold to monopolistically competitive
retailers who then differentiate the wholesale good costlessly into different varieties. Each
retailer uses the wholesale good as the only input to produce a different variety. The
final consumption good is a composite CES (constant elasticity of substitution) bundle
of all the varieties. Perfectly competitive capital producers buy the undepreciated capital
from entrepreneurs and consumption goods from retailers to produce new capital, which
is then sold back to the entrepreneurs.
Banks offer two types of one-period contracts: deposit contracts and loan contracts.
The contracts are denominated in nominal terms, which means they are not inflation-
indexed and the borrowing or saving decisions are made on the basis of a preset contractual
nominal loan or deposit rate. Assuming nominal bank deposits and one-period riskless
nominal bonds are perfect substitutes to households under full deposit insurance, the
gross nominal deposit rate must equal the gross nominal interest rate Rt earned on the
riskless nominal bond invested in period t. Following Andrés and Arce (2012), this paper
abstracts away from the deposit insurance premium in the banking sector’s problem.
Since banks are perfectly competitive, each of them takes the nominal loan rate as given
and maximizes its profit with respect to the loan (or deposit) quantity. Assuming costless
financial intermediation and no expected default on loans,5 the gross nominal loan rate
Rb,t equals the gross nominal deposit rate Rt, which is controlled by the central bank.
Households
There is a continuum of identical infinitely-lived households of unit mass. The represen-
tative household maximizes the following expected utility:
Et
∞∑
s=0
βs[ln(ct+s) + φlln(1− lt+s) + φhln(ht+s)] (2.1)
5Under reasonable calibration, the steady state net worth of the entrepreneur is large enough that
even after a very large and persistent negative productivity shock (five times its standard deviation),
the net worth is far from being negative and the entrepreneur is able to afford the gross loan interest
payment. So this paper ignores the possibility of default on loans.
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which depends on consumption c, labor supply l and real estate holdings h, with Et
being the expectation operator conditional on information in period t, and β ∈ (0, 1) the
subjective discount factor of the household. The total time endowment is normalised to
1, so (1 − lt) denotes the amount of period-t leisure time, and φl > 0 and φh > 0 are
the relative utility weights on leisure time and housing respectively. As in Gertler and
Karadi (2011), a cashless economy is considered here for the convenience of neglecting
real money balances in the utility function.
In each period t, the household consumes ct, saves dt in real (final consumption) terms,
invests in housing ht and supplies labor hours lt. Assume there is zero net supply of
risk-free nominal bonds, so in equilibrium, households hold only nominal bank deposits.
The nominal deposits dt−1 saved in period t− 1 earn a gross nominal interest rate Rt−1 at
the beginning of period t. Let pt denote the unit price of the final consumption good, then
the gross inflation rate is πt ≡ ptpt−1 . Assume retailers, capital producers and banks are
owned by the households. Given the gross real interest earnings on deposits Rt−1dt−1
πt
at the
beginning of period t, real labor income wtlt and real lump-sum profits ΠRt , ΠCPt and ΠBt
made by retailers, capital producers and the banking sector respectively, the household
decides how much to consume and save and how much housing investment (ht − ht−1)
to make in period t. Assuming there is no depreciation of housing, the representative
household faces the following budget constraint:
ct + dt + qh,t(ht − ht−1) = Rt−1dt−1
πt
+ wtlt +ΠRt +ΠCPt +ΠBt (2.2)
where qh,t is the real price of housing. Let λt denote the Lagrange multiplier associated
with the budget constraint or equivalently, the marginal utility of consumption. The first
order conditions with respect to consumption ct (2.3), labor supply lt (2.4), housing ht
(2.5), and bank deposits dt (2.6) are as follows:
λt =
1
ct
(2.3)
φl
1− lt = λtwt (2.4)
φh
ht
+ βEt[λt+1qh,t+1] = λtqh,t (2.5)
λt = βEt
[
λt+1
Rt
πt+1
]
(2.6)
Equation (2.6) is the standard intertemporal Euler equation, which can also be written
as:
1 = Et
[
Λt,t+1
Rt
πt+1
]
(2.7)
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where Λt,t+1 ≡ β λt+1λt = β
u′(ct+1)
u′(ct) is the stochastic discount factor in period t for real
payoffs in period t+ 1, with u(c) = ln(c).
Entrepreneurs
Assume entrepreneurs are born with some physical capital and housing in the initial
period. In period t − 1, a continuum of perfectly competitive entrepreneurs of unit
mass acquire physical capital kEt−1 from capital producers at the real price qt−1 and real
estate hEt−1 from households at the real price qh,t−1 for production in period t. Capital
kEt−1, housing hEt−1 and labor lEt hired from households are used as inputs to produce the
wholesale good in period t using a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production
technology:
yw,t = zt(kEt−1)α(hEt−1)v(lEt )1−α−v (2.8)
where α ∈ (0, 1) and v ∈ (0, 1) are the output elasticities of physical capital and housing
respectively and 0 < α+ v < 1. yw,t is the output of the wholesale good (which differs
from the output of the final consumption good by a factor of the price dispersion as will
be shown by equation (2.38) in Section 2.2.1). Productivity zt follows an AR(1) process
in logs:
lnzt = ψlnzt−1 + ez,t (2.9)
with ψ ∈ (0, 1) indicating the persistence of the process, and ez,t normally distributed
with mean zero and variance σ2z .
Let βE denote the subjective discount factor for entrepreneurs. Following Iacoviello
(2005), it is assumed that βE < β to ensure that in the steady state and its neighborhood,
entrepreneurs are net borrowers and households are net savers. The necessity of this
assumption is shown later after solving the entrepreneur’s problem. The entrepreneur’s
objective is to maximize the expected lifetime utility:
Et
∞∑
s=0
(βE)sln(cEt+s) (2.10)
subject to a budget constraint (2.11) and a collateral constraint (2.12). Let Rb,t denote
the gross nominal loan rate in period t, then at the beginning of period t+1, the gross real
loan interest payment is Rb,tbt
πt+1
. Since the loan contract is denominated in nominal terms
with a specified Rb,t, a rise in inflation in period t+ 1 reduces the firm’s real debt burden.
At the end of period t, entrepreneurs can sell the undepreciated capital (1− δ)kEt−1 to
capital producers at the real price of capital qt, where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation rate
for physical capital. The wholesale good produced in period t is sold to retailers at a
nominal price pw,t. Let xt denote the markup of the price of the final consumption good
over the price of the wholesale good, that is, xt ≡ ptpw,t . In each period t, the outflow
of funds due to consumption cEt , cost of capital investment qt[kEt − (1− δ)kEt−1], cost of
housing investment qh,t(hEt −hEt−1), real wage payments to households wtlEt and real gross
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loan interest payments Rb,t−1bt−1
πt
, would equal the inflow of funds due to the real revenue
from selling the wholesale good yw,t
xt
and the loans granted by banks bt. Hence the budget
constraint in real terms is:
cEt + qtkEt + qh,thEt + wtlEt +
Rb,t−1bt−1
πt
= yw,t
xt
+ (1− δ)qtkEt−1 + qh,thEt−1 + bt (2.11)
An agency problem is introduced by assuming costly debt enforcement, based on
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Assume the entrepreneurs face limited liability on debt
obligations and if they repudiate their debt obligations, banks can only claim a fraction
of their assets. Assuming both real estate and physical capital can be used as collateral
assets,6 let mh ∈ (0, 1) and mk ∈ (0, 1) denote the fractions of housing collateral
and physical capital collateral respectively that can be confiscated by banks when
the entrepreneurs fail to repay their debt. Consequently, the maximum amount an
entrepreneur can borrow is such that the gross nominal debt interest payment Rb,tbt
equals the expected value of assets that banks can claim after debt repudiation, which
is equal to mh,tEt
[
qh,t+1h
E
t πt+1
]
+mk,tEt
[
qt+1k
E
t (1− δ)πt+1
]
. As a result, the collateral
constraint can be written as:
bt 6 mh,tEt
[
qh,t+1h
E
t πt+1
Rb,t
]
+mk,tEt
[
qt+1k
E
t (1− δ)πt+1
Rb,t
]
(2.12)
The pledgeability ratios mh,t and mk,t are subject to the collateral shocks and follow an
AR(1) process in logs:
lnmh,t = (1− ψmh)lnmh + ψmhlnmh,t−1 + emh,t (2.13)
lnmk,t = (1− ψmk)lnmk + ψmk lnmk,t−1 + emk,t (2.14)
where mh and mk are the steady state values, ψmh ∈ (0, 1) and ψmk ∈ (0, 1) indicate
the persistence of the process, emh,t and emk,t are normally distributed with mean zero
and variance σ2mh and σ
2
mk
, respectively. Since the pledgeability ratio resembles the
loan-to-value ratio (i.e., amount of borrowing divided by the value of collateral), the
collateral shock can also be interpreted as the macroprudential policy shock.
Let λE1,t and λE2,t denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with the budget constraint
(2.11) and the borrowing constraint (2.12) respectively. Then the first order conditions
with respect to the entrepreneur’s consumption cEt (2.15), loan demand bt (2.16), labor
demand lEt (2.17), capital demand kEt (2.18) and housing demand hEt (2.19) are:
1
cEt
= λE1,t (2.15)
6From this section onwards, assets refer to both real estate and physical capital. Although real estate
is the only collateral in both Iacoviello (2005) and Andrés and Arce (2012), it is plausible to assume
physical capital can also serve this purpose.
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λE2,t = λE1,t − βEEt
[
λE1,t+1
Rb,t
πt+1
]
(2.16)
(1− α− v)yw,t
xtlEt
= wt (2.17)
qtλ
E
1,t = βEEt
[
λE1,t+1
{
αyw,t+1
xt+1kEt
+ (1− δ)qt+1
}]
+ λE2,tmk,tEt
[
qt+1(1− δ)πt+1
Rb,t
]
(2.18)
qh,tλ
E
1,t = βEEt
[
λE1,t+1
{
vyw,t+1
xt+1hEt
+ qh,t+1
}]
+ λE2,tmh,tEt
[
qh,t+1πt+1
Rb,t
]
(2.19)
Let variables without the time subscript denote the steady state values. Combining (2.15)
and (2.16), it can be seen that in the steady state:
λE2 =
1
cE
(
1− βERb
π
)
(2.20)
From Euler equation (2.7) derived from the household’s problem in Section 2.2.1, the
steady state value of the gross real interest rate R
π
is determined by the household’s
subjective discount factor, such that R
π
= 1
β
. Since Rb,t = Rt under perfect banking
competition, λE2 = 1cE
(
1− βE
β
)
. To ensure that the borrowing constraint always binds in
the steady state, λE2 must be positive, which implies βE < β. This heterogeneity in the
subjective discount factors guarantees that in the steady state, impatient entrepreneurs
are net borrowers.7
Based on the budget constraint (2.11), define the entrepreneur’s net worth nt in period
t after the productivity shock has been realized and output is produced, as the revenue
accruing to the factor inputs of physical capital and real estate (α+v)yw,t
xt
, plus the total
value of the real estate holdings and capital stock qh,thEt−1 + qt(1− δ)kEt−1, and net of the
gross real loan interest payment Rb,t−1bt−1
πt
at the beginning of period t.8 Hence, nt can be
written as:
nt ≡ (α + v)yw,t
xt
+ qt(1− δ)kEt−1 + qh,thEt−1 −
Rb,t−1bt−1
πt
(2.21)
7In this strand of the literature, it is a common approach to assume βE < β to ensure that the
borrowing constraint always binds in the steady state and its neighborhood, as long as the size of the
shocks are sufficiently small (Liu et al., 2013; Andrés and Arce, 2012; Gerali et al., 2010; Iacoviello, 2005).
To ensure the borrowing constraint is always binding in this paper, the parameter restriction is imposed
to guarantee a positive λE2 , and only adverse shocks are analysed, although the results are symmetric for
positive shocks as long as the constraint remains binding.
8Theoretically, after a negative productivity shock, the output of the wholesale good yw,t can be low
enough such that the entrepreneur is not able to repay the gross real loan interest repayment Rb,t−1bt−1πt
and hence the net worth is negative. Under reasonable calibration, the steady state net worth is high,
as shown in Table A.2 in Appendix A.4, such that even after a very large and persistent negative
productivity shock (i.e., the size of the shock is five times the standard deviation and the persistence
parameter is 0.97 in the AR(1) process for productivity), the net worth is far from being negative.
Since the default on loans is extremely unlikely, this paper ignores the possibility of loan default. The
possibility of entrepreneurs’ default on loans and hence banks’ default on liabilities (deposits) are studied
in Chapter 3.
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where (α+v)yw,t
xt
= yw,t
xt
− wtlEt , which follows from the first order condition with respect to
lEt (2.17). Rewriting the budget constraint (2.11) in terms of nt gives:
cEt + qtkEt + qh,thEt = nt + bt (2.22)
which implies the entrepreneur finances his consumption cEt and the purchase of new
capital and housing (qtkEt + qh,thEt ) by bank loans bt and the retained earnings nt. To
derive cEt , use the first order conditions (2.15)-(2.19) and the binding borrowing constraint
based on (2.12):
bt = mh,tEt
[
qh,t+1h
E
t πt+1
Rb,t
]
+mk,tEt
[
qt+1k
E
t (1− δ)πt+1
Rb,t
]
(2.23)
It is proved in Appendix A.1 that due to the assumption of log utility, the entrepreneur’s
consumption in period t is a fixed proportion (1− βE) of net worth nt:
cEt = (1− βE)nt (2.24)
It follows from (2.22) that in the presence of a binding constraint, the real loan demand bt
is the total purchasing cost of new capital and housing in excess of the internal financing
or savings βEnt:
bt = qtkEt + qh,thEt − βEnt (2.25)
where βEnt is the part of net worth that is not consumed and can thus be used to finance
the purchase of physical capital and housing. Note that (2.23) effectively determines
market loan demand due to the binding borrowing constraint and it implies an inverse
relation between the equilibrium loan rate Rb,t and loan quantity bt.9 In particular, for
given (asset) prices qh,t+1, qt+1 and πt+1, a higher loan rate Rb,t corresponds to a lower
loan quantity bt, both directly and indirectly through its effect on the entrepreneur’s
housing and capital demand, hEt and kEt . It is shown in Appendix A.3.1 that
∂hEt
∂Rb,t
< 0
and ∂k
E
t
∂Rb,t
< 0.
Capital Producers
Perfectly competitive capital producers are introduced to derive an explicit expression
for the real price of capital qt (Gambacorta and Signoretti, 2014).10 They purchase
undepreciated capital (1− δ)kt−1 at the real price qt from entrepreneurs and it units of
9With perfect banking competition, Rb,t is given by the gross deposit rate Rt, so bt is determined.
With imperfect banking competition, each individual bank takes into account the effect of its choice on
bt and hence Rb,t.
10In a standard RBC model, the price of physical capital relative to consumption is one. qt is an
important variable here because it can affect the entrepreneur’s collateral value and net worth.
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final consumption goods from retailers to produce new capital kt at the end of period t:
kt = it + (1− δ)kt−1 (2.26)
where it is also gross investment. The new capital produced will be sold back to the
entrepreneur at the real price qt, which will be used in the production of the wholesale
good in period t+ 1. Following Christiano et al. (2005), assume capital producers face
investment adjustment costs that depend on the gross growth rate of investment it
it−1
.
Assume old capital can be converted one-to-one into new capital and a quadratic unit
investment adjustment cost f
(
it
it−1
)
= χ2
(
it
it−1
− 1
)2
is only incurred in the production of
new capital when using the final consumption good as the input, where f(1) = f ′(1) = 0,
f ′′(1) > 0 and χ > 0. This specification of the adjustment cost implies that fewer units
of new capital would be produced from one unit of investment whenever it
it−1
deviates
from its steady state value of one and the parameter χ reflects the magnitude of the cost.
Hence, the representative capital producer chooses the gross investment level it to
maximize the sum of the expected discounted future profits made from the sales revenue
of new capital qtkt net of the input cost [qt(1− δ)kt−1+ it] and the investment adjustment
cost f
(
it
it−1
)
it:
Et
∞∑
s=0
Λt,t+s
qtkt − qt(1− δ)kt−1 − it − χ2
(
it
it−1
− 1
)2
it
 (2.27)
where Λt,t+s ≡ βs u′(ct+s)u′(ct) is the stochastic discount factor, since households own the capital
producers. Using (2.26), the objective function (2.27) can be simplified to:
Et
∞∑
s=0
Λt,t+s
(qt − 1)it − χ2
(
it
it−1
− 1
)2
it
 (2.28)
Taking the first order condition with respect to investment it gives the following expression
for the real price of capital:
qt = 1 +
χ
2
(
it
it−1
− 1
)2
+ χ it
it−1
(
it
it−1
− 1
)
− χEt
[
Λt,t+1
(
it+1
it
)2 (it+1
it
− 1
)]
(2.29)
In the steady state, the real price of capital q is one, since it+1 = it = it−1. Any real
profits ΠCPt (which only arise outside the steady state) are rebated to the households,
where ΠCPt = (qt − 1)it − χ2
(
it
it−1
− 1
)2
it.
Retailers
Following Bernanke et al. (1999), retailers are assumed to be monopolistically competitive.
A continuum of retailers of unit mass, indexed by j, buy the wholesale good at a nominal
price pw,t from entrepreneurs and use it as the only input to produce differentiated retail
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goods costlessly. Assume that one unit of the wholesale good can produce one unit of the
differentiated product, so the marginal cost of production is the real price of the wholesale
good pw,t
pt
. Each retailer j produces a different variety yt(j) and charges a nominal price
pt(j) for the differentiated product. The output of the final consumption good yt is a
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) composite of all the different varieties produced
by the retailers, using the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) framework:
yt =
[∫ 1
0
yt(j)
ϵ−1
ϵ dj
] ϵ
ϵ−1
(2.30)
where ϵ > 1 is the elasticity of intratemporal substitution between different varieties.
Given the aggregate output index yt, it can be calculated from the cost minimization
problem of the buyers of the final consumption good that each retailer j faces a downward-
sloping demand curve:
yt(j) =
[
pt(j)
pt
]−ϵ
yt (2.31)
It can be shown that the aggregate consumption-based price index is:
pt =
[∫ 1
0
pt(j)1−ϵdj
] 1
1−ϵ
(2.32)
which is defined as the minimum expenditure to obtain one unit of consumption yt in the
cost minimization problem for the final output users.
Under monopolistic competition, retailers have price setting power, which is essential
for introducing the nominal price rigidity à la Calvo (1983). With a nominal rigidity,
monetary policy has real effects and the impact of a monetary policy shock can be
analysed. Each retailer j sets its own price pt(j) taking the aggregate price pt and the
demand curve (2.31) as given. Under Calvo pricing, each retailer j is only allowed to
change its price pt(j) in period t with probability (1 − θ). The probability of price
adjustment is independent of the time since the last adjustment, so in each period, a
fraction (1− θ) of retailers reset their prices, whereas a fraction θ of retailers keep their
prices fixed. Hence, θ ∈ (0, 1) reflects the degree of price stickiness. Let p∗t (j) denote
the optimal reset price in period t, then the corresponding demand facing retailer j who
adjusted its price in period t, but cannot adjust its price in period t+ s, is:
y∗t+s(j) =
[
p∗t (j)
pt+s
]−ϵ
yt+s (2.33)
Retailer j chooses p∗t (j) to maximize the expected discounted value of real profits while
its price is kept fixed at p∗t (j):
∞∑
s=0
θsEt
[
Λt,t+s
{
p∗t (j)
pt+s
y∗t+s(j)−
1
xt+s
y∗t+s(j)
}]
(2.34)
17
subject to the demand function (2.33), where Λt,t+s ≡ βs u′(ct+s)u′(ct) is the stochastic discount
factor, since households own the retailers, θs is the probability that p∗t (j) would remain
fixed for s periods, and 1
xt+s
= pw,t+s
pt+s
is the price of the wholesale good in terms of the
consumption units or the real marginal cost of production in period t+ s. Taking the
first order condition to solve for p∗t (j) gives the following optimal pricing equation:
p∗t (j) =
ϵ
ϵ− 1
∑∞
s=0(βθ)sEt
[
u′(ct+s)x−1t+spϵt+syt+s
]
∑∞
s=0(βθ)sEt
[
u′(ct+s)pϵ−1t+syt+s
] (2.35)
The derivation is shown in Appendix A.2.1. In a symmetric equilibrium, all the retailers
that adjust their prices in period t will set the same optimal price, such that p∗t (j) = p∗t .
It is proved in Appendix A.2.2 that the aggregate price level evolves as follows:
p1−ϵt = θp1−ϵt−1 + (1− θ)(p∗t )1−ϵ (2.36)
which is independent of the heterogeneity of the retailers due to the convenience of the
Calvo assumption. With randomly chosen price-adjusting retailers and the large number
of retailers, there is no need to keep track of each retailer’s price evolution.
Since there is a one-to-one conversion rate from the wholesale good to the differentiated
retail good, in equilibrium the supply of wholesale good output yw,t is equal to the demand
yt(j) over the entire unit interval of retailers j. Using retailer j′s individual demand
function (2.31), the wholesale good output can be expressed as:
yw,t =
∫ 1
0
yt(j)dj = yt
∫ 1
0
[
pt(j)
pt
]−ϵ
dj (2.37)
As seen from the above equation, the final consumption good output yt differs from
the wholesale good output yw,t by a factor of the price dispersion
∫ 1
0
[
pt(j)
pt
]−ϵ
dj. In a
zero-inflation steady state, the price dispersion is one and the final output yt would equal
the wholesale good output yw,t. Use (2.37) and let f3,t ≡ ∫ 10 [pt(j)pt ]−ϵ dj denote the price
dispersion, then the real profit ΠRt made by the retailers is:
ΠRt = yt −
yw,t
xt
=
(
1
f3,t
− 1
xt
)
yw,t (2.38)
which will be rebated lump sum back to the households. The recursive formulation of
the price dispersion used for numerical computation and the derivation for ΠRt are shown
in Appendix A.2.3.
Banking Sector
Assume there is a continuum of banks of mass one, indexed by j, which are perfectly
competitive with no price-setting power. The gross nominal interest rate Rt is controlled
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by the central bank and is thus taken as given. Following Andrés and Arce (2012),
assume all bank profits ΠBt (j) are distributed as dividends to households each period, so
ΠBt =
∑
j ΠBt (j). In addition, assume there is zero bank capital, so bank loans (assets)
equal the deposits (liabilities):
bt(j) = dt(j) (2.39)
In each period t, the total outflow of funds, consisting of the dividend payment to
households ΠBt (j), loans granted to firms bt(j), and the gross real deposit interest
payments to households Rt−1dt−1(j)
πt
, equals the total inflow of funds from the deposits
saved by households dt(j) and the gross real loan interest payments received from firms
Rb,t−1bt−1(j)
πt
. Assuming costless financial intermediation and no default on loans,11 each
bank j faces the following budget constraint:
ΠBt (j) + bt(j) +
Rt−1dt−1(j)
πt
= dt(j) +
Rb,t−1bt−1(j)
πt
(2.40)
Each bank j chooses the units of loans bt(j) and the units of deposits dt(j) to maximize
the sum of the expected discounted value of real profits:
Et
∞∑
s=0
Λt,t+sΠBt (j) (2.41)
subject to the balance sheet identity (2.39) and the budget constraint in real terms (2.40).
Substituting (2.39) into (2.40) simplifies the bank’s real profit ΠBt (j) to:
ΠBt (j) =
1
πt
(Rb,t−1 −Rt−1)bt−1(j) (2.42)
Taking the first order condition of (2.41) with respect to bt(j) gives:
Et
[
Λt,t+1
1
πt+1
(Rb,t −Rt)
]
= 0 (2.43)
Since Λt,t+1 > 0 and πt+1 ≡ pt+1pt > 0, the nominal loan interest margin (Rb,t − Rt) is
zero. With perfect banking competition and no expected default on loans, the market-
determined gross nominal loan rate Rb,t equals Rt.
Central Bank
Suppose monetary policy is implemented by a Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing,
which responds to both the deviation of the gross inflation rate from the inflation target
π and the deviation of output from its steady state y. The central bank controls the
gross nominal interest rate Rt on risk-free bonds and bank deposits, following the Taylor
11Recall that this paper neglects the possibility of loan default since it is extremely unlikely under
reasonable calibration, as discussed in Section 2.2.1.
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rule specification below:
Rt = ρrRt−1 + (1− ρr) [R + κπ(πt − π) + κy (yt − y)] + er,t (2.44)
where variables without time subscript represent steady state values, and er,t is a monetary
policy shock which is a white noise process with zero mean and variance σ2r . The coefficient
ρr ∈ (0, 1) is the interest rate smoothing parameter, and κπ and κy are non-negative
feedback parameters that reflect the sensitivity of the interest rate to output and inflation
deviations. In the baseline analysis, I set κy to be zero for simplicity.12 Due to interest
rate smoothing, this policy rule implies a partial adjustment of Rt. As can be seen from
(2.44), Rt is a weighted average of the lagged nominal interest rate Rt−1 and the current
target rate, which depends positively on the deviation of inflation from its target and the
deviation of output from its steady state value. Let Rr,t denote the gross real interest
rate, then the relation between the nominal and real interest rates is given by the Fisher
equation:
Rr,t = Et
[
Rt
πt+1
]
(2.45)
2.2.2 Imperfect Banking Competition
Imperfect banking competition is analysed by replacing the perfectly competitive banking
sector by a Cournot banking sector. As the banking sector tends to be dominated by a few
large players, a Cournot banking sector is used to characterise oligopolistic competition.
In a Cournot equilibrium, banks’ quantity-setting decisions affect the market loan rate.
The model set-up is unchanged apart from the banking sector which is now imperfectly
competitive. Only the differences from Section 2.2.1 are discussed here. Assume now there
are N banks in the economy, indexed by j, which operate under Cournot competition.
Each individual bank takes the quantities of loans chosen by the other banks m ̸= j
as given. However, it takes into account the effect of its choice bt(j) on the (partial)
equilibrium in the loan market, through the total loan quantity bt and the loan rate Rb,t,
but it ignores general equilibrium effects and takes other prices and aggregate quantities
as given.13 Each bank j sets the quantity of loans bt(j) to maximize the sum of the
present discounted value of future profits:
Et
∞∑
s=0
Λt,t+sΠBt (j) (2.46)
12When κy = 0, the Taylor principle implies that κπ > 1 will ensure the nominal interest rate Rt is
raised sufficiently in response to an increase in the gross inflation rate πt so that the real interest rate
rises.
13Using (2.23), the effect of Rb,t on bt includes the effect through capital kEt and housing hEt , taking
the inflation rate πt+1 and the real prices of housing qh,t+1 and capital qt+1 as given.
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where
ΠBt (j) =
1
πt
Rb,t−1
bt−1(j) + ∑
m̸=j
bt−1(m)
−Rt−1
 bt−1(j) (2.47)
The real profit ΠBt (j) is positive due to imperfect competition and will be rebated back
to the households. A key difference from Section 2.2.1 is that Rb,t(.) now represents the
inverse loan demand function, which depends on bt and thereby bt(j). This is crucial for
introducing imperfect banking competition. The dependence of Rb,t on bt(j) means that
each bank j has some control over the equilibrium gross loan interest rate by altering
its own quantity of loans given the other banks’ loan quantities and this is taken into
consideration by bank j under Cournot competition when choosing bt(j). Solving the
profit maximization problem with respect to bt(j) gives the following first order condition:
Et
[
Λt,t+1
1
πt+1
{
∂Rb,t
∂bt(j)
bt(j) +Rb,t −Rt
}]
= 0 (2.48)
In a Cournot equilibrium, the total optimal loan quantity is bt = bt(j) +
∑
m ̸=j bt(m) and
each bank produces a share of the total quantity. Assuming banks are identical, then
bt(j) = btN in equilibrium. Since
∂Rb,t
∂bt(j) =
∂Rb,t
∂bt
∂bt
∂bt(j) =
∂Rb,t
∂bt
, in Cournot equilibrium, the
first order condition (2.48) can be rewritten as:
Et
[
Λt,t+1
1
πt+1
{
∂Rb,t
∂bt
bt
N
+Rb,t −Rt
}]
= 0 (2.49)
where the market loan demand bt and the partial derivative ∂Rb,t∂bt can be calculated
explicitly from the representative entrepreneur’s problem in Section 2.2.1.14 The market
loan demand is given by the binding collateral constraint (2.23). As can be seen from
(2.23), Rb,t has a direct negative effect on market loan demand bt since an increase in Rb,t
reduces the entrepreneur’s borrowing capacity. Besides, Rb,t also has an indirect effect
on bt by influencing the entrepreneur’s demand for housing and physical capital, which
can be seen from the first order conditions for housing (2.19) and physical capital (2.18).
Hence, when bank j chooses bt(j), which affects the equilibrium gross loan rate Rb,t under
Cournot competition, it needs to consider how entrepreneurs would respond by changing
their demand for physical capital ∂k
E
t
∂Rb,t
and housing ∂h
E
t
∂Rb,t
. Taking the total derivative of
bt in (2.23) with respect to Rb,t and using (2.23) to simplify:
∂bt
∂Rb,t
= − bt
Rb,t
+mh,tEt
[
qh,t+1πt+1
Rb,t
]
∂hEt
∂Rb,t
+mk,tEt
[
qt+1(1− δ)πt+1
Rb,t
]
∂kEt
∂Rb,t
< 0 (2.50)
It is shown in Appendix A.3.1 that the partial derivatives ∂h
E
t
∂Rb,t
< 0 and ∂k
E
t
∂Rb,t
< 0 can be
calculated from the first order conditions (2.19) and (2.18) and have negative signs, which
14In equilibrium, the total supply of loans from the Cournot banking sector equals the market loan
demand (2.23) from the entrepreneur’s problem.
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means an increase in Rb,t reduces the entrepreneur’s demand for housing and physical
capital. In addition, Appendix A.3.1 shows that these partial derivatives ( ∂h
E
t
∂Rb,t
and ∂k
E
t
∂Rb,t
)
only depend on period t variables and expectations, and therefore so do ∂bt
∂Rb,t
using (2.50)
and the loan demand elasticity PEDt ≡ − ∂bt∂Rb,t
Rb,t
bt
. Since Λt,t+1 > 0 and πt+1 ≡ pt+1pt > 0,
(2.49) implies that
(
∂Rb,t
∂bt
bt
Rb,t
1
N
+ 1
)
Rb,t = Rt. It follows that the equilibrium loan rate
depends on the policy rate Rt, the number of banks N , and the price elasticity of loan
demand PEDt ≡ − ∂bt∂Rb,t
Rb,t
bt
> 0:
Rb,t =
1
1− 1
N
PED−1t
Rt (2.51)
As can be seen, a larger number of banks N (implying more intense banking competition)
and/or a higher loan demand elasticity PEDt lead to a lower loan rate. With perfect
banking competition, each bank faces a perfectly elastic loan demand, so NPEDt →∞
and Rb,t = Rt, although the market loan demand given by (2.23) is downward-sloping,
as shown in Appendix A.3.2. With Cournot competition, banks with market power
can affect the equilibrium loan rate by taking advantage of the endogenously changing
loan demand elasticity. After an adverse shock, the entrepreneur is more financially
constrained and hence the loan demand becomes more inelastic (i.e., PEDt falls), leading
to a higher loan rate and higher loan interest margin (Rb,t −Rt) for a given level of Rt.
This countercyclical loan interest margin can amplify aggregate fluctuations.
As the change in loan demand elasticity determines how the loan margin responds
to shocks, it is important to understand what determines the elasticity. It is shown in
Appendix A.3.2 that the price elasticity of the market loan demand PEDt decreases (more
inelastic loan demand) when the expected marginal products of capital and housing are
higher and/or the expected future prices of capital and housing are lower. This is because
in the presence of a binding collateral constraint, higher expected marginal products imply
that the entrepreneur is more financially constrained and cannot finance the purchase
of the optimal amount of production inputs (capital and housing). Lower expected
asset prices directly reduce the entrepreneur’s borrowing capacity through the binding
constraint (2.23). Hence, both higher expected marginal products and lower expected
asset prices imply that the entrepreneur is more financially constrained and hence the
loan demand is more inelastic. Besides, PEDt is also decreasing in the pledgeability
ratios mh,t and mk,t (e.g., after a negative collateral shock), as shown in Appendix A.3.2.
A lower pledgeability ratio directly reduces the entrepreneur’s borrowing capacity, leading
to a more inelastic loan demand. A lower borrowing capacity also raises the expected
marginal products of capital and housing and reduces the expected asset prices due to a
lower demand for capital and housing, thus further reducing the loan demand elasticity.
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2.2.3 Equilibrium Conditions
In equilibrium, the aggregate resource constraint is:
ct + cEt + it +
χ
2
(
it
it−1
− 1
)2
it = yt (2.52)
which is also the goods market clearing condition. Let bBt and dBt denote the total units of
loans given out and deposits taken in by the banking sector, respectively. Under perfect
banking competition with a continuum of banks of unit mass, bBt =
∫ 1
0 bt(j)dj and dBt =∫ 1
0 dt(j)dj, while with a Cournot banking sector, bBt =
∑N
j=1 bt(j) and dBt =
∑N
j=1 dt(j) in
equilibrium. The other market clearing conditions are: (labor) lt = lEt , (capital) kt = kEt ,
(housing) ht + hEt = 1, where the total fixed supply of housing is normalised to one,
(deposits) dt = dBt , (loans) bt = bBt , and (financial intermediation) bBt = dBt .
2.3 Calibration
The models with two types of banking competition are solved numerically using Dynare
after calibrating the parameters to a quarterly frequency. Using the ECB’s harmonized
monetary financial institutions’ (MFI) interest rates from 2000 to 2018, the average
annualised household deposit rate is around 2.16%. Hence, the household subjective
discount factor β, is set at 0.995, giving an annualised net real deposit rate of
(
1
0.995 − 1
)
∗
4 ≈ 2%. The subjective discount factor for the entrepreneur βE = 0.97 is taken from
Andrés and Arce (2012). As shown in Section 2.2.1, the subjective discount factor for
entrepreneurs βE needs to be smaller than β, to ensure a binding collateral constraint in
the steady state. When imperfect banking competition is introduced into the framework of
collateral constraints, the restriction to ensure a binding borrowing constraint is no longer
βE < β, because the loan interest margin is greater than zero. Since λE2 = 1cE
(
1− βE Rb
π
)
and R
π
= 1
β
, as shown by equations (2.20) and (2.7), λE2 = 1cE
(
1− βE
β
Rb
R
)
. Hence, as long
as Rb
R
< β
βE
under imperfect banking competition, λE2 will be positive, which means the
borrowing constraint will bind in the steady state (Andrés and Arce, 2012). As a result,
when replacing the perfectly competitive banking sector with the Cournot banking sector,
the ratio of gross nominal loan rate to gross nominal deposit rate in the steady state Rb
R
must satisfy the following condition:
1 6 Rb
R
<
β
βE
(2.53)
where the first inequality comes from the nonnegativity of bank profits. The upper bound
β
βE
imposes a limit on the size of the loan margin, which is around 10 percent points for
an annualised loan interest margin under the calibration for β and βE.
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Standard parameters such as the physical capital share α, the depreciation rate δ, and
the elasticity of substitution among differentiated retail goods ϵ are chosen to be 0.33,
0.025, and 6, respectively. The gross inflation target π is set at 1. In this zero-inflation
steady state, ϵ = 6 implies a final good price markup over the wholesale good of 20%
since x = ϵ
ϵ−1 . Given the above parameters, the relative utility weight on leisure time φl
is set at 1.45 to achieve steady state labor hours l of around 0.33. The relative utility
weight on the holdings of real estate for households, φh = 0.1, and the real estate share
of the wholesale good output, v = 0.05, are taken from Andrés and Arce (2012) to
achieve hE = 0.22 under perfect banking competition in the steady state. The investment
adjustment cost parameter χ does not affect the steady state and is set at 10, which is
in line with Gerali et al. (2010). A larger χ reduces the magnitude of the responses of
investment and physical capital after shocks.15
The probability θ of retailers keeping prices fixed in each period, the parameters in
the Taylor rule and the shock-related parameters are in line with the literature (e.g.,
Andrés and Arce, 2012; Gerali et al., 2010). The probability θ is set at 0.75 to give a
price rigidity of 11−0.75 = 4 quarters on average. The interest rate smoothing parameter
ρr and the feedback coefficient on inflation κπ are specified to be 0.8 and 1.5, respectively.
The feedback coefficient on output κy is set to zero in the baseline analysis to simplify
the Taylor rule. I also use different calibrations for ρr, κπ and κy as robustness checks.
The persistence parameters of the productivity shock ψ, the loan to value ratio shocks
ψmh and ψmk are 0.97, 0.8 and 0.8, respectively. Besides, the standard deviation of the
monetary policy shock σr is 0.001 and the standard deviations of the productivity shock
σz, and the collateral shocks σmh and σmk are all set to be 0.01.
The steady-state loan-to-value ratios for housing and physical capital are chosen to
be mh = 0.8 and mk = 0.5 respectively. The calibration for mh is within the range set in
the literature (e.g., Andrés and Arce, 2012; Gerali et al., 2010; Iacoviello, 2005). Note
that mk is set at a smaller value than mh because physical capital often has a lower
resale value than real estate. Given mh = 0.8, mk = 0.5, β = 0.995, βE = 0.97, α = 0.33,
v = 0.05 and δ = 0.025, the number of banks N is set to 4 to get a steady-state gross loan
rate Rb of 1.01, implying an annualised net real loan rate of (1.01− 1)∗ 4 ≈ 4% and a real
loan margin of around 200 basis points. This matches the average annualised corporate
loan rate of around 4.14% and the loan interest margin of around 198 basis points across
EU countries over the past 19 years, using the ECB’s harmonized monetary financial
institutions’ (MFI) interest rates from 2000 to 2018. The annualised loan interest margin
of around 2 percent points satisfies the condition Rb
R
∈ [1, β
βE
), and hence the borrowing
constraint is binding in the steady state with a Cournot banking sector. A summary of
the calibrated parameters is shown in Table A.1 in Appendix A.4. Given the calibration
15This is discussed in Section 2.5 and the impulse responses under different calibrations for χ are
shown in Figure A.8 in Appendix A.6.
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in this Section, the steady state values of the key variables are summarised in Table A.2
in Appendix A.4.
Figure 2.2: Steady State Values for Different Number of Banks
Note: The figure shows the steady state values of variables, with the loan margin expressed in percent
points, for different number of banks N ranging from 1 to 100. The calibration for the other parameters
can be found in Table A.1 in Appendix A.4. The second row plots the elasticities of loan demand,
capital demand and housing demand to the loan rate, for different values of N . The leverage ratio is
computed as the value of total assets (qkE + qhhE) over net worth n. The partial leverage ratios for
capital bkb ≡ mk qk
E(1−δ)π
Rbb
and housing bhb ≡ mh qhh
E(1−δ)π
Rbb
reflect the fractions of total borrowing
against the capital and housing collateral, respectively, where bk + bh = 1.
Figure 2.2 plots the steady state values for some variables against the number of
banks N that ranges from 1 to 100. A higher N implies more intense competition. When
there is a monopoly bank, the annualised loan margin is around 1200*4 = 4800 basis
points. Only in this case will the borrowing constraint not be binding. As can be seen,
as N increases, the loan margin (Rb −R) approaches zero and output increases. Besides,
a lower loan rate raises the borrowing capacity of the entrepreneur through the binding
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collateral constraint (2.23). As a result, the leverage ratio rises and as the entrepreneur
is less financially constrained, the loan demand elasticity PED is also higher.
One interesting aspect to notice is that the steady state capital-to-housing ratio
falls when the loan rate declines as the number of banks N rises. Using the first order
conditions (2.18) and (2.19), the steady state capital-to-housing ratio is:
kE
hE
=
αqh
[
1− βE −mh
(
π
Rb
− βE
)]
vq
[
1− βE(1− δ)−mk(1− δ)
(
π
Rb
− βE
)] = αRh
vRk
(2.54)
where Rh ≡ 1βE qh
[
1− βE −mh
(
π
Rb
− βE
)]
equals the marginal product of housing vyw
xhE
and Rk ≡ 1βE q
[
1− βE(1− δ)−mk(1− δ)
(
π
Rb
− βE
)]
equals the marginal product of
capital αyw
xk
in terms of the final good. If the collateral constraint were nonbinding in
the steady state, λE2 in (2.20) would equal zero and thereby
(
π
Rb
− βE
)
= 0, resulting
in a capital-to-housing ratio kE
hE
= αqh(1−β
E)
vq[1−βE(1−δ)] . But when the collateral constraint is
binding, as for the calibration in this paper, it can be shown that the capital-to-housing
ratio falls as the loan rate decreases if Rk
Rh
> mkq(1−δ)
mhqh
. This condition is satisfied if mh
is sufficiently large compared to mk because (2.54) shows that a higher mh relative to
mk reduces the user cost of housing Rh relative to that of capital Rk. Intuitively, for
a given reduction in loan rate as banking competition becomes more intense, a higher
hE relaxes the binding collateral constraint (2.23) more than capital as mh > mk. As a
result, the entrepreneur devotes more of the additional borrowing to housing, and the
capital-to-housing ratio falls as the loan rate declines. This is also reflected by the higher
elasticity of the entrepreneur’s housing demand to the loan rate, as shown in Figure 2.2.
2.4 Dynamic Analysis
The impulse responses of some key variables under the two types of banking competition
are compared after a contractionary monetary policy shock, a negative productivity shock
and collateral or macroprudential policy shocks to the pledgeability ratios mk and mh.
The model is solved numerically using Dynare, in which the impulse response functions
(IRFs) are computed as the deviation in the trajectory of a variable from its steady state
value following a shock at the beginning of period 1. This nonlinear model is solved using
a first-order Taylor approximation around the steady state and the responses of variables
are expressed as the percentage deviations from the steady state. All the equations used
to compute the model are shown in Appendix A.5.
2.4.1 Monetary Policy Shock
An unexpected one-time monetary policy shock is implemented by a one standard
deviation (σr = 0.001) or 10 basis points increase in the white noise term er,t in the
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Figure 2.3: Impulse Responses to a Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock
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Note: Horizontal axis shows quarters after a contractionary monetary policy shock of 10 basis points
that occurs at the beginning of period 1. Vertical axis shows the percentage deviation from the steady
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entrepreneur’s loan demand to the loan rate.
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Taylor rule at the beginning of period 1, so that the gross nominal deposit rate (policy
rate) Rt is raised.
As can be seen from Figure 2.3, after a contractionary monetary policy shock, the
responses of output, consumption, investment and physical capital tend to be amplified
under imperfect banking competition. Following Andrés and Arce (2012), there are three
relevant channels through which a monetary policy shock can affect this model economy:
the traditional interest rate channel, the endogenous loan interest margin, and the net
worth effect.
The interest rate channel works in a standard way via sticky prices. When a contrac-
tionary monetary shock raises the gross nominal interest rate Rt, the gross real interest
rate also rises due to price rigidity. The increase in the real deposit rate reduces con-
sumption via household intertemporal substitution. However, there is little difference in
the response of the real deposit rate for the two types of banking competition, indicating
that this channel is not very important in explaining the amplified responses of output
and consumption under imperfect banking competition.
The amplification effect can be explained by the rise in the real loan interest margin.
With perfect banking competition, the loan interest margin is zero, hence households
and entrepreneurs face the same real interest rate. A higher real loan rate after the
contractionary monetary policy shock directly increases the tightness of the binding
collateral constraint (2.23). Besides, a higher real loan rate reduces the demand for
physical capital and housing and thus their prices, leading to a lower value of collateralised
assets and a further tightening of the binding constraint by reducing the entrepreneur’s
borrowing capacity. As a result, the Lagrange multiplier λE2,t rises by around 15% under
perfect banking competition, indicating that the binding collateral constraint (2.23)
tightens, as can be seen in Figure 2.3. This implies that the entrepreneur is more
financially constrained and hence the loan demand becomes more inelastic. As can be
seen from Figure 2.3, the elasticity of the market loan demand to the loan rate (PED) falls
by more than 5%. With perfect banking competition, although the market loan demand
becomes more inelastic, each individual bank faces a perfectly elastic loan demand and
cannot affect the equilibrium loan rate. By contrast, with Cournot banking competition,
each bank has market power and takes advantage of this reduction in loan demand
elasticity by reducing the quantity of loans to achieve a higher equilibrium loan rate.
Because of this joint effect between banks’ market power and the time-varying market
loan demand elasticity PEDt, the real loan rate rises further above that under perfect
banking competition and the real loan margin increases by 5 basis points on impact, as
can be seen from Figure 2.3. The higher real loan interest rate reduces the entrepreneur’s
demand for housing and physical capital and their prices by more, thus tightening the
binding constraint even further. As shown in Figure 2.3, the Lagrange multiplier λE2,t
rises by around 25% under imperfect banking competition.
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The net worth effect tends to reinforce the amplification effect arising from the
countercyclical real loan margin. With both types of banking competition, the fall in net
worth after a contractionary monetary policy shock reduces entrepreneur’s borrowing
capacity and hence their demand for housing and physical capital. This depresses the
real prices of housing and physical capital, and further reduces entrepreneur’s net worth
and their access to external financing, leading to a further fall in demand. This net
worth effect is stronger under imperfect banking competition due to a larger fall in
entrepreneur’s net worth, as shown in Figure 2.3, which is likely due to a larger increase
in the real loan rate and a larger fall in asset prices under imperfect banking competition.
2.4.2 Productivity Shock
After a one-standard-deviation negative productivity shock at the beginning of period 1,
the responses of output, investment and physical capital are slightly amplified, which can
be explained by the countercyclical loan interest margin and the net worth effect.
As discussed in Section 2.4.1, the rise in the real loan margin is due to the joint effect
of banks’ market power and the decreasing loan demand elasticity. Falling asset prices
after the negative productivity shock reduce entrepreneurs’ borrowing capacity and make
them more financially constrained, thus resulting in more inelastic loan demand (PED
falls), as can be seen from Figure 2.4. With imperfect banking competition, banks have
market power and take advantage of the lower loan demand elasticity by reducing their
loan quantities to achieve a higher equilibrium loan rate.
The net worth effect reinforces the amplification effect arising from the countercyclical
loan margin. As discussed in Section 2.4.1, a lower net worth reduces the entrepreneur’s
borrowing capacity and hence their demand for physical capital and housing, which then
depresses the asset prices and thereby further reduces the entrepreneur’s net worth. With
imperfect banking competition, the net worth effect is stronger as the fall in asset prices
is larger (due to the countercyclical loan margin that reduces the entrepreneur’s demand
for housing and capital by more) and thereby the fall in the entrepreneur’s net worth is
greater, as shown in Figure 2.4.
Despite the countercyclical real loan margin and the net worth effect, the amplification
effect of imperfect banking competition is weaker after the negative productivity shock.
This is likely because of a debt-deflation effect. A negative productivity shock is a negative
supply shock, so it is inflationary and the real loan rate falls due to the higher inflation,
which is the main difference from the contractionary monetary policy shock.
Asset prices still decline after the negative productivity shock, which reduces the
entrepreneur’s borrowing capacity. But the real loan rate now falls, which tends to improve
the entrepreneur’s borrowing capacity. As a result, after the negative productivity shock,
the tightness of the binding borrowing constraint increases to a lesser extent.16
16Note that one cannot compare the values of λE2,t between the productivity shock and the monetary
policy shock. But notice that although both are one-standard-deviation shocks, the reduction in output
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Figure 2.4: Impulse Responses to a Negative Productivity Shock
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Note: Horizontal axis shows quarters after a one-standard-deviation negative productivity shock that
occurs at the beginning of period 1. Vertical axis shows the percentage deviation from the steady state
for variables other than the interest rates and the loan margin, which are expressed in deviations from
the steady state in percent points. The blue dashed line corresponds to perfect banking competition.
The pink solid line corresponds to imperfect banking competition. Leverage ratio is computed as total
asset value (qkE + qhhE) over net worth n and PED denotes the elasticity of the entrepreneur’s loan
demand to the loan rate.
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2.4.3 Collateral or Macroprudential Policy Shocks
This section investigates the shocks to the pledgeability ratios, mh and mk, which
can be interpreted as either collateral shocks or macroprudential policy shocks. These
collateral shocks are supply-side shocks, as they directly affect the supply of credit to the
entrepreneur and thereby the supply of output. Therefore, they tend to reduce output
but increase inflation.
Negative Shock to mh
After a one-standard-deviation (σmh = 0.01) negative mh shock at the beginning of
period 1, the responses of output, investment and physical capital are all amplified under
imperfect banking competition, which can be explained by the countercyclical real loan
margin and the net worth effect. The mechanisms are similar to the negative productivity
shock, as both are negative supply shocks. However, there are two main differences from
the negative productivity shock.
First, the amplification effect is larger compared to that after the negative productivity
shock because of the exogenous reduction in the pledgeability ratio mh that directly
reduces the fraction of the housing collateral that can be borrowed against and thereby
lowers the entrepreneur’s borrowing capacity through the binding collateral constraint
(2.23). The decrease in mh,t makes the entrepreneur more financially constrained and thus
reduces the loan demand elasticity. Although the negative shock to mh is also inflationary,
which tends to reduce the real debt burden and improve the entrepreneur’s borrowing
capacity, this debt-deflation effect is dominated by the effect of a lower pledgeability ratio
mh that directly reduces the borrowing capacity.
Second, the reduction in output after the negative shock to mh is much smaller. This
is because the pledgeability ratio affects the output only indirectly through the supply of
credit, unlike the negative productivity shock that directly lowers the output.
Negative Shock to mk
In response to a one-standard-deviation (σmk = 0.01) negative mk shock at the beginning
of period 1, imperfect banking competition is again found to amplify aggregate fluctuations,
which can be explained by the countercyclical real loan margin and the net worth effect,
as discussed in Section 2.4.2. The two differences from the negative productivity shock are
the same as discussed for the negative shock to mh. More specifically, the amplification
effect after the negative shock to mk is stronger since the lower pledgeability ratio directly
reduces the entrepreneur’s borrowing capacity and the magnitude of the output response
is smaller since mk only has an indirect effect on output through the supply of credit.
after the negative productivity shock is twice as large while the response for λE2,t is similar compared to
those after the contractionary monetary policy shock .
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Figure 2.5: Impulse Responses to a Negative mh Shock
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Note: Horizontal axis shows quarters after a one-standard-deviation negative shock to mh that occurs at
the beginning of period 1. Vertical axis shows the percentage deviation from the steady state for
variables other than the interest rates and the loan margin, which are expressed in deviations from the
steady state in percent points. The blue dashed line corresponds to perfect banking competition. The
pink solid line corresponds to imperfect banking competition. Leverage ratio is computed as total asset
value (qkE + qhhE) over net worth n and PED denotes the elasticity of the entrepreneur’s loan demand
to the loan rate.
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Figure 2.6: Impulse Responses to a Negative mk Shock
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Note: Horizontal axis shows quarters after a one-standard-deviation negative shock to mk that occurs at
the beginning of period 1. Vertical axis shows the percentage deviation from the steady state for
variables other than the interest rates and the loan margin, which are expressed in deviations from the
steady state in percent points. The blue dashed line corresponds to perfect banking competition. The
pink solid line corresponds to imperfect banking competition. Leverage ratio is computed as total asset
value (qkE + qhhE) over net worth n and PED denotes the elasticity of the entrepreneur’s loan demand
to the loan rate.
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However, the two types of collateral shocks are asymmetric and hence the impulse
responses between the negative shocks to mk and mh are different.17 As can be seen
from Figure 2.5 and 2.6, the amplification effect after the negative shock to mk is slightly
stronger. This is because the standard deviations for both types of shocks are assumed
to be the same. Since the steady state value of mk is smaller than mh, a one-standard-
deviation shock leads to a larger proportional drop in mk than mh, which leads to a
larger reduction in the entrepreneur’s borrowing capacity. As a result, the entrepreneur
becomes more financially constrained and thereby loan demand is more inelastic, leading
to a slightly larger increase in the loan interest margin and thus the amplification effect.
2.5 Sensitivity Analysis
I check the robustness of the results by changing the number of banks N , the parameters
in the Taylor rule (ρr, κπ, and κy), the steady state pledgeability ratios (mh and mk),
the investment adjustment cost parameter χ, the output elasticity of housing v and the
household preference for housing φh, while each time, all the other variables are calibrated
as in the baseline analysis. This section discusses the sensitivity of the baseline results in
Section 2.4 to these changes of parameters in turn.
Figure 2.7 shows the impulse responses of output, investment, real loan margin and
loan demand elasticity PEDt after four types of shocks when the number of banks N is
two, eight and infinity (i.e., perfect competition). As can be seen, when there are only
two banks, the amplification effect is much larger.18 The real loan margin rises by around
30 basis points after the contractionary monetary policy shock, negative productivity
shock and negative shock to mk, which is almost six times as large compared to the
baseline results with N = 4. Figure 2.7 shows that when N increases to eight, banks’
market power is greatly reduced and the outcome is very similar to the perfect banking
competition benchmark.
The baseline results are robust to eliminating interest rate smoothing by setting
ρr = 0. In this case, the Taylor rule (2.44) reduces to the simplest possible form. As
shown in Figure A.1 in Appendix A.6, the results are very similar to the baseline results
in Section 2.4, apart from the monetary policy shock, after which the magnitude of the
responses under both types of banking competition are much reduced. This is because
the contractionary monetary policy no longer leads to a persistent increase in the nominal
interest rate due to interest rate smoothing, thus reducing the effective size of the shock.
As a result, the effects of the shock are substantially smaller.
17The two types of shocks are asymmetric due to differences in the steady state values of mk and mh,
and the values of the capital share α and housing share v in the production function, as can be seen from
the elasticities of the entrepreneur’s housing demand PEHt (A.56) and capital demand PEKt (A.58) to
the loan rate in Appendix A.3.2. In addition, since housing is inelastically supplied whereas capital can
be adjusted, this gives rise to another source of asymmetry between the two types of shocks.
18When N = 2 (8), the steady state annualised net loan rate is around 10.6% (3.0%).
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Figure 2.7: Impulse Responses for Different Shocks and Number of Banks N
Note: Horizontal axis shows quarters after the shock that occurs at the beginning of period 1. Vertical
axis shows the percentage deviation from the steady state for variables other than interest rates and the
loan margin, which are expressed in deviations from the steady state in percent points. The blue dashed
line corresponds to perfect banking competition. The pink solid line corresponds to imperfect banking
competition. Each row shows the impulse responses of four variables after a given type of shock: a 10
basis-point contractionary monetary policy shock, a one-standard-deviation negative productivity shock,
and one-standard-deviation negative shocks to mh and mk.
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Increasing κπ leads to greater response to the deviation of inflation from its target.
Figure A.2 in Appendix A.6 shows that the fall in output is smaller under both types of
banking competition after the contractionary monetary policy shock that is deflationary,
but larger after the negative productivity shock that is inflationary. In the latter case,
the real loan rate rises more to bring down inflation, causing a larger fall in output.
However, the amplification effect after a productivity shock in the baseline analysis
is not robust to changes in the sensitivity κy of the policy rate to the output gap, for a
given calibration of κπ = 1.5. Figure A.3 in Appendix A.6 shows that when κy = 0.2, the
loan margin actually decreases after a negative productivity shock. This is because after
the negative productivity shock, the fall in output is very large. With κy > 0, the central
bank’s response to the output gap leads to a lower policy rate, and thereby a lower real
loan rate. This makes the entrepreneur less financially constrained and the loan demand
more elastic, causing a slight decline in the loan interest margin in this case.19
The results are robust to calibration for a range of different values for the pledgeability
ratios. Keeping mh = 0.8 as in the baseline calibration, the amplification effect is robust
to varying mk from 0.3 to 0.95, while keeping mk = 0.5 as in the baseline calibration, the
amplification effect is robust to varying mk from around 0.5 to 0.9. In each case, a higher
mk or mh tends to increase the amplification effect. This is because with a higher steady
state value of mh or mk, the effect of changes in the real loan rate, capital, housing and
asset prices on total borrowing is stronger because of the binding collateral constraint
(2.23).20 When mk (mh) is below 0.3 (0.5), the amplification is very weak. Figures A.4
and A.5 in Appendix A.6 show the impulse responses after four different types of shocks
after setting mk and mh to their lower bounds respectively. As can be seen, in each case,
the magnitude of the countercyclical real loan margin is much smaller. The responses of
output after a contractionary monetary policy shock and a negative productivity shock
are only slightly amplified. Intuitively, for a given rise in the loan rate or fall in asset
prices, a higher mk or mh tends to amplify these changes, leading to a greater tightening
of the collateral constraint and thus a larger fall in loan demand elasticity and a greater
rise in the real loan margin.
Increasing the output elasticity of housing v from 0.05 to 0.15 has a larger effect on
output, as shown in Figure A.6 in Appendix A.6. This is because when v is higher, any
reduction in the entrepreneur’s housing after a negative shock has a greater impact on
output due to the production function (2.8). However, the amplification effect is smaller,
because a higher v tends to increase the entrepreneur’s housing-to-capital ratio, which
means housing is used more intensively in the production, and hence the reduction in
the entrepreneur’s housing (one of the collateral assets) is smaller after the negative
19When κy < 0.1, the loan interest margin increases slightly.
20Note that changes in the steady state pledgeability ratio are different from collateral shocks. As
discussed in Section 2.4.3, a negative collateral shock (that reduces the pledgeability ratio) can result
in a lower loan demand elasticity and a countercyclical loan interest margin, which in turn amplifies
aggregate fluctuations.
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shocks. As a result, the entrepreneur’s borrowing capacity is not reduced as much and
the entrepreneur is less constrained compared to the case when v is 0.05, leading to a
smaller fall in the elasticity of loan demand and thereby a smaller magnitude of the
countercyclical real loan margin, as can be seen from Figure A.6.
Changing the parameter of the household’s preference for housing φh from 0.1 to 0.3
changes the steady state allocation of housing between the household and the entrepreneur
and does not affect the impulse responses much, as shown in Figure A.7 in Appendix
A.6. This is because a stronger household’s preference for housing leads to a higher
household’s demand for housing and thereby a higher real price of housing. However, the
entrepreneur’s housing demand is reduced as the total supply of housing is one. These
two opposite effects tend to roughly offset each other, and hence changes in φh have little
impact on the impulse responses.21
The amplification effect is not sensitive to changing the investment adjustment cost
parameter χ. A higher χ mainly reduces the magnitude of the response for investment
and physical capital. As shown in Figure A.8 in Appendix A.6, different values of χ give
very similar responses of output, despite the noticeable differences in the responses of
physical capital. This is because a one percentage reduction of capital from its steady
state only leads to 0.33 (calibration for α is 0.33) percentage reduction of output from its
steady state, given everything else the same.
Finally, one crucial assumption used in this paper is that borrowers are always
financially constrained. Relaxing this assumption will lead to asymmetries between
positive shocks and negative shocks. Starting from a steady state of a binding constraint,
the results after negative shocks remain unchanged as the constraint will become more
tightly binding. By contrast, large enough positive shocks can make the borrower
financially unconstrained initially, leading to a potentially more elastic loan demand and
procyclical loan margin during the initial periods.
2.6 Conclusions
This paper studies the effect of imperfect banking competition on macroeconomic volatility
in a DSGE model embedded with the agency problem that gives rise to the collateral
constraint. I find that in the presence of a binding collateral constraint, imperfect
banking competition tends to amplify the responses of output, investment and physical
capital after a contractionary monetary shock and negative collateral shocks, while this
amplification effect is relatively weak after a negative productivity shock.
The amplification effect can be explained by the countercyclical loan interest margin,
which arises from a joint effect between banks’ market power and the time-varying loan
demand elasticity facing the banks. After an adverse shock, a tightening of the binding
21Note that if the borrowing constraint were nonbinding and the entrepreneur rented housing, then
qh,th
E
t =
vywt
xt
and changes in qh,t and hEt would perfectly offset each other.
37
collateral constraint indicates that the borrowing capacity is reduced and the borrower is
more financially constrained, thus leading to a more inelastic loan demand. Banks with
market power can take advantage of this lower loan demand elasticity by reducing their
loan quantities to achieve a higher equilibrium loan rate, thereby increasing the loan
interest margin. This countercyclical real loan margin has a clear amplification effect on
the response of output after a monetary policy shock and collateral shocks.
The results in this paper suggest that imperfect banking competition tends to be
an important propagation mechanism for macroeconomic shocks especially when the
degree of banking competition is low. This has implications for monetary policy and
macroprudential policy. With imperfect banking competition and a binding collateral
constraint, a contractionary monetary policy that makes borrowers more financially
constrained can have greater impact on the real economy via a countercyclical loan
margin. As a result, when policymakers decide by how much to raise the policy rate, it is
important to factor in the amplification effect from imperfect banking competition.
In addition, the results also have implications for macroprudential policy in the form
of adjustments in loan-to-value (LTV) ratios. The collateral shocks (i.e., shocks to the
steady state pledgeability ratios on housing and physical capital) in this paper resemble
macroprudential policy shocks. In the presence of a binding borrowing constraint,
a temporary reduction in LTV ratio directly reduces the borrowing capacity of the
entrepreneur and makes the entrepreneur more financially constrained, leading to a
more inelastic loan demand and a countercyclical loan margin that amplifies aggregate
fluctuations. Consequently, when changing the LTV ratio for financial stability concerns,
the side effect on macroeconomic volatility should not be neglected.
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Chapter 3
Imperfect Banking Competition and
Financial Stability
3.1 Introduction
Does banking competition jeopardize financial stability? Understanding how banking
competition affects financial stability provides crucial guidance on choosing the most
effective macroprudential policy tools. Despite its importance, the relationship between
banking competition and financial stability remains highly debated in the literature.
Much of the literature has focused on how bank competition affects banks’ or borrowers’
risk-taking.1 Instead, this paper examines how competition affects banks’ equity-to-assets
ratios (equity ratios) and thereby financial stability measured through banks’ default
probabilities. By building a model of imperfect banking competition featuring the
accumulation of bank equity via retained earnings, this paper finds that less banking
competition can lead to a large gain in financial stability provided that banks retain the
greater profits to build up their capital buffer.
Although less banking competition improves financial stability, it reduces aggregate
output and hence macroeconomic efficiency, because a higher loan rate leads to a lower
demand for physical capital and thus lower output. This paper quantifies the importance
of the financial stability gain from less banking competition relative to the macroeconomic
efficiency loss.
This paper shows that bank equity accumulation is important for understanding the
trade-off between financial stability and macroeconomic efficiency. In the absence of bank
equity accumulation, the financial stability gain from less banking competition is very
small and is always outweighed by the macroeconomic efficiency loss. As a result, perfect
banking competition is the best in this case. However, when banks retain their profits
to build up their capital buffer over time, the financial stability gain from less banking
competition can be large enough to outweigh the macroeconomic efficiency loss.
1See Corbae and Levine (2018), Boyd and De Nicolo (2005), Allen and Gale (2000), Keeley (1990),
etc.
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The importance of bank equity accumulation implies the relevance of macroprudential
regulation on banks’ dividend distribution.2 For instance, by limiting banks’ dividend
distribution to shareholders, macroprudential policies can help to obtain a larger financial
stability gain from less banking competition. Empirically, this paper finds supporting
evidence for the model’s prediction that when banks accumulate equity over time, less
banking competition can lead to a large gain in financial stability measured by banks’
default probabilities.
The imperfectly competitive nature of the banking sector can be seen in Figure 3.1,
which shows that the largest 5 banks by total assets share more than 60% of the market in
many EU and OECD countries in 2007 and 2014. This paper models imperfect banking
competition via a Cournot banking sector where banks with different efficiencies compete
for loans in each period. Loans are financed by deposits and equity accumulated via
retained earnings. Entrepreneurs with limited liability and no initial wealth borrow via
non-state-contingent debt contracts from the banking sector, to finance the purchase of
physical capital for production. Entrepreneurs face idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks
to productivity after installing the physical capital. Banks can perfectly diversify the
idiosyncratic risk, but cannot diversify the aggregate risk, so they can default ex post if
an adverse aggregate productivity shock causes too many entrepreneurs to default and
their equity is not enough to absorb the loan losses. Hence, banks with higher equity
ratios are better able to withstand aggregate shocks and have lower default probabilities.
This paper analyzes how banking competition affects banks’ equity ratios and thereby
their default probabilities.
A key theoretical insight is that less banking competition can lead to a large gain
in financial stability provided that banks retain the greater profits to build up their
equity over time. With less banking competition, banks have higher profit margins,
which provide a buffer against losses. However, this static margin effect only has a small
impact on financial stability. When taking into account that banks can accumulate the
greater profits over time, less banking competition can lead to a much larger gain in
financial stability. This implies an important role for macroprudential regulation on
banks’ dividend distribution.
The model gives rise to some empirical implications that I assess using data for EU
and OECD countries from 1999 to 2016. The model predicts that when banks retain their
profits as equity over time, less banking competition improves financial stability measured
through banks’ default probabilities. I assess this prediction in two steps. First, based
on the model, less banking competition leads to a larger change in bank equity when
banks retain their profits. Second, banks with higher equity ratios have lower default
probabilities. I provide two sets of supporting evidence. First, bank concentration, which
is used as an inverse proxy for banking competition, has a significant positive effect on
2Macroprudential policies can regulate banks’ dividend distribution. For example, in the US, banks
that fail the stress test face restrictions on dividend distribution to shareholders.
40
Figure 3.1: Bank Concentration for EU and OECD Countries in 2007 and 2014
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largest 5 banks by total assets. For EU countries, this is based on credit institutions (defined as
receiving deposits or other repayable funds from the public and granting credits for its own account)
authorized by a given country, using ECB data. For non-EU OECD countries (i.e., Australia, Canada,
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the change in bank equity. Second, banks’ equity ratios are negatively related to their
default probabilities, proxied by credit default swap (CDS) spreads.3 I also assess the
model prediction in one step by looking at the direct relationship between banks’ CDS
spreads and bank concentration. I find that higher bank concentration leads to lower
CDS spreads during the post-crisis period, which is consistent with the model prediction.4
The existing theoretical literature on the relationship between banking competition
and financial stability can be classified into three categories: the competition-fragility view,
competition-stability view, and an ambiguous relationship. The literature supporting the
competition-fragility view tends to focus on the risk-taking channel (e.g., Corbae and
Levine, 2018; Corbae and D’Erasmo, 2011; Allen and Gale, 2000; Hellmann et al., 2000;
Matutes and Vives, 2000; Keeley, 1990) – competition reduces banks’ franchise values
(i.e., net present value of expected future profits) and thus induces more risk-taking by
3The CDS spread is the price of insurance against the default of a bank, so a higher CDS spread
implies a higher bank default probability.
4When directly regressing banks’ CDS spreads on bank concentration, the latter is only significant
during the post-crisis period due to the lack of cross-country variation in CDS spreads during the
pre-crisis period.
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banks.5 In contrast, there is also literature supporting the competition-stability view.
For instance, by focusing on borrowers’ risk-taking rather than banks’ risk-taking, Boyd
and De Nicolo (2005) introduce the risk-shifting hypothesis – competition lowers the
loan rate and reduces borrowers’ risk-taking, thus making banks’ loan portfolio safer.
Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) combine the risk-shifting effect with the margin effect
that reduces profits and thereby the buffer against losses, and argue that the relationship
between competition and stability is ambiguous, depending on which effect dominates.6
Similarly, the existing empirical evidence can also be classified according to three
different views on the relationship between competition and stability: the competition-
fragility view (e.g., Carlson et al., 2018; Corbae and Levine, 2018; Jiang et al., 2017; Beck
et al., 2013; Ariss, 2010; Yeyati and Micco, 2007; Salas and Saurina, 2003; Keeley, 1990),
the competition-stability view (e.g., Anginer et al., 2014; Dick and Lehnert, 2010; Uhde
and Heimeshoff, 2009; Schaeck and Cihák, 2007), and an ambiguous relationship (e.g.,
Faia et al., 2018; Jiménez et al., 2013; Tabak et al., 2012). One reason to explain the
mixed empirical results is that competition affects different types of risks differently, as
pointed out by Freixas and Ma (2015).7 In addition, the diversity of measures used for
competition explains part of the mixed empirical results. In fact, there are papers that
find that different measures for competition can lead to opposite results for the impact of
competition on stability (e.g., Fu et al., 2014; Schaeck et al., 2009; Beck et al., 2006).
This paper contributes to the existing literature in three major respects. First, this
paper introduces a new mechanism, the equity ratio effect, whereby competition affects
banks’ equity ratios and thereby their default probabilities. A few papers studying bank
competition and financial stability also model bank equity but they look at the role of
equity in deterring bank risk-taking (Corbae and Levine, 2018; Hellmann et al., 2000;
Keeley, 1990), or making banks commit to monitoring (Allen et al., 2011). Instead, this
paper focuses on the role of equity as a buffer against loan losses. More specifically, it
incorporates the static margin effect and introduces dynamic bank equity accumulation
via retained earnings. Based on the calibrated model, the static margin effect only has a
5Besides, bank competition can also jeopardize stability by worsening the coordination problem
between depositors that can foster bank runs (Vives, 2016). Banks with long-term assets financed by
short-term liabilities are vulnerable to runs, irrespective of competition, as in Diamond and Dybvig
(1983). However, more intense competition raises the probability of failure in a symmetric interior
equilibrium where banks are direct competitors for deposits (Matutes and Vives, 1996). Similarly, Egan
et al. (2017) find that banks with high default probabilities are willing to offer high insured deposit rates.
To compete for deposits, rival banks also raise their rates which reduce their margins and increase their
default probabilities. This paper does not look at how competition affects stability via the bank-run
channel by assuming full deposit insurance and a perfectly elastic supply of deposits.
6Caminal and Matutes (2002) also find that the relationship between bank competition and banking
failures is ambiguous. In their model set-up, higher borrowers’ investment implies a higher failure rate of
the bank and under less banking competition, both the loan rate and the monitoring effort are higher,
which affect borrowers’ investment differently. While a higher loan rate reduces the investment, a higher
monitoring effort raises the investment.
7For instance, Berger et al. (2009) find that banks with more market power have higher non-performing
loans ratios, but have less overall risk measured by the Z-index, using more than 8000 banks in 23
developed countries from 1999 to 2005.
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small impact on financial stability. However, when banks retain the greater profits to
build up their capital buffer, less banking competition can lead to a much larger gain
in financial stability. In essence, the improved profitability of banks under less banking
competition is amplified over time.
Interestingly, if policymakers try to reduce competition to improve financial stability,
the model suggests that it could make things worse in the short run. In particular, if a
solvent bank merges with a distressed bank during a crisis, the merged bank with greater
market power would have a larger size of loan assets, which reduces its equity ratio and
hence raises its default probability. However, this short-run equity ratio effect tends to
disappear over time due to faster equity accumulation with less banking competition,
which results in higher bank equity ratios over time (long-run equity ratio effect).
Second, the paper provides a new measure to quantify the trade-off between financial
stability and macroeconomic efficiency, using a calibrated version of the model.8 More
specifically, when there is little competition, the macroeconomic efficiency loss is very
large. For instance, with a monopoly bank, aggregate output is 40% lower compared
with a perfectly competitive banking sector. This large macroeconomic efficiency loss
completely outweighs the financial stability gain. But when there are more than six
banks, the financial stability gain from less banking competition becomes large enough
over time to outweigh the macroeconomic efficiency loss, when banks engage in equity
accumulation.
Since bank equity accumulation can result in a large gain in financial stability under
imperfect banking competition, this implies an important role for macroprudential
regulation that limits banks’ dividend distribution to shareholders. Such macroprudential
regulation of banks’ dividend distribution has not received much attention in the literature,
compared to capital requirements and deposit rate regulation,9 even though it has already
been implemented in practice, most notably by the US Federal Reserve for banks that fail
stress tests. Admati et al. (2013) point out that prohibiting banks’ dividend payouts for a
period of time is an efficient and quicker way to have banks build up equity. The long-run
equity ratio effect in this paper suggests a greater effectiveness of this macroprudential
policy tool under less competition, because banks make higher profits.
Third, this paper provides new empirical evidence by assessing the model prediction
that in the presence of bank equity accumulation, less banking competition improves
financial stability. In this paper, I use bank concentration as an inverse measure for
8As Allen and Gale (2004) point out, although it is hard to measure the efficiency loss from
concentration, it is unwise to neglect the efficiency costs. To address the balance between competition
and stability, it is important to have a framework that allows for welfare analysis at different levels of
competition. While Corbae and Levine (2018) compare the efficient level of risk taking and investment
chosen by a social planner in a frictionless economy with the levels chosen in a decentralized Cournot
equilibrium embedded with other frictions, I focus on the efficiency loss caused by imperfect banking
competition in this paper.
9See Repullo (2004), Hellmann et al. (2000) and Besanko and Thakor (1992) for analysis on capital
requirements and deposit rate ceilings.
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competition based on the Cournot model and neglect that there may be a weak relationship
between bank concentration and other banking competition measures empirically (e.g.
Claessens and Laeven, 2004).10 Based on the model, financial stability is measured by
banks’ default probabilities, so banks’ CDS spreads are used to proxy for their default
probabilities, with an additional benefit that this market-based measure is less likely
to cause endogeneity problems, relative to the accounting-based measures, as noted
by Anginer et al. (2014).11 By assessing the model prediction in two steps, this paper
provides supporting evidence for the mechanism behind the relationship between banking
competition and financial stability via banks’ equity ratios. Furthermore, this paper
provides new evidence by investigating the direct relationship between banks’ default
probabilities and banking competition. I find that bank concentration, as an inverse
proxy for banking competition, has a significantly negative effect on banks’ CDS spreads
during the post-crisis period.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents the model
set-up and the basic model results. Section 3.3 explains the model calibration. Section 3.4
uses the calibrated model to illustrate the long-run and short-run equity ratio effects, and
to quantify the relative importance of the macroeconomic efficiency loss and the financial
stability gain associated with imperfect banking competition. Section 3.5 documents the
data sources used in this paper. Section 3.6 discusses the empirical specifications and
reduced-form results supporting the model predictions. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Model
A model of non-state-contingent debt contracts between competitive entrepreneurs and a
Cournot banking sector is presented in this section. Entrepreneurs are born each period
and only live for two periods. They start with no initial wealth and hence need to borrow
from banks at a fixed loan rate to purchase and install physical capital in their first
period, which is used as the only input for production in their second period, at the end
of which they consume the profits. Entrepreneurs with limited liability are assumed to
be identical ex ante but their productivity is subject to an idiosyncratic shock and an
aggregate shock in their second period. Banks with different efficiencies compete in loan
10The competition measures such as HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) and 5-bank concentration
ratios are based on the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) hypothesis (Bikker et al., 2012), which
holds under Cournot competition. Under the SCP hypothesis, a highly concentrated banking industry
tends to cause banks to behave in a non-competitive way to make higher profits, for instance, via non-
competitive pricing. This structural measure (e.g., bank concentration measures) has been questioned a
lot in terms of how well they capture competition (Bolt and Humphrey, 2015), which has led to the
development of non-structural measures such as the Lerner index, Panzar-Ross H-statistic and Boone
indicator, etc. However, each of these measures has also received criticism, as can be seen from Carbó
et al. (2009), Bikker et al. (2012) and Schiersch and Schmidt-Ehmcke (2010), etc.
11Few papers in this literature use CDS data. A recent paper by Faia et al. (2018) only use CDS
data on 15 global systematically important banks, while this paper covers 157 banks in EU and OECD
countries.
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quantities à la Cournot and all banks’ loan quantities then determine the equilibrium
loan rate. Entrepreneurs that suffer adverse productivity shocks may not be able to repay
their loans, in which case banks would incur a collection cost or auditing cost to observe
and verify their realized output, and then confiscate the output. Due to the large number
of entrepreneurs that each receives a different idiosyncratic shock to productivity, banks
can perfectly diversify the idiosyncratic loan risk. However, banks are all affected by
the aggregate shock to productivity. Ex post, some banks may default after an adverse
aggregate shock if their efficiency level or equity ratio is sufficiently low.
3.2.1 Entrepreneur’s Problem
There is a unit mass of ex ante identical entrepreneurs indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] with no
initial wealth. Each borrows from a bank at a non-state-contingent gross loan rate Rb,t to
purchase physical capital ki,t in period t. Entrepreneurs take the loan rate Rb,t set by the
banking sector as given. There is a common deterministic productivity level A > 0 that
is subject to multiplicative shocks that only realize at the beginning of period t+ 1 after
entrepreneurs have installed the capital. The idiosyncratic multiplicative shock ω > 0 is
i.i.d. across entrepreneurs and time, with a continuous c.d.f. F (ω) and E(ω) = 1. The
aggregate multiplicative shock ϵ > 0 has a continuous c.d.f. Γ(ϵ) and E(ϵ) = 1. Ex post,
each entrepreneur i receives a different realized idiosyncratic shock ωi,t+1 and produces
output yi,t+1:
yi,t+1 = ωi,t+1ϵt+1Akαi,t (3.1)
where α ∈ (0, 1) is the output elasticity of capital. Facing the same Rb,t, each entrepreneur
has the same demand for physical capital, so ki,t = kt ∀i.
If the realized idiosyncratic productivity shock at the beginning of period t + 1 is
below a certain threshold ω¯t+1, the entrepreneur is not able to repay the debt obligation
Rb,tkt, where ω¯t+1 is determined by the following break-even condition:
ω¯t+1ϵt+1Ak
α
t −Rb,tkt ≡ 0 → ω¯t+1 ≡
Rb,tk
1−α
t
ϵt+1A
(3.2)
As can be seen from (3.2), a higher Rb,t leads to a higher entrepreneur’s default threshold
ω¯t+1, keeping everything else unchanged, i.e., ∂ω¯t+1∂Rb,t > 0. A higher realized aggregate
productivity shock ϵt+1 results in a lower default threshold ω¯t+1, meaning that the
proportion of defaulting entrepreneurs is smaller, i.e., ∂ω¯t+1
∂ϵt+1
< 0.
Both the idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks are unobserved ex ante (when en-
trepreneurs and banks are making their decisions). Ex post, entrepreneurs and banks
can observe the realized aggregate shock ϵt+1. Each entrepreneur i can also observe the
realized idiosyncratic shock ωi,t+1 ex post, but other agents need to incur an auditing
cost or collection cost to observe it. Given the information asymmetry and a positive
auditing cost, the optimal debt contract takes the form of a standard non-state-contingent
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debt contract (Gale and Hellwig, 1985). That is, the entrepreneur pays Rb,tkt when the
repayment can be afforded (i.e., when ωi,t+1 > ω¯t+1). If the realized output is too low to
cover the debt repayment (i.e., when ωi,t+1 < ω¯t+1), the entrepreneur declares bankrupt.
Since each entrepreneur borrows from only one bank, the bank then verifies the defaulting
entrepreneur’s output, incurring a collection cost µ ∈ (0, 1) that is proportional to the
realized output, and seizes the output.
A larger capital stock kt requires higher productivity to break even due to the
diminishing marginal product of capital, so it leads to a higher default threshold ω¯t+1
and thus raises the entrepreneur’s default probability F (ω¯t+1), keeping everything else
the same:
∂ω¯t+1
∂kt
= (1− α)Rb,tk
−α
t
ϵt+1A
> 0 (3.3)
The representative entrepreneur takes the gross loan rate Rb,t as given and chooses kt
to maximize expected profits, taking into consideration the effect of kt on the default
threshold ω¯t+1. Hence, the entrepreneur with limited liability maximizes the following
expected profit with respect to kt:
Et
[∫ ∞
ω¯t+1(Rb,t,kt,ϵt+1)
ωϵt+1Ak
α
t dF (ω)−
∫ ∞
ω¯t+1(Rb,t,kt,ϵt+1)
Rb,tktdF (ω)
]
(3.4)
where the expectation operator Et[.] is taken over the distribution of the aggregate shock
ϵt+1, and the entrepreneur’s default threshold ω¯t+1 is a function of the gross loan rate
Rb,t, physical capital kt and the aggregate shock ϵt+1 (as explained above). The optimal
loan demand kt decreases with Rb,t, as shown in Appendix B.1.1, so the loan demand
curve is downward-sloping:
dkt
dRb,t
= − kt(1− α)Rb,t < 0 (3.5)
The banking sector affects the demand for loans via the equilibrium loan rate. In addition,
the loan rate may also affect the entrepreneur’s default threshold. However, in this model
setup, ω¯t+1 is independent of the gross loan rate Rb,t, as proved in Appendix B.1.2:
dω¯t+1
dRb,t
= ∂ω¯t+1
∂Rb,t
+ ∂ω¯t+1
∂kt
dkt
dRb,t
= 0 (3.6)
The positive partial effect of Rb,t on ω¯t+1 is analogous to the argument made by Boyd and
De Nicolo (2005) that an increase in loan rate caused by less loan market competition
can reduce borrowers’ profitability, inducing them to choose a higher riskiness attached
to their portfolio, which undermines financial stability.12 The main difference is that by
12When riskiness itself is a choice variable, as commonly seen in the literature (Martinez-Miera and
Repullo, 2010; Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005), and when the expected revenue from the debt-financed project
is strictly increasing in the riskiness, the only way to make profit facing a higher loan rate is to choose a
higher riskiness.
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separating the choice variable kt from the riskiness measure ω¯t+1, this model gives rise
to the possibility that the adverse impact of the loan rate on borrowers’ profitability is
internalized by the borrowers themselves such that there is no overall impact of Rb,t on
ω¯t+1. In essence, this is because entrepreneurs facing a higher interest rate would reduce
their loan demand. As shown in (3.6), the positive partial effect of Rb,t on ω¯t+1 is exactly
offset by the effect of the reduction in loan demand in response to a higher loan rate, so
banks do not affect the entrepreneur’s default threshold. The result that dω¯t+1
dRb,t
= 0 holds
more generally if the entrepreneur has full liability.13 The fact that the entrepreneur’s
default probability is unaffected by the loan rate in this model greatly simplifies the
problem of the Cournot banking sector.
3.2.2 Cournot Banking Sector
There are N risk-neutral banks with different marginal costs competing in loan quantities
a` la Cournot. Banks are indexed by j, where j = 1, 2, 3, ..., N . When N = 1, the banking
sector consists of a monopoly bank and when N approaches infinity, the banking sector is
perfectly competitive. In equilibrium, the total loan demand kt from the entrepreneur’s
problem is equal to the total loan supply which is provided by j banks, such that
kt =
∑
j kj,t, where kj,t denotes the loan quantity supplied by bank j in period t.
Banks diversify to reduce idiosyncratic risk by lending to a fraction kj,t
kt
of randomly
selected ex ante identical entrepreneurs. Once the idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks
realize, entrepreneurs with realized values of ωi,t+1(ϵt+1) above the threshold ω¯t+1(ϵt+1)
would be able to repay the full debt obligation and each bank j gets the loan repayment∫∞
ω¯t+1(ϵt+1)Rb,tkj,tdF (ω) from these non-defaulting entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurs with
realized values ωi,t+1(ϵt+1) below the threshold ω¯t+1(ϵt+1) will declare bankruptcy. In this
case, banks verify and confiscate the output after incurring a collection cost, which is a frac-
tion µ of the realized output. So bank j obtains kj,t
kt
(1−µ) ∫ ω¯t+1(ϵt+1)0 ϵt+1ωAkαt dF (ω) from
the defaulting entrepreneurs in its portfolio. Due to the large number of entrepreneurs,
banks can perfectly diversify the idiosyncratic risk. The aggregate shock ϵt+1 to pro-
ductivity that hits all entrepreneurs, however, affects the fraction of entrepreneurs that
default and thereby the fraction of nonperforming loans and banks’ default probabilities.
Consequently, banks with low efficiencies or low equity ratios can default ex post due to
an adverse aggregate shock.
Assume bank j finances its loans kj,t, which are the only assets on its balance sheet,
via deposits and net worth (equity) nj,t, which is accumulated through retained earnings.
Assume there is a perfectly elastic supply of deposits at the exogenous gross deposit
rate Rt > 0. Depositors are protected by a deposit guarantee from the government, who
repays any depositors affected by bank default. Based on the balance sheet identity that
13It is shown in Appendix B.1.2 that with full liability of the entrepreneur, the default threshold
at the optimal kt is ω¯t+1 = 1ϵt+1 , which is also independent of Rb,t. Compared with full liability, the
entrepreneur chooses a larger kt under limited liability, leading to a higher default probability F (ω¯t+1).
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assets equal the sum of liabilities (deposits) and equity, the amount of deposits taken by
bank j is (kj,t − nj,t). Each bank j has a different time-invariant marginal intermediation
cost for loans τj ∈ (0, 1), with higher τj indicating lower efficiency. Consequently, banks
have different market shares in the Cournot equilibrium, with more efficient banks gaining
higher market shares.
Let πBj,t+1 denote the net profit earned by bank j on period-t loans in period t + 1.
Assume bankers are appointed for one loan cycle, so they only care about maximizing
the expected profit EtπBj,t+1 by choosing the loan quantity kj,t.14 Although bankers are
short-lived, banks are long-lived and they can accumulate equity over time. The net
profit of bank j in period t+ 1 depends on the aggregate shock ϵt+1:
πBj,t+1 =
∫ ∞
ω¯t+1(ϵt+1)
Rb,tkj,tdF (ω) +
kj,t
kt
(1− µ)
∫ ω¯t+1(ϵt+1)
0
ϵt+1ωAk
α
t dF (ω)
−Rt(kj,t − nj,t)− τjkj,t − nj,t
(3.7)
where the first RHS term represents the revenue from performing loans and the second
term equals the revenue from nonperforming loans, both for a given level of the aggregate
shock. The third RHS term is the gross deposit interest payment, and τjkj,t equals bank
j’s intermediation cost. The gross loan rate Rb,t is a function of bank j’s loan quantity
and all the other banks’ loan quantities. Under Cournot competition, each bank j chooses
its loan quantity kj,t to maximize its expected net profit, taking into account the impact
of its loan quantity choice on Rb,t and taking all the other banks’ loan quantities as given.
The equilibrium loan rate is determined by all banks’ loan quantities.
Using the expression for ω¯t+1 (3.2), it is shown in Appendix B.2.1 that the net profit
(3.7) can be simplified to:
πBj,t+1 = G(ϵt+1)Rb,tkj,t −Rt(kj,t − nj,t)− τjkj,t − nj,t (3.8)
where G(ϵt+1) ≡ [1− F (ω¯t+1(ϵt+1))] + 1−µω¯t+1(ϵt+1)
∫ ω¯t+1(ϵ)
0 ωf(ω)dω < 1 can be interpreted
as the fraction of the contractual gross loan revenue Rb,tkj,t that can be obtained by
bank j for a given level of ϵt+1. The revenue fraction G(ϵt+1) is smaller than one due to
the nonperforming loans. The net profit of bank j can be negative if the realization of
the aggregate shock in period t+ 1 is sufficiently low, more precisely, below a threshold
ϵ¯j,t+1. Although the aggregate shock is common to all banks, the default threshold ϵ¯j,t+1
differs across banks due to different levels of equity nj,t and efficiency indicated by τj.15
A higher bank’s default threshold ϵ¯j,t+1 implies a higher default probability for the bank.
14Since bankers are appointed for one loan cycle, they do not consider the effect of the loan quantity
choice kj,t on the bank’s survival probability in future periods. In a dynamic Cournot model where
bankers take into account the effect of kj,t on the bank’s default probability, each bank would choose a
smaller kj,t to reduce its default probability, resulting in a higher equilibrium loan rate and a higher
profit. So under dynamic Cournot, banks can accumulate equity faster due to higher profits.
15In the model, banks have no debt, but the “default threshold” of a bank refers to the threshold at
which it goes bankrupt and “defaults” on its liabilities (deposits).
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Bank Equity Accumulation
Equity in period t+ 1, nj,t+1, is modelled as the retained earnings of the continuing bank
j, which is the sum of nj,t and net profit πBj,t+1 net of any dividend payments Dj,t+1:
nj,t+1 = nj,t + πBj,t+1 −Dj,t+1 (3.9)
where πBj,t+1 is given by (3.8). As can be seen from (3.9), macroprudential regulation on
banks’ dividend distribution can affect the equity accumulation via Dj,t+1, leading to
different dynamics of equity over time and thus affecting banks’ equity ratios under a
given level of competition. This section shows three different bank dividend distribution
or macroprudential policies: (i) no dividend distribution; (ii) distribute all positive net
profits; (iii) distribute only if the equity ratio exceeds a desired or required level. The
effects of these three policies on equity accumulation are shown below.
Bank j’s default threshold ϵ¯j,t+1 is determined by the condition that the pre-dividend
net worth (equity) in period t + 1 is zero, i.e., πBj,t+1 + nj,t = 0. If the loss made by
bank j (πBj,t+1 < 0) is too large to be absorbed by its capital buffer nj,t, then bank j
goes bankrupt. Hence, a larger net worth nj,t lowers bank j’s default threshold ϵ¯j,t+1.
The negative relationship between banks’ equity ratios and their default thresholds is
established in Section 3.2.3.
Case I: No dividend distribution
Assuming banks do not distribute to shareholders (i.e., Dj,t+1 = 0), equity accumulates
as follows:
nj,t+1 = nj,t + πBj,t+1 (3.10)
which is the sum of the equity in the previous period and the realized net profit. Condi-
tional on a non-negative nj,t+1 at the beginning of t+ 1, the continuing bank j will then
choose loan quantity kj,t+1 to maximize Et+1πBj,t+2.
Case II: Distribute all positive net profits to shareholders
Assume that whenever bank j makes a positive net profit ex post, it will distribute all
the net profit to its shareholders, so the dividend payment in period t+1 before choosing
the loan quantity kj,t+1 is:
Dj,t+1 = max{πBj,t+1, 0} (3.11)
where πBj,t+1 is the net profit of bank j for a given realized aggregate shock ϵt+1. According
to the evolution of equity (3.9), the post-dividend equity of bank j in period t+1 is then:
nj,t+1 = min{nj,t + πBj,t+1, nj,t} (3.12)
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When the realized net profit πBj,t+1 is negative, equity capital nj,t is used to absorb this
loss, and no dividend is paid to shareholders. As long as nj,t+1 is non-negative, bank j
can stay in the market and choose the loan quantity kj,t+1, financed by the post-dividend
equity nj,t+1 (3.12) and deposits.
Case III: Distribute if equity ratio exceeds the desired or required level
Assume banks have a desired or required equity ratio κ∗ and they only pay dividend when
the pre-dividend equity nj,t + πBj,t+1 exceeds the desired/required level κ∗kj,t.16 When
the pre-dividend equity ratio nj,t+π
B
j,t+1
kj,t
falls short of κ∗, banks do not pay any dividend
in period t+ 1 and instead, they keep accumulating their equity. Hence, the dividend
payment made by bank j in period t+ 1 is:
Dj,t+1 = max{nj,t + πBj,t+1 − κ∗kj,t, 0} (3.13)
According to the evolution of equity capital (3.9), bank j’s equity in period t+ 1 after
paying dividend (3.13) is then:
nj,t+1 = min{nj,t + πBj,t+1, κ∗kj,t} (3.14)
Compared to Case II, even when the net profit πBj,t+1 is positive, if the pre-dividend equity
nj,t + πBj,t+1 is lower than the desired or required level as indicated by κ∗kj,t, no dividend
will be paid to the shareholders.
3.2.3 Basic Model Results
This section presents the basic model results and uses these results to show the macroe-
conomic efficiency loss from imperfect banking competition, the equity ratio effect, and
the negative relationship between banks’ equity ratios and their default thresholds.
Macroeconomic Efficiency Loss from Imperfect Banking Competition
Before any shocks realize, N heterogeneous banks with different levels of efficiency
indicated by τj compete in loan quantities and the equilibrium loan rate is determined by
all banks’ choices of loan quantities. It is shown in Appendix B.2.1 that the equilibrium
loan rate can be found by first taking the first-order condition of (3.7) with respect to
kj,t for each bank j and then summing over all N banks’ first order conditions. The
equilibrium gross loan rate R∗b,t is:
R∗b,t =
Rt + τ¯(
1− 1−α
N
)
Et[G(ϵt+1)]
(3.15)
16One example of this desired equity ratio is the capital ratio set by regulatory authorities.
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where G(ϵt+1) ≡
[
[1− F (ω¯t+1(ϵt+1))] + 1−µω¯t+1(ϵt+1)
∫ ω¯t+1(ϵt+1)
0 ωf(ω)dω
]
< 1 denotes the
fraction of Rb,tkj,t that can be obtained by bank j for a given level of aggregate shock ϵt+1,
as can be seen in (3.8). This fraction is smaller than one due to the presence of defaulting
entrepreneurs. A higher Et[G(ϵt+1)] implies a smaller proportion of entrepreneurs are
expected to default, which lowers R∗b,t due to less risk compensation. The parameter
τ¯ ≡ 1
N
∑N
j=1 τj denotes the mean marginal intermediation cost across all banks. A higher
τ¯ implies lower bank efficiency and raises R∗b,t due to a higher marginal cost. It can be seen
from (3.15) that the equilibrium loan rate is larger than Rt + τ¯ due to the market power
of banks for finite N and the presence of non-performing loans such that Et[G(ϵt+1)] is
smaller than one. With perfect banking competition (i.e., when N approaches infinity),
the equilibrium loan rate RPCb,t is:
RPCb,t =
Rt + τ¯
Et[G(ϵt+1)]
(3.16)
which is lower than R∗b,t, but still larger than the marginal cost Rt+ τ¯ due to the presence
of non-performing loans.
The marginal intermediation costs for the N banks are randomly drawn from a given
distribution which is assumed to be time-invariant.17 If τj is too high relative to the
distribution mean τ¯ , then bank j is too inefficient to operate profitably. It is shown in
Appendix B.2.2 that the following condition on τj is sufficient to ensure that all banks
are able to make a positive expected net profit for Rt > 1:
Rt + τj <
Rt + τ¯(
1− 1−α
N
) (3.17)
Note that this condition is satisfied if all banks are identical so that τj = τ¯ ∀ j. Assume
that τj is randomly drawn from a given time-invariant distribution for all levels of N , so
changes in N do not affect the distribution mean τ¯ .18 All results in the rest of this section
are proved under this assumption and condition (3.17). Some fundamental properties of
the Cournot equilibrium are summarised in the following proposition which is proved in
Appendix B.2.3.
Proposition 1: A higher number of banks N
(i) reduces the equilibrium loan rate R∗b,t:
dR∗b,t
dN
= − (1−α)R
∗
b,t
N(N−1+α) < 0;
(ii) increases the equilibrium aggregate loan quantity k∗t :
dk∗t
dN
= k
∗
t
N(N−1+α) > 0;
(iii) improves macroeconomic efficiency measured through higher expected output A(k∗t )α.
17In simulation results shown in Section 3.4, τj is drawn from a reverse bounded Pareto distribution
in order to produce an unequal distribution for equilibrium market shares with a few large banks and a
lot of small banks.
18In essence, this assumes constant returns to scale for banks.
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As the number of banks N increases (more intense banking competition), the equi-
librium loan rate is lower, which raises the demand for physical capital and thus leads
to a higher equilibrium aggregate loan quantity. Let kPCt denote the aggregate physical
capital or loan quantity under perfect banking competition when the loan rate is RPCb,t
(3.16). Proposition 1 shows that the expected output under perfect banking competition
Et(yPCt+1) = A
(
kPCt
)α
is higher than that under imperfect banking competition due to a
lower loan rate and hence a higher demand for physical capital. In addition, less banking
competition leads to a larger macroeconomic efficiency loss (or loss in expected output)
compared to perfect banking competition.
Equity Ratio Effect
This paper introduces a new mechanism, the equity ratio effect, which describes how
competition affects banks’ equity ratios nj,t
kj,t
and thereby banks’ default probabilities.
This mechanism differentiates between the short-run and long-run effects of banking
competition on financial stability. The short-run equity ratio effect is a denominator
effect via which banking competition changes the size of loan assets kj,t, whereas the
long-run equity ratio effect is a numerator effect via which banking competition affects
the speed of equity accumulation and thereby the level of nj,t over time. This section
explains the short-run and long-run equity ratio effects in turn. To analyze the former
effect, it is necessary to show how bank j’s loan quantity kj,t changes with N , while for
the latter, it is important how bank j’s net profit πBj,t changes with N .
It is shown in Appendix B.2.4 that each bank j’s optimal equilibrium loan quantity
k∗j,t is:
k∗j,t =
1
1− α
[
1− (1−
1−α
N
)(Rt + τj)
(Rt + τ¯)
]
k∗t = ms∗j,tk∗t (3.18)
where ms∗j,t ≡ 11−α
[
1− (1− 1−αN )(Rt+τj)(Rt+τ¯)
]
denotes the equilibrium market share. If banks are
identical, so τj = τ¯ ∀ j, then each bank has a market share of 1N in the Cournot equilibrium.
It can be seen that the equilibrium market share depends on the marginal intermediation
cost τj . More specifically, when bank j has a below average marginal intermediation cost
(i.e., τj < τ¯), its market share will be larger than 1N . Since
∑N
j=1msj,t = 1, ms∗j,t must be
less than or equal to one given each bank’s market share is positive under the parameter
restriction on τj (3.17). Using (3.17) and (3.18), the fact that 0 < ms∗j,t 6 1 implies that
the marginal cost for loans, Rt + τj, must lie within the following range:
α(Rt + τ¯)
(1− 1−α
N
) 6 Rt + τj <
Rt + τ¯
(1− 1−α
N
) (3.19)
Proposition 2 which is derived in Appendix B.2.4, shows the bank-specific marginal
intermediation cost τj affects the extent to which a bank’s market share is decreasing in
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N .
Proposition 2: A higher number of banks N reduces the market share of each bank,
and this effect is stronger for less efficient banks (with higher τj):
dms∗j,t
dN
= − (Rt+τj)
N2(Rt+τ¯) < 0.
When banks have different efficiency levels, how bank j’s equilibrium loan quantity
k∗j,t changes with an increase in the number of banks N depends on the balance between
the effect of an increasing aggregate loan quantity and the effect of a falling market share:
dk∗j,t
dN
= ms∗j,t
dk∗t
dN
+ k∗t
dms∗j,t
dN
(3.20)
As N increases (i.e., more intense banking competition ), the aggregate loan quantity k∗t
is higher (dk
∗
t
dN
> 0 by Proposition 1), but each bank has a smaller share of the market
(dms
∗
j,t
dN
< 0 by Proposition 2). Consequently, the sign of dk
∗
j,t
dN
is ambiguous. If the fall
in market share of bank j dominates the effect from the increase in total loan quantity,
then bank j’s loan quantity decreases in N . This requires banks to be identical or have
sufficiently similar efficiency levels,19 as is summarized in Proposition 3, which is proven
in Appendix B.2.5.
Proposition 3: When banks have sufficiently similar efficiency levels such that
Rt+τ¯
(2−α)(1− 1−α
N
) < Rt + τj <
Rt+τ¯
1− 1−α
N
, bank j’s equilibrium loan quantity k∗j,t unambiguously
decreases with N . This condition is satisfied if all banks are identical for N > 1.
Proposition 3 is important for the short-run equity ratio effect which predicts that
less banking competition can jeopardize financial stability in the short run. When a
reduction in N in period t increases kj,t, it leads to a lower equity ratio nj,tkj,t as the bank’s
equity nj,t is not affected in period t. Thus, the short-run equity ratio effect operates via
the denominator kj,t.
In contrast, the long-run equity ratio effect operates via the numerator as competition
affects bank’s net profit and hence equity accumulated over time, as described in the
following proposition, which is derived in Appendix B.2.6.
Proposition 4: The expected profit of bank j decreases with the number of banks N ,
as the higher loan rate R∗b,t resulting from less banking competition dominates the changes
in loan quantity kj,t.
According to the dynamics of bank equity accumulation (3.9), a higher net profit
πBj,t+1 leads to a higher nj,t+1 and a larger change in bank equity, as long as not all
positive profits are distributed as dividends. Together with Proposition 4, this implies
19This condition is satisfied for the calibration in Section 3.3.
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the long-run equity ratio effect – with less banking competition, banks make higher
profits and can accumulate equity faster, leading to higher equity ratios and thereby
lower default probabilities over time, as shown next.
Equity Ratio Effect and Banks’ Default Probabilities
In this paper, financial stability is measured through banks’ default probability Γ(ϵ¯j,t+1).
By showing how banks’ default threshold ϵ¯j,t+1 is determined, the short-run and long-run
equity ratio effects on financial stability are explained and compared with the static
margin effect.
Since banks cannot diversify away the aggregate risk, an adverse aggregate productivity
shock ϵt+1 will cause more entrepreneurs than expected to default and as a result, banks
can make negative net profits πBj,t+1. If bank j’s loss is too large to be absorbed by its
equity nj,t, its pre-dividend equity nj,t + πBj,t+1 will turn negative and it has to default on
its liabilities. The threshold for the realized aggregate shock ϵ¯j,t+1 below which bank j
defaults is determined by the following condition:
πBj,t+1(ϵ¯j,t+1) + nj,t = 0 (3.21)
where πBj,t+1(ϵ¯j,t+1) ≡ G(ϵ¯j,t+1)R∗b,tk∗j,t−Rt(k∗j,t−nj,t)−τjk∗j,t−nj,t represents the equilibrium
net profit when the aggregate shock takes a value of ϵ¯j,t+1, based on (3.8). The LHS of
(3.21) represents the pre-dividend equity in period t+ 1. Although the aggregate shock
is common to all banks, each bank j’s default threshold ϵ¯j,t+1 differs due to their specific
τj and nj,t. Condition (3.21) shows that when the realized aggregate shock takes a value
of ϵ¯j,t+1, the proportion of non-performing loans is at such a level that the negative profit
for bank j is just absorbed by nj,t. If ϵt+1 is below ϵ¯j,t+1, the pre-dividend equity will be
negative and bank j will default. Dividing (3.21) by k∗j,t and substituting the definition
of πBj,t+1(ϵ¯j,t+1), bank j’s default threshold is determined by the following condition:
R∗b,tG(ϵ¯j,t+1)− (Rt + τj) +Rt
nj,t
k∗j,t
= 0 (3.22)
where R∗b,tG(ϵ¯j,t+1)− (Rt + τj) is the bank’s profit margin when the realized aggregate
shock takes a value of ϵ¯j,t+1. The bank’s revenue fraction G(ϵt+1) is increasing in the
aggregate productivity shock ϵt+1, as fewer entrepreneurs default, so G′(ϵ¯j,t+1) > 0 as
shown in Appendix B.2.7. Let κj,t ≡ nj,tk∗j,t denote bank j’s equilibrium equity ratio. Then
it is straightforward to see from (3.22) that banks’ default thresholds ϵ¯j,t+1 and hence
default probabilities are negatively correlated with their equity ratios. Intuitively, this
is because with higher equity ratios, banks can still survive even with a lower realized
aggregate shock. The result is summarized in the following proposition, which is formally
derived in Appendix B.2.7:
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Proposition 5: Banks’ default thresholds ϵ¯j,t+1 are negatively related to banks’ equity
ratios κj,t: dϵ¯j,t+1dκj,t = − RtR∗b,tG′(ϵ¯j,t+1) < 0 ∀j.
Recall that Γ(ϵ) denotes the c.d.f. of the aggregate shock and bank j defaults if
ϵt+1 < ϵ¯j,t+1. So a high default threshold ϵ¯j,t+1 leads to a high default probability Γ(ϵ¯j,t+1).
Thus, Proposition 5 implies a negative relationship between banks’ default probabilities
and their equity ratios.
This paper focuses on how imperfect banking competition affects banks’ equity ratio
and hence their default probabilities. The role of the equity ratio effects can be shown by
implicitly differentiating bank j’s default condition (3.21) with respect to the number of
banks N , as shown in Appendix B.2.8:
dϵ¯j,t+1
dN
=
SR equity ratio effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
Rt
nj,t
k∗j,t
dk∗j,t
dN
1
k∗j,t
LR equity ratio effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
−Rt 1
k∗j,t
dnj,t
dN
margin effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
−dR
∗
b,t
dN
G(ϵ¯j,t+1)
R∗b,tG′(ϵ¯j,t+1)
(3.23)
Suppose that banks’ efficiency levels are sufficiently similar so that dkj,t∗
dN
< 0 by Proposition
3. According to (3.23), when N is lower, there is a short-run equity ratio effect that
predicts a higher default probability due to a lower equity ratio, provided that the bank
has equity nj,t > 0. This is because when N is lower, each bank has greater market
power and hence a larger loan quantity k∗j,t. This reduces bank j’s equity ratio
nj,t
k∗j,t
for a
given nj,t, which leads to a higher default threshold ϵ¯j,t+1. In addition, there is a long-run
equity ratio effect such that a lower N tends to raise future equity via higher profits (by
Proposition 4), which increases bank j’s equity ratio in the long run and thereby reduces
its future default threshold. In contrast, the static margin effect predicts that a lower N
reduces the default threshold ϵ¯j,t+1 due to a higher loan rate (as
dR∗b,t
dN
< 0 by Proposition
1) and thus higher revenue from performing loans, which provide a buffer against loan
losses.
How ϵ¯j,t+1 changes with N in the short run (when dnj,tdN = 0) is ambiguous theoretically.
For the calibration of the model described in the next section, the short-run equity ratio
effect tends to dominate the static margin effect and as a result, less banking competition
tends to raise banks’ default probabilities and undermine financial stability in the short
run. Over time, the short-run equity ratio effect tends to disappear, provided that banks
retain their profits to build up equity. These results are summarized in Proposition 6,
which is formally shown in Appendix B.2.8.
Proposition 6: In the short run, less banking competition can jeopardize financial
stability by lowering banks’ equity ratios. However, when banks retain the greater profits
to build up their equity over time, less banking competition can enhance financial stability.
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The extent of the financial stability gain from less banking competition over time
(long-run equity ratio effect) depends on banks’ dividend distribution or macroprudential
policies. For instance, if banks do not distribute to shareholders and equity is accumulated
over time via past profits, this can lead to a large gain in financial stability from less
banking competition, which is shown in Section 3.4. By restricting banks’ dividend
payment to shareholders, macroprudential policies can thus help to ensure a larger gain
in financial stability under imperfect banking competition.
The model is first calibrated in Section 3.3 and then simulated to illustrate three
model implications. First, less banking competition can lead to a large gain in financial
stability provided that banks accumulate equity over time. This shows the relevance of
macroprudential regulation on banks’ dividend distribution. Second, a bank merger that
reduces banking competition can raise the default probability of the merged bank by
lowering its equity ratio. Third, less banking competition leads to a larger macroeconomic
efficiency loss and whether this efficiency loss outweighs the financial stability gain
depends on the extent of equity accumulation and macroeconomic volatility.
3.3 Calibration
The model is calibrated to match the data for Germany during the period of 1999-2014
on nine key variables, i.e., 5-bank asset concentration ratio, HHI concentration index
(Herfindahl-Hirschman Index), mean market share, corporate lending rate, interest income
to total assets ratio, non-interest expense to total assets ratio, loan impairment cost
ratio, equity ratio, and bank’s default probability. The first four variables indicate banks’
market power and concentration in the banking sector, while the remaining variables
include ratios that indicate banks’ leverage, profitability and cost efficiency.
The last column in Table 3.1 shows the mean values of the nine variables in the data
for Germany. The net corporate lending rate (Rb,t − 1) is empirically constructed by
averaging two country-level corporate lending rate series (i.e., for loans of up to 1 million
EUR and for loans of over 1 million EUR) across years (2000-2014), where the lending
rates are from the ECB. HHI is the sum of squared market shares of all banks, where the
market share of a given bank in a given year kj,t
kt
is computed as the ratio of the bank’s
total assets to the sum of total assets of all banks in that year.20 HHI ranges from 1
N
to one and a higher value implies higher bank concentration. The 5-bank concentration
ratio is the sum of the market shares of the five largest banks by total assets. Both
concentration measures are obtained from the ECB and the numbers reported in Table
3.1 are mean values over the period of 1999-2014. The remaining variables are calculated
20Loans are assumed to be the only assets on banks’ balance sheets in the model, so total assets are
used to proxy for kj,t empirically.
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using Bankscope annual balance sheet data for six types of banks in Germany during the
period of 1999-2014.21
The loan impairment cost ratio in the model is Rb,tkj,t(1−Et[G(ϵt+1)])
Rb,tkj,t
, where the numerator
reflects the loss in gross loan revenue due to non-performing loans and the denominator is
the gross loan revenue if all loans are repaid. Empirically, the loan impairment charge is
used to proxy for the numerator and gross loans are used as the denominator since gross
loan revenue is not available in data. So the loan impairment charge to gross loans ratio
is used to proxy for the loan impairment cost ratio (1− Et[G(ϵt+1)]) in the model. The
average total equity to total assets ratio nj,t
kj,t
across banks in Germany over 1999-2014 is
around 7.2%, so the desired equity ratio κ∗ is set to be 7.2%. Interest income to total
assets π
B
j,t
kj,t
is calculated as the gross interest and dividend income net of the total interest
expense over total assets. The marginal intermediation cost τj in the model is empirically
proxied by total non-interest expenses to total assets ratio. Bank’s default probability
in the model is Γ(ϵ¯j,t+1), where Γ(.) is the c.d.f. the aggregate shock distribution. The
risk-neutral annual bank’s default probability of 2.01% in the data is computed from the
average CDS spread of 122 basis points across German banks during 2003-2014 based on
Hull (2012).22
Table 3.1: Matching Key Variables with Data for Germany During 1999-2014
Variable Model (N=60) Model (N=60) Data
Identical τ Heterogeneous τ Germany
5-bank asset concentration 0.083 0.229 0.249
HHI (total assets) 0.017 0.025 0.021
Net corporate lending rate 5.07% 5.07% 4.06%
Loan impairment charge/gross loans 0.006 0.006 0.006
Non-interest expense/total assets 0.032 0.032 0.026
Bank’s default probability 2.13% 2.13% 2.01%
Interest income/total assets 0.012 0.012 0.024
Mean market share 0.017 0.017 0.000
Desired total equity/total assets 0.072 0.072 0.072
Data sources: ECB, Bankscope, Thomson Reuters EIKON
Note: The numbers reported in the last column are mean values across banks and years (across years)
for bank-level (country-level) variables. Data on the first three variables are from the ECB. The remain-
ing variables except for bank’s default probability are computed using Bankscope annual statements.
Variables from Bankscope are winsorized at 1% of the top and the bottom of the distribution. Bank’s
default probability is calculated using the average CDS spread across banks from Thomson Reuters
EIKON. All the numbers in the two model columns are model results, except for the desired equity to
assets ratio which is calibrated.
21The sample of banks used consists of bank holding companies, commercial banks, cooperative banks,
finance companies, real estate & mortgage banks, and savings banks.
22Following Egan et al. (2017) and Hull (2012), the probability of default is calculated under a risk
neutral model with a constant hazard rate, assuming that the recovery rate is 40% and the risk-free rate
or LIBOR is 3%.
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I calibrate the model parameters to match the value of these nine variables in the
data for Germany. Table 3.1 compares the mean values of these variables computed
using the simulated data with those in the real data. The capital share α is set at 0.3. A
value of α larger than 0.5 leads to an unrealistically large gross loan rate.23 The desired
equity-to-assets ratio is set at 0.072 to match the average equity ratio of around 7.2%
across banks in Germany during 1999-2014. Both the deterministic productivity level A
and the exogenous gross deposit rate R is set at one. The distribution for the idiosyncratic
productivity shock ω is assumed to be lognormal with the mean set to be -0.15, so that
the probability of entrepreneurs’ default F (ω¯t+1) is around 3%, following the literature
(e.g., Bernanke et al., 1999). Since the expected value of ω is one, the variance of the
log-normal distribution needs to be 0.3. The distribution for the aggregate productivity
shock ϵ is assumed to be lognormal with the variance chosen to be 0.28 to match the
average default probability of 2.01% in data. The collection cost parameter µ ∈ [0, 1] is
set at 0.04 to match the mean loan impairment charge to gross loans ratio of 0.006.
Banks’ marginal intermediation costs τj are randomly drawn from a reverse bounded
Pareto distribution with a support of [0.001, 0.04] and a shape parameter of 0.1.24 The
distribution needs to be bounded to ensure a non-negative market share. In essence, the
bounded Pareto distribution is the conditional distribution that results from restricting
the domain of the Pareto distribution to [0.001, 0.04]. As shown in (3.17), τj cannot be
larger than a certain factor of the mean τ¯ , otherwise bank j is too inefficient to operate
profitably. The bounded Pareto distribution is reversed to give a long left tail, such that
most simulated banks have a τj close to 0.04 and only a few banks will have a relatively
low τj close to 0.001, resulting in a market share distribution with a few large dominant
banks and a lot of small inefficient banks. High bank concentration and a small mean
market share across banks in the data, as can be seen in Table 3.1, indicate that the
banking sector tends to be dominated by a few dominant players with high market shares,
alongside a lot of small banks with very low market shares. The support of [0.001, 0.04]
is chosen to match the average non-interest expense to total assets ratio (or τ¯ in the
model) of 0.026. The shape parameter is chosen to be 0.1 to give a skewed distribution
for market shares. More details on the distribution for τ can be found in Appendix B.3.1.
Together with the calibration for the aggregate shock distribution, the number of
banks N is chosen to be 60 to match the concentration measures, mean market share,
average corporate lending rate, and the interest income to assets ratio with empirical
data. Further increasing N lowers the mean market share and brings it closer to the
23For example, α = 0.7 gives Rb higher than 1.5 for N ranging from 1 to 20.
24Increasing the upper bound of the support will raise the mean marginal intermediation cost across
banks τ¯ and the equilibrium loan rate. The support of [0.001, 0.04] means the lowest and highest value
that τj can take is 0.001 and 0.04 respectively. The shape parameter is the tail index and a smaller value
gives a heavier tail. The Pareto distribution is a skewed and heavy-tailed distribution that allows a more
dispersed distribution of bank efficiency, which gives rise to a more unequal market share distribution.
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mean market share of almost zero in data, but at the same time, it also reduces the
interest income to total assets ratio due to a lower equilibrium loan rate.
Table 3.1 shows that bank concentration measures computed using the simulated data
based on the model with heterogeneous banks (with different τj) are very close to the
measures in the data. In contrast, the concentration measures predicted by the model
with identical banks (τj = τ¯ ∀ j) are much lower than those in the data. This is because
with N = 60, each identical bank only has a small market share. A summary table of the
calibrated parameters is shown in Table B.1 in Appendix B.3.2.
3.4 Simulation Results
Using the calibrated model, this section illustrates the long-run equity ratio effect,
the short-run equity ratio effect and quantifies the relative importance of the financial
stability gains and macroeconomic efficiency losses associated with imperfect banking
competition.25 Section 3.4.1 shows the average financial stability gain across heterogeneous
banks relative to the perfect banking competition benchmark over time, for different
numbers of banks N and different bank dividend distribution or macroprudential policies.
In addition, it also shows the financial stability gain for banks with different market
shares relative to the perfect banking competition benchmark over time under a given
level of banking competition (or a given N). Section 3.4.2 uses a bank merger scenario
to illustrate the short-run equity ratio effect. Section 3.4.3 quantifies the macroeconomic
efficiency loss from imperfect banking competition and constructs a new measure to
compare its importance relative to the financial stability gain.
3.4.1 Financial Stability Gain from Imperfect Banking Compe-
tition
This section illustrates the long-run equity ratio effect, assuming all banks have the same
initial equity ratio across different levels of banking competition, to focus on the effect of
the number of banks N on financial stability.
In this section, the financial stability gain of bank j is measured by the difference
between the default probability of the representative bank under perfect banking com-
petition Γ(ϵ¯PCt+1) and bank j’s default probability under imperfect banking competition
Γ(ϵ¯j,t+1):
Financial Stability Gain of Bank j = Γ(ϵ¯PCt+1)− Γ(ϵ¯j,t+1) (3.24)
25The model consists of a few systems of nonlinear equations, which are solved using Julia JuMP and
Ipopt. More specifically, after solving for the equilibrium loan rate and the market shares, the profit
of each bank is known and the equity accumulation process can be determined for each bank under
different banks’ dividend distribution or macroprudential policies. Given the equity dynamics of banks,
their default thresholds or default probabilities in each period can be solved.
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where Γ(ϵ) is the continuous c.d.f. for the aggregate shock ϵ. Following (3.22), the default
threshold of the representative bank ϵ¯PCt+1 is determined by:
RPCb,t G(ϵ¯PCt+1)− (Rt + τ¯) +Rt
nt
kt
= 0 (3.25)
where the equilibrium gross loan rate RPCb,t under perfect competition can be found from
the equilibrium loan rate (3.15) by setting N to infinity. The representative bank is
assumed to have a marginal intermediation cost of τ¯ , which equals the mean marginal
intermediation cost across banks under imperfect banking competition. Without aggregate
shocks, the representative bank under perfect competition always makes a zero profit, so
the equity ratio nt
kt
is equivalent to its initial level and its default threshold ϵ¯PCt+1 is constant
over time. By contrast, each bank under imperfect competition has a different marginal
intermediation cost and hence a different profit margin, which leads to differences in
equity ratios and thus default thresholds across banks and over time.
Figure 3.2 plots the average financial stability gain across heterogeneous banks for
different levels of competition (i.e., different number of banks N) and the financial stability
gain of banks with different market shares for a given (baseline) level of N .26 In each case,
the effects on financial stability gains over time are shown for the three different bank
dividend distribution or macroprudential policies presented in Section 3.2.2. For each
N , banks’ marginal intermediation costs τj are randomly drawn from the same reverse
bounded Pareto distribution. To focus on the effects coming from imperfect banking
competition for a fixed N , assume the realization of aggregate shocks is ϵ = 1 throughout.
Graphs in the first column of Figure 3.2 plot the average financial stability gain
(in percentage points) of heterogeneous banks under imperfect banking competition, so
1
N
∑
j
(
Γ(ϵ¯PCt+1)− Γ(ϵ¯j,t+1)
)
∗ 100, following (3.24). As can be seen in graph I(a) of Figure
3.2, the average financial stability gain across banks in period 1 is slightly higher for
smaller N (i.e., less banking competition), which is purely caused by the static margin
effect as banks are assumed to start with the same initial equity ratio for simplicity. But
the differences in financial stability gain across different N are amplified over time due
to bank equity accumulation that leads to higher equity ratios over time. By contrast,
if all positive net profits are distributed away, as shown in graph II(a), bank equity
accumulation is absent and hence the financial stability gain does not increase over time.
The differences in the mean financial stability gain across banks for different N are only
caused by the static margin effect in this case.
Graph III(a) shows the case where banks only distribute profits if their equity ratios
exceed the desired or required level κ∗, which is calibrated to be 0.072 based on the
average equity ratio across banks in Germany during 1999-2014. Starting with zero
initial equity, for smaller values of N , banks face less competition, so they have higher
26The mean financial stability gain of identical banks with the same marginal intermediation cost τ¯ for
different N gives very similar results to the case of heterogeneous banks with different τj , so the former
case is not shown in this section.
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Figure 3.2: Financial Stability Gain from Imperfect Banking Competition
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II(a) Distribute All Positive Net Profits
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III(a) Distribute if Equity Ratio > 0.072
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III(b) Distribute if Equity Ratio > 0.072
Time
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0.0518
0.0214
0.0123
0.0082
0.0059
ms(j)
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
ﬁn
an
cia
l s
ta
bi
lit
y 
ga
in
 (p
p)
Note: Financial stability gain is measured by the differences in banks’ default probabilities between
perfect and imperfect banking competition, based on (3.24). Graphs in the first column plot the average
stability gain (in percentage points) across heterogeneous banks with different marginal intermediation
cost τj over time for different numbers of banks N , while graphs in the second column plot the stability
gain (in percentage points) of 5 different banks at 5 percentiles (1st, 25th, 50th, 75th, 99th) of the
equilibrium market share ms∗j for N = 60. Each row shows a different case of bank dividend distribution
or macroprudential policies.
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profits and accumulate equity faster, resulting in lower default probabilities compared to
the perfect banking competition benchmark. As a result, their financial stability gains
increases more quickly during the first few periods. Once banks’ equity ratios reach
κ∗, (positive) profits are distributed to shareholders, so there is no further increase in
financial stability gains, as shown in graph III(a).
Comparing graph I(a) without dividend distribution to graph II(a) with full distri-
bution of positive profits shows the power of the long-run equity ratio effect. Since the
financial stability gain from less banking competition is largely attributed to the accumu-
lation of greater profits over time rather than the static margin effect, macroprudential
policies that limit banks’ dividend distribution can significantly increase the financial
stability gains.
Graphs in the second column of Figure 3.2 plot the financial stability gain of banks
with different market shares under a given level of competition (N = 60 as in the baseline
calibration) over time. Banks are ranked according to their marginal intermediation
costs τj, where banks with lower τj have higher equilibrium market shares. Five banks
at five different percentiles (1st, 25th, 50th, 75th, 99th) of τj are plotted. The legend
shows the corresponding equilibrium market share for each bank msj. As can be seen
in graph I(b), when there is no dividend distribution, a more efficient larger bank has a
higher financial stability gain over time due to a higher profit margin and faster equity
accumulation. By contrast, when profits are distributed away, as shown in graph II(b),
differences in financial stability gain between banks are purely caused by the differences
in profit margins (margin effect), which are relatively small compared to the differences
caused by equity accumulation. Graph III(b) shows that when banks distribute only if
their equity ratios exceed κ∗, the financial stability gain of a larger bank is higher due to
a larger profit margin and faster equity accumulation. Once banks’ equity ratios reach
κ∗, the differences in the financial stability gain across banks are purely caused by the
margin effect. As shown in graph III(b), the smallest bank with a market share of 0.59%
accumulates equity very slowly due to a lower profit margin and even after 10 periods,
its equity ratio still has not reached κ∗.
3.4.2 Bank Merger Scenario
This section illustrates the short-run equity ratio effect using a bank merger scenario
where solvent banks that survived a crisis merge with distressed banks that have little
equity. This is an interesting case to look at since the massive public intervention and
bank mergers during the 2007-2009 crisis have distorted banking competition and led to
increased bank concentration in many countries (Vives, 2011).27 Unlike an increase in the
number of banks N , which is clearly due to new entrants, a reduction in N can be caused
27Perotti and Suarez (2002) specifically look at the merger policy that promotes takeovers of failed
banks by solvent banks and argue that this policy can reinforce financial stability by raising banks’
expected profits and thus reducing their risk taking. However, I find that these bank mergers can
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Figure 3.3: Financial Stability Gain after Solvent Banks Merge with Distressed Banks
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(b) Distribute if Equity Ratio > 0.109
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Note: The two graphs plot the average financial stability gain (in percentage points) across the merged
banks, computed using (3.24), under different initial levels of N as shown in the legend. In graph (a) vs
(b), half of the banks with an equity ratio of 0.072 vs 0.109 merge in period 1 with the other half
distressed banks with zero equity, so N reduces to N2 from period 1 onwards. The desired equity ratio
κ∗ is assumed to be 0.072 vs 0.109 in graph (a) vs (b).
by bank exits or bank mergers. The magnitude and the direction of the short-run equity
ratio effect depend on the causes for the reduction in N . In the case of bank exits, the
remaining banks’ equity levels are unaffected, so their equity ratios unambiguously fall
after the increase in concentration. By contrast, in the case of a bank merger, the equity
of the merged bank (which is the sum of the two banks’ equity levels before the merger)
increases. Nevertheless, when a solvent bank merges with a distressed bank with little
equity, the equity of the merged bank may not increase as much relative to the increase
in loan quantity due to the greater market power, resulting in a lower equity ratio.28
Assume there are N banks in period 0, with half being relatively more efficient with
a lower marginal intermediation cost τj of 0.024, and the other half being less efficient
with a higher marginal intermediation cost of 0.04.29 An adverse aggregate productivity
shock in period 0 wipes out the equity of those inefficient banks, so they are left with zero
equity. The efficient banks are also affected by the aggregate shock but are less badly hit
and have a positive equity ratio of κ∗ = 0.072 in graph (a) of Figure 3.3. In period 1,
each solvent bank merges with one distressed bank whose equity was wiped out in period
undermine financial stability in the short run by looking at their effect on the equity ratios of the merged
banks.
28In the model, when two identical banks with the same equity ratio merge, the increase in equity
will more than offset the increase in loan quantity, leading to an increase in its equity ratio and a lower
default probability even in the short run. Technically, each merged bank has greater market power and
thus a higher loan quantity after the merger. However, the merged bank’s loan quantity does not double
compared to each individual bank’s loan quantity before the merger due to the fall in aggregate loan
quantity with less banking competition, while its equity doubles, so its equity ratio goes up in the short
run.
29In this case, the inefficiency τm of the merged bank is the average of the two banks before the merger,
which is 0.032, equivalent to the average bank inefficiency in the baseline calibration shown in Table 3.1.
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0.30 Assume the inefficiency τm of the merged bank is the average inefficiency τj of the
two banks before the merger, so the mean bank inefficiency τ¯ does not change with N .
The bank mergers in period 1 reduce the number of banks to N2 from period 1 onwards,
resulting in less banking competition. Consequently, the financial stability gain would be
expected to increase due to the higher profit margin on performing loans that provides a
buffer against loan losses (margin effect). The graphs in Figure 3.3, however, show the
opposite in most cases. The graphs plot the average financial stability gain (in percentage
points) of a merged bank after the bank mergers for different initial numbers of banks
N before the mergers. As long as N is not too small (e.g., N = 20 in graph (a)), the
financial stability gain falls after the bank mergers. This is because the short-run equity
ratio effect (due to the drop in the merged bank’s equity ratio) dominates the margin
effect. Since the solvent bank does not inherit much equity from the distressed bank,
the equity of the merged bank only increases a little after the merger. Meanwhile, the
merged bank has greater market power and thus a larger loan quantity under less banking
competition, so the equity ratio of the merged bank falls. The lower equity ratio of the
merged bank in period 1 leads to a fall in financial stability gain in period 2. Since the
margin effect is weaker with larger N (i.e., more intense banking competition), the fall in
financial stability gain is more noticeable for larger N .
Furthermore, when the initial equity of the solvent bank is larger, the short-run equity
ratio effect is stronger, as shown in graph (b). This follows from (3.23), which shows that
the short-run equity ratio effect is absent when the initial equity is zero. When the initial
equity is larger, the increase in loan quantity caused by the merger has a larger impact
on reducing the merged bank’s equity ratio. As shown in graph (b), where solvent banks
are assumed to have an initial equity ratio of 0.109,31 even when N decreases from 20 to
10 after the bank mergers, the short-run equity ratio effect still dominates the margin
effect and hence the financial stability gain falls in period 2. So in the short run, less
banking competition can jeopardize financial stability due to a stronger short-run equity
ratio effect relative to the static margin effect.
3.4.3 Efficiency Loss from Imperfect Banking Competition
This section quantifies the macroeconomic efficiency loss associated with imperfect
banking competition in terms of the reduction in expected output and compares it with
the financial stability gain. The macroeconomic efficiency loss from imperfect banking
competition is computed as:
Macroeconomic Efficiency Loss = Et(y
PC
t+1)− Et(yt+1)
Et(yPCt+1)
(3.26)
30Just before the merger in period 1, however, distressed banks also have some equity due to the
realized profits in period 1.
31The mean equity ratio across EU banks from 1999-2014 is 0.109.
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where Et(yt+1) = A(k∗t )α is the expected output with imperfect banking competition when
the loan rate is R∗b,t (3.15). Based on Proposition 1 in Section 3.2.3, the macroeconomic
efficiency loss is larger with less banking competition due to a higher loan rate and thus
a lower demand for physical capital and lower expected output.
To compare the financial stability gain with the macroeconomic efficiency loss, this
section constructs a new measure of financial stability gain in real terms. The financial
stability loss of a bank j is the part of the liabilities (deposits) that the bank defaults on
when it goes bankrupt. More specifically, when the realized aggregate productivity shock
is sufficiently low, i.e., ϵt+1 < ϵ¯j,t+1, bank j’s loss (or negative net profit πBj,t+1) is too
large to be absorbed by its equity nj,t, so πBj,t+1(ϵt+1)+nj,t represents the unabsorbed loss
of bank j or the amount of liabilities (deposits) that bank j defaults on. Since depositors
are assumed to be protected by a full deposit guarantee, in this case, the government
steps in to repay the bank’s depositors. So the financial stability loss when bank j goes
bankrupt is
∫ ϵ¯j,t+1
0
(
πBj,t+1(ϵ) + nj,t
)
dΓ(ϵ), which is negative.
With perfect banking competition, the representative bank is more likely to default
due to a lower profit margin and a lower equity ratio over time, so the expected loss in
financial stability when the representative bank defaults is even larger. Hence, there is a
financial stability gain of bank j from imperfect banking competition relative to perfect
banking competition. The financial stability gain from imperfect banking competition
normalized by the expected output under perfect banking competition is constructed as
follows:
Financial Stability Gain =
∑
j
∫ ϵ¯j,t+1
0
(
πBj,t+1(ϵ) + nj,t
)
dΓ(ϵ)− ∫ ϵ¯PCt+10 (πBt+1(ϵ) + nt) dΓ(ϵ)
Et(yPCt+1)
(3.27)
where Γ(ϵ) is the c.d.f. of the aggregate shock distribution and ϵ¯PCt+1, πBt+1 and nt represent
the default threshold, net profit and equity of the representative bank under perfect
banking competition respectively. The default threshold ϵ¯PCt+1 is calculated using the same
method as shown in (3.25) in Section 3.4.1. The first term in the numerator of (3.27)
represents the total financial stability loss of banks from imperfect banking competition
and the second term shows the financial stability loss of the representative bank from
perfect banking competition.
To quantify the importance of the financial stability gain relative to the macroeconomic
efficiency loss from imperfect banking competition, I construct the following net gain
measure:
Net Gain = Financial Stability Gain−Macroeconomic Efficiency Loss
=
∑
j
∫ ϵ¯j,t+1
0 (πBj,t+1(ϵ) + nj,t)dΓ(ϵ)−
∫ ϵ¯PCt+1
0 (πBt+1(ϵ) + nt)dΓ(ϵ)− [Et(yPCt+1)− Et(yt+1)]
Et(yPCt+1)
(3.28)
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Figure 3.4: Macroeconomic Efficiency Loss and Financial Stability Gain
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(b) Financial Stability Gain
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Note: Graph (a) plots the macroeconomic efficiency loss (%) based on (3.26) across different levels of
banking competition, with the number of banks N ranging from 1 to 100. Assuming there is no
dividend distribution to shareholders, graph (b) plots the output measure for financial stability gain (%)
based on (3.27) in period 1, 5, and 10 respectively, with the baseline calibration for the standard
deviation of the aggregate shock ϵ distribution (i.e., sd(ϵ) = 0.53) and different N ranging from 1 to 100.
Figure 3.5: Compare Macroeconomic Efficiency Loss with Financial Stability Gain
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(b) Net Gain in Period 10
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Note: Graphs (a) and (b) plot the net gain (%) based on (3.28) in period 1 and 10 respectively, for
different number of banks N ranging from 5 to 100 and different standard deviations of the aggregate
shock ϵ distribution, assuming there is no dividend distribution to shareholders.
which is the difference between the financial stability gain (3.27) and the macroeconomic
efficiency loss (3.26) resulting from imperfect banking competition. As can be seen from
(3.28), the net gain measure is positive when the financial stability gain outweighs the
macroeconomic efficiency loss.
Graph (a) in Figure 3.4 plots the macroeconomic efficiency loss across different number
of banks N , which is computed following (3.26). As can be seen in graph (a), there is a
large macroeconomic efficiency loss when there is very little competition (i.e., N is very
small). For example, with a monopoly bank, the expected output is 40% lower than that
with a perfectly competitive banking sector. When N increases, the loan rate becomes
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lower and approaches the the loan rate under perfect banking competition, which leads
to a higher demand for physical capital and higher expected output.
Graph (b) in Figure 3.4 plots the output measure for the financial stability gain across
different number of banks N and in three different time periods, which is computed
following (3.27). The graph is plotted under the baseline calibration for the standard
deviation of the aggregate shock distribution of 0.53, which gives a bank default probability
of around 2.13%. As the standard deviation increases during the volatile times, for
instance, the financial stability gain also rises. As can be seen from graph (b), the
financial stability gain increases over time due to bank equity accumulation under
imperfect banking competition, which leads to higher bank equity ratios and thus lower
bank default probabilities.
Graphs (a) and (b) in Figure 3.5 plot the net gain measure based on (3.28) with
different number of banks N and different standard deviations of the distribution for the
aggregate shock ϵ in period 1 and 10 respectively.32 Assume banks are identical and have
zero initial equity across different levels of N (including perfect banking competition
when N approaches infinity). The differences in the average financial stability gain across
different N in period 1 are caused by the margin effect. As can be seen from graph
(a), when there is only the static margin effect, the net gain measure is negative and
approaches zero as N tends to infinity. This is because in the absence of bank equity
accumulation, the financial stability gain from imperfect banking competition is very
small and is always outweighed by the macroeconomic efficiency loss. In this case, perfect
banking competition is the best.
However, as banks under imperfect banking competition accumulate equity over time
and have higher equity ratios than their counterparts under perfect banking competition,
the net gain starts to turn positive during more volatile times when the standard deviation
of the aggregate shock distribution is high, implying that the financial stability gain can
outweigh the macroeconomic efficiency loss over time, as shown in graph (b). This also
depends on the degree of imperfect banking competition.
More specifically, when there is very little competition (i.e., the number of banks
is below 5), the macroeconomic efficiency loss is very large, as shown in graph (a)
in Figure 3.4, which overrides any financial stability gain. As a result, even in the
presence of bank equity accumulation, the net gain is still negative for small values of N .
When there are more than six banks, the macroeconomic efficiency loss from imperfect
banking competition is not too substantial and the financial stability gain due to equity
accumulation over time can outweigh the macroeconomic efficiency loss, as can be seen
from graph (b) in Figure 3.5. The net gain in period 10 is almost 2% when there are ten
banks and aggregate volatility is high.
32In Figure 3.5, the number of banks N ranges from 5 to 100 to make the differences between the lines
more noticeable.
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3.5 Data
Bank-level data on annual financial statements information are from Bankscope, which are
used to calculate national concentration in the banking sector (i.e., Herfindahl Hirschman
Index (HHI) and the 5-bank asset concentration ratio). The ECB Macroprudential
database provides these two concentration measures estimated based on the total assets
of credit institutions authorized in a given country, however, these measures are only
available for EU countries. Using Bankscope data, I compute the two concentration
measures for both EU and OECD countries.
There are two difficulties in computing the national banking concentration. First,
some banks can have multiple statements with different consolidation code in Bankscope
(i.e., unconsolidated statements U2 and consolidated statements C2).33 To avoid double
counting, only one of U2 or C2 should be kept for each bank. Keeping C2 means
consolidated statements are used wherever possible when computing bank concentration.
This may be appropriate if the controlled subsidiaries are domestic, so using consolidated
statements may better reflect the national bank concentration. However, if the controlled
subsidiaries are foreign, then using consolidated statements can overestimate the national
concentration. In this paper, I choose to drop C2 and use unconsolidated statements
wherever possible because the resulted measures align more closely with the ECB estimates.
I use six different types of banks to compute the concentration, i.e., bank holding
companies, commercial banks, cooperative banks, finance companies, real estate &
mortgage banks, and savings banks, since this paper focuses on the types of banks whose
main business is making loans. The types of banks that are dropped only account for
around 5% of the total observations. Graphs for the two concentration measures over
time for each EU or OECD countries in Figure B.1 and B.2 in Appendix B.4.3 show
that in general, the ECB concentration measures have a smaller magnitude than my own
calculation since the sample of banks used by ECB is likely to be larger than my sample.
Second, as noted by Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009), the sample of banks tends to
increase over time in Bankscope, so the observed variation in concentration may be
caused by the data coverage issue. To avoid this problem, I checked the data coverage
for each EU or OECD country in each year using aggregate-level total assets and total
credit data from the ECB and Bank for International Settlements (BIS) respectively.
More specifically, for each EU country in each year, the sum of total assets of banks
from Bankscope is divided by the total assets of all credit institutions from ECB and a
larger ratio indicates better coverage. For each OECD country in each year, the sum of
gross loans of banks from Bankscope is divided by the total credit of domestic banks (to
33There are four main consolidation types in Bankscope, U1, U2, C1, and C2. U2 (U1) refers to
the statement not integrating the statements of the possible controlled subsidiaries or branches of the
concerned bank with (without) a consolidated companion in Bankscope. C2 (C1) refers to the statement
of a mother bank integrating the statements of its controlled subsidiaries or branches with (without) an
unconsolidated companion in Bankscope.
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private non-financial sector) from BIS. After plotting the concentration measures over
time for each country, some extreme changes in concentration from one year to the next
are easily spotted. Using the data on the shares of aggregate-level total assets and total
credit, the number of banks in each year from Bankscope, and the ECB estimates on
bank concentration for comparison, if the extreme changes in concentration in earlier
years are caused by poor data coverage, then the country-year pairs are dropped. Table
B.5 in Appendix B.4.3 shows the Bankscope data coverage (mean values for the shares of
aggregates over time) after dropping country-year pairs with poor data coverage. The
data descriptions for each EU or OECD country including the number of observations
and the number of different types of banks are shown in Table B.4 in Appendix B.4.3.
Quarterly 5-year credit default swap (CDS) spreads for EU or OECD banks are from
Thomson Reuters EIKON.34 There are 218 unique banks in EU or OECD countries that
have quarterly 5-year CDS spreads data available in the EIKON database. Each bank can
have multiple CDS securities, with different seniorities, currencies, restructuring events,
or data providers, which are uniquely identified in the database. Only one CDS security is
kept for each bank. The cleaning procedures can be found in Appendix B.4.1. To analyse
the relationship between banks’ default probabilities proxied by the CDS spreads and
their equity ratios, the cleaned CDS dataset is merged with the quarterly bank-level data
on financial information from Bankscope.35 The difficulty in merging the two datasets is
that using the common identifiers (i.e., ISIN number and Ticker) can only allow me to
match a limited number of banks since some banks are unlisted and some have missing
ISIN or Ticker information in Bankscope. So for banks that cannot be matched by the
identifiers, I manually match the banks from the two data sources using bank names.
In this way, 174 banks can be matched, of which around 65% are commercial banks. I
only keep 6 types of banks, i.e., bank holdings & holding companies, commercial banks,
cooperative banks, finance companies, real estate & mortgage banks, and savings banks.36
The period covered, number of observations in each quarter and other statistics for each
country in the merged sample can be found in Table B.6 in Appendix B.4.3.
Annual country-level variables such as real GDP growth rate and inflation rate
(growth rate of GDP deflator) are from World Bank. Quarterly real GDP growth rates
are from OECD. Dollar/euro exchange rates used to convert the total assets of credit
institutions into dollar values are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
(FRED). Country-level lending rates used for model calibration are monetary and financial
institution (MFI) interest rates from ECB. Table B.2 in Appendix B.4 summarizes the
data sources used in this paper.
34Monthly spreads are also downloaded and averaged to give the quarterly spreads, which are very
similar to the quarterly spreads and do not affect the results.
35Quarterly Bankscope data has a poor coverage as many banks do not report interim statements.
However, this is not a problem if only looking at a small sample of large banks with CDS spreads data
available.
36I drop 4 investment banks, 1 multi-lateral governmental banks, and 12 specialized governmental
credit institutions. The final sample has 157 banks.
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3.6 Empirical Evidence
The model predicts that when banks retain their profits to build up capital buffer, less
banking competition improves financial stability measured by banks’ default probabilities.
I empirically assess this prediction in two steps. The first step is to test whether banking
competition has an impact on the change in bank equity, where bank concentration is
used as an inverse proxy for banking competition based on the Cournot model. The
second step is to test if banks’ equity ratios are negatively related to banks’ default
probabilities proxied by the CDS spreads. Since only a small sample of large banks have
CDS data available, quarterly bank-level data on financial statements are used to allow
for more data points. Following these two steps, two main empirical specifications based
on the theoretical model are shown in Section 3.6.1 and 3.6.2. Finally, in Section 3.6.3,
I also assess the model prediction in one step by investigating the direct relationship
between banking competition and banks’ default probabilities.
3.6.1 Imperfect Bank Competition and Change in Bank Equity
Following the dynamics of bank’s equity accumulation (3.9), bank j’s equity nj,t is the
sum of the equity in the previous period nj,t−1 and the realized net profit net of any
dividends Dj,t paid.37 Equivalently, after rearranging (3.9),
nj,t +Dj,t −Rt−1nj,t−1
kj,t−1
= Rb,t−1G(ϵt)− (Rt−1 + τj) (3.29)
where G(ϵt) ≡ [1− F (ω¯t(ϵt))] + 1−µω¯t(ϵt)
∫ ω¯t(ϵt)
0 ωf(ω)dω < 1 is the fraction of Rb,tkj,t earned
by bank j when the aggregate shock takes a value of ϵt. The right hand side of the
equation (3.29) is the profit margin that is negatively related to the number of banks N ,
since the equilibrium loan rate decreases with N (Proposition 1). As a result, a lower N
or higher concentration raises the pre-dividend change in equity nj,t+Dj,t−nj,t−1
kj,t−1
by raising
the equilibrium loan rate and hence the profit margin. The observed equity nj,t from the
bank’s balance sheet is net of the cash dividend. As long as some positive net profits
are retained as equity, then the change in equity nj,t−nj,t−1
kj,t−1
is expected to be larger for a
smaller N or less banking competition. Based on equation (3.29), the following empirical
specification is used in the baseline analysis:
nj,c,t − nj,c,t−1
kj,c,t−1
= β0 + β1Nc,t−1 + β′X + βj + βt + βc + εj,c,t (3.30)
37In this paper, dividends Dj,t are paid via cash or share repurchase, in which case the dividend
payment leads to a reduction in total equity. In reality, another way to pay dividend is through stock
dividend (issuing more shares), which does not reduce total equity and simply results in a reallocation of
equity funds, that is, retained earnings decrease and paid-in-capital increases by the same amount. The
reason to use total equity as a proxy for nj,t instead of retained earnings is because total equity is a
more relevant measure for capital buffer and in addition, around 53% of observations for EU countries
would be lost if using retained earnings.
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where j, c and t denote bank, country, and year respectively, and βj, βc, and βt denote
bank, country and year fixed effects respectively. X is a vector of bank-level and country-
level control variables and β′ is a row vector of the coefficients associated with each
element in X. In the baseline results shown in Table 3.2, the change in equity over
lagged assets nj,t−nj,t−1
kj,t−1
is used as the dependent variable. For robustness check, I also
use nj,t+Dj,t−nj,t−1
kj,t−1
as the dependent variable, where Dj,t is proxied by cash dividends.
Since lagged bank concentration (proxy for Nc,t−1) is the main variable of interest that
varies on country-year level, a pooled sample of different countries is used to control for
the year fixed effects and exploit the cross-country variation.38 Lagged number of banks
Nc,t−1 is proxied by lagged Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) or lagged 5-bank asset
concentration ratio as one robustness check, as can be seen in Table B.8 in Appendix
B.5. The vector X includes lagged loan impairment charge to gross loans ratio at the
bank-year level, inflation rate (measured by the growth rate of GDP deflator) and lagged
real GDP growth rate at the country-year level. Summary statistics of the key variables
are shown in Table B.3 in Appendix B.4.3.
Table 3.2 shows the results by regressing the change in total equity over lagged total
assets on lagged HHI, controlling for lagged loan impairment charge to gross loans ratio
(loan impairment ratio), lagged real GDP growth rate and inflation rate (i.e., the growth
rate of GDP deflator). The measure HHI (ECB) is directly obtained from the ECB, while
HHI (Bankscope) is calculated from Bankscope annual data. Lagged loan impairment
ratio and lagged GDP growth rate capture the variable G(ϵt) in equation (3.29) as they
reflect the borrowers’ ability to repay and hence the potential bank revenue loss due to
non-performing loans. Controlling for inflation rate is because the dependent variable is
not deflated. A higher inflation rate could inflate the change in equity in nominal terms
and hence it should be positively related to the dependent variable. Banks from EU
countries and OECD countries are used as two separate samples. Results without the
controls are also shown in Table 3.2 for comparison.
It can be seen from Table 3.2 that bank concentration has a significant positive effect
on the change in equity over lagged assets, as expected. Column 2 shows that when HHI
(ECB) measure increases by 0.01 (or 10% from its mean of 0.1 across EU countries), the
change in bank equity for EU banks increases by 0.0011 (or 14% relative to the mean
change in bank equity of around 0.008 for EU banks). HHI calculated using Bankscope
data gives smaller coefficients than the ECB measure, which can be explained by the
differences in the data sources. Figure B.1 in Appendix B.4.3 compares the HHI from
my own calculation with the HHI estimates from the ECB. As can be seen from Figure
B.1, although the two measures have similar time variation in many EU countries such
as Czech Republic, France, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, and Spain, in general, the
HHI from the ECB tends to be smaller in mangnitude than the one calculated using
38Regressions run separately for each country with year fixed effects will absorb the concentration
variable.
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Table 3.2: The Effect of Bank Concentration (HHI) on Change in Total Equity over
Lagged Total Assets in EU and OECD Countries during 1999-2014
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EU EU EU EU OECD OECD
L.HHI (ECB) 0.14∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
L.HHI (Bankscope) 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
L.loan impairment ratio -0.06∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
L.GDP growth rate 0.11∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
inflation rate 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Observations 44,419 44,419 45,033 45,033 199,317 199,317
Number of banks 4,875 4,875 4,936 4,936 19,230 19,230
Adjusted R2 0.270 0.279 0.265 0.275 0.105 0.110
Within R2 0.004 0.015 0.001 0.015 0.001 0.008
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-level clustered standard errors in parentheses
Data sources: Bankscope annual data, ECB, World Bank
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table shows the results from regressing the change in total equity over lagged total assets
on lagged concentration index HHI, controlling for lagged loan impairment ratio (computed as loan
impairment charge/gross loans), lagged real GDP growth rate (based on GDP in constant 2010 US
dollar) and inflation rate (growth rate of GDP deflator). HHI (ECB) refers to the ECB estimate of
HHI based on total assets of credit institutions in EU countries. HHI (Bankscope) is calculated
using 6 types of banks (i.e., bank holding companies, commercial banks, cooperative banks, finance
companies, real estate & mortgage banks, and savings banks) from Bankscope annual data.
Bankscope data, which is potentially due to a larger sample of credit institutions used by
ECB.39
The signs of the other variables are also consistent with expectations. A higher loan
impairment ratio lowers the equity due to loan losses, as a result, it is negatively related
to the change in equity, as shown in Table 3.2. A higher GDP growth rate implies that
more entrepreneurs would be able to repay their loans so it is positively related to change
in equity. Inflation rate has a positive coefficient, as a higher inflation rate leads to a
higher change in equity in nominal terms.
Results from four main robustness checks are shown in Appendix B.5. First, the
regressions in Table 3.2 are re-run using 5-bank concentration ratio as an alternative
inverse measure for Nc,t. As shown in Table B.8, 5-bank ratio from ECB still has a
39The comparison between 5-bank concentration ratio from ECB and the ratio calculated using
Bankscope data is shown in Figure B.2 in Appendix B.4.3. Similar patterns are also observed for the
5-bank concentration ratio. In spite of a larger magnitude of the ratio calculated using Bankscope data,
its time variation resembles that of the ECB measure in many EU countries.
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Table 3.3: The Effect of Bank Equity Ratio on Bank CDS Spread in EU, Eurozone and
OECD Countries during 2003-2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EU EU Eurozone Eurozone OECD OECD
L.equity ratio -0.34∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗ -0.32∗∗ -0.23∗ -0.33∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10)
L.loan impairment ratio 0.59∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.17) (0.12)
L.GDP growth rate -0.74∗∗∗ -1.00∗∗∗ -0.43∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.18) (0.14)
Observations 1,344 1,340 998 994 3,008 2,871
Number of Banks 50 50 38 38 108 104
Adjusted R2 0.723 0.752 0.727 0.763 0.690 0.719
Within R2 0.060 0.159 0.056 0.180 0.093 0.175
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-level clustered standard errors in parentheses
Data sources: Thomson Reuters EIKON, Bankscope quarterly data, OECD
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table shows the results from regressing 5-year CDS spreads on banks’ equity ratios, controlling
for loan impairment charge to gross loans ratios, and real GDP growth rate. Bank, country and quarter
fixed effects are included in all regressions. Quarterly data are used and all variables are in decimal
places. Lagged explanatory variables are used. The sample consists of 6 types of banks (i.e., bank holding
companies, commercial banks, cooperative banks, finance companies, real estate & mortgage banks, and
savings banks).
highly significant positive effect on change in equity over lagged assets, while the measure
calculated using Bankscope data is not significant in the sample of EU countries. Second,
the samples of EU countries and OECD countries are further split into Eurozone countries,
non-Eurozone EU countries, and non-EU OECD countries. As can be seen in Table B.9,
HHI still has a siginificant positive coefficient, except for the Euro area countries when
HHI is calculated using Bankscope data, which may be because the ECB measure is more
reliable. Besides, the results tend to suggest that HHI has a larger impact on the change
in equity for non-Eurozone EU countries than the Eurozone countries. Third, instead of
using post-dividend change in equity over lagged assets as the dependent variable, cash
dividends are added back. That is, change in equity plus cash dividends over lagged assets
nj,t+Dj,t−nj,t−1
kj,t−1
is used as the dependent variable. As expected, HHI has a slightly larger
impact on the pre-dividend change in equity, as shown in Table B.10. Fourth, the sample
over the period 1999-2014 is split into three different periods, 1999-2006, 2006-2014, and
2010-2014 for EU countries. Using the ECB measures for HHI and 5-bank concentration
ratio, the results show that HHI is not significant during the pre-crisis period 1999-2006,
as can be seen from Table B.11.
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3.6.2 Bank Equity Ratio and Default Probability
According to Proposition 5, banks’ default probabilities are negatively related to banks’
equity ratios. Using the CDS spreads to proxy for banks’ default probabilities, the
following empirical specification is used:
CDS Spreadj,c,t = β0 + β1
nj,c,t−1
kj,c,t−1
+ β′X + βj + βc + βt + εj,c,t (3.31)
where j, c, t denote bank, country and quarter respectively. X is a vector of bank-level
and country-level control variables and β′ is a row vector of the coefficients associated
with each element in X. βj, βc, and βt denote bank, country and quarter fixed effects
respectively. The main variable of interest, nj,c,t−1
kj,c,t−1
, is proxied by lagged bank’s equity to
total assets ratio. The vector X includes lagged loan impairment charge to gross loans
ratio at the bank-quarter level, and lagged real GDP growth rate. The summary statistics
of the CDS spreads and bank equity ratios for each country can be seen in Table B.7 in
Appendix B.4.3.
The sample is divided into different groups of countries, i.e., EU, Eurozone and OECD
countries. Using banks from different samples of countries, Table 3.3 shows that banks’
equity ratios have a negative effect on their CDS spreads over the period of 2003-2016,
controlling for lagged loan impairment charge to gross loans ratios and lagged real GDP
growth rates.40 More specifically, focusing on columns 2, 4 and 6 in Table 3.3, when
bank equity ratios increase from 10% to 11%, their CDS spreads would be reduced by
around 23 to 33 basis points, which represents around 10% to 15% of the mean CDS
spread of around 220 basis points across EU banks. Table 3.3 also shows that a higher
loan impairment charge to gross loans ratio leads to an increase in the CDS spread since
it indicates a higher proportion of non-performing loans. A higher real GDP growth rate
that implies a higher repay capacity of borrowers leads to a lower CDS spread, as shown
in Table 3.3.
Robustness checks using different time periods (i.e., 2003-2011 and 2011-2016) and
different data frequency (i.e., annual data) are shown in Table B.12 and B.13 in Appendix
B.5. Table B.12 shows that equity ratios are not significant during 2003-2011 for EU
countries and Eurozone countries. Using annual data instead of quarterly data does
not change the results much if equity ratios are the only explanatory variable, as shown
in Table B.13, however, it tends to reduce the magnitude and the significance of the
coefficients on equity ratios after controlling for other variables. Another robustness check
is to use country-year fixed effects instead of the quarter fixed effects to control for any
country-level macroeconomic variables that vary over time and any potential time trend
40Hasan et al. (2016) find that market leverage (book value of liabilities over the sum of book value of
liabilities and market value of equity) has a positive effect on banks’ CDS spreads using a sample of 161
global banks during 2001-2011. Similarly, Acosta Smith et al. (2017) find that Tier 1 equity-to-total
assets ratio has a negative effect on bank distress probabilities using data on a binary bank distress
variable for EU banks during 2005-2014.
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in the equity ratio variable. As shown in Table B.14 in Appendix B.5, the coefficients are
significantly negative at 10% level, but the magnitude of the coefficients is smaller for
EU and Eurozone countries.
3.6.3 Imperfect Bank Competition and Default Probability
In this section, I investigate whether imperfect banking competition lowers banks’ default
probabilities using a one-step approach. Table 3.4 shows the results from regressing
banks’ annual CDS spreads (proxy for banks’ default probabilities) on bank concentration
which is used as an inverse proxy for banking competition. In this section, annual CDS
spreads (end of the fourth quarter data) are used since bank concentration has an annual
frequency.
Table 3.4: Direct Relationship between CDS Spread and Concentration Measures in EU Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EU EU EU EU EU EU
2003-2016 2003-2011 2011-2016 2003-2016 2003-2011 2011-2016
L.HHI (ECB) -0.08 -0.03 -0.52∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.09) (0.11)
L.equity ratio -0.04 -0.33∗ 0.05 -0.05 -0.33∗ 0.02
(0.05) (0.19) (0.08) (0.05) (0.19) (0.08)
L.loan impairment ratio 0.50∗∗ 1.12∗∗∗ 0.24 0.50∗∗ 1.12∗∗∗ 0.22
(0.21) (0.36) (0.15) (0.22) (0.36) (0.15)
L.GDP growth rate -0.08 -0.31∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -0.08 -0.31∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.14) (0.02) (0.08) (0.14) (0.02)
L.5-bank ratio (ECB) -0.03 -0.02 -0.16∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
Observations 702 342 422 702 342 422
Number of Banks 76 65 76 76 65 76
Adjusted R2 0.683 0.605 0.866 0.684 0.606 0.863
Within R2 0.093 0.245 0.226 0.095 0.246 0.211
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-level clustered standard errors in parentheses
Data sources: Thomson Reuters EIKON, ECB, Bankscope annual data, World Bank
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table shows the results from regressing 5-year CDS spreads on concentration index HHI or 5-bank concen-
tration ratio, controlling for banks’ equity ratios, loan impairment charge to gross loans ratios, and real GDP growth
rate and including bank, country and year fixed effects. Annual data are used and all variables are in decimal places.
Lagged explanatory variables are used. The sample consists of EU banks and is divided into different sub-samples
based on time periods.
As can be seen from Table 3.4, the concentration index HHI or the 5-bank asset
concentration ratio (both obtained from the ECB) has a significant negative effect on
banks’ CDS spreads during the post-crisis period (2011-2016).41 More specifically, when
41The two different sample periods are divided by 2011 to make sure that the number of observations
in each sample is roughly the same. The results are robust to dividing the whole sample by 2010 or 2012.
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HHI (5-bank concentration ratio) increases by 0.01 or 10% (2%) from its mean of 0.1
(0.6) across EU banks, the CDS spreads would be reduced by around 52 (16) basis points
or 24% (7%) from its mean of 220 basis points across EU banks during 2011-2016. Bank
concentration is only significant during the post-crisis period because the cross-country
variation in CDS spreads during the pre-crisis period is small. The finding is consistent
with the model prediction that in the presence of bank equity accumulation, imperfect
banking competition improves financial stability by lowering banks’ default probabilities.
The signs of the other explanatory variables align with the expectation, as discussed in
Section 3.6.2.
The result is robust to using the Bankscope measures of concentration, as shown
in Table B.15 in Appendix B.5. HHI still has a significant negative effect on banks’
CDS spreads during the post-crisis period and 5-bank concentration ratio is significantly
negative across all different sample periods. Results for OECD countries using the
concentration measures from Bankscope are very similar to those shown in Table B.15.
Finally, excluding banks’ equity ratios gives very similar results, despite the positive
correlation between the equity ratio and bank concentration.
3.7 Conclusions
This paper provides new theoretical and empirical evidence on the effects of imperfect
competition in the banking sector on banks’ equity ratios and thereby financial stability,
which is measured through banks’ default probabilities. By building a model of imperfect
banking competition featuring bank equity accumulation, this paper finds that less
banking competition can lead to a large gain in financial stability, provided that banks
retain the greater profits as equity over time. As a result, macroprudential policies, for
example, by limiting banks’ dividend distribution to shareholders, can help ensure a
larger gain in financial stability from less banking competition.
However, in the short run, a reduction in banking competition can jeopardize financial
stability by lowering banks’ equity ratios. For instance, by allowing solvent banks to
merge with distressed banks to improve financial stability after a crisis, the merged banks
have greater market power and hence more loan assets, resulting in lower equity-to-assets
ratios and therefore higher default probabilities.
In addition, this paper quantifies the financial stability gain from less banking compe-
tition compared to the macroeconomic efficiency loss. In doing so, I find that bank equity
accumulation is important for understanding the trade-off between financial stability
and macroeconomic efficiency. In the absence of bank equity accumulation, i.e., when
there is only the static margin effect, the gain in financial stability from less banking
competition is very limited and is always outweighed by the macroeconomic efficiency loss.
In this case, perfect banking competition is the best. However, when banks accumulate
equity over time, the financial stability gain from less banking competition can be large
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enough to outweigh the macroeconomic efficiency loss, depending on the degree of banking
competition.
More specifically, when there is very little competition, the macroeconomic efficiency
loss is very large and completely outweighs any financial stability gain. For example, with
a monopoly bank, the expected output is 40% lower compared to that with a perfectly
competitive banking sector. Moving away from the extreme case (i.e., when there are
more than six banks), the financial stability gain from imperfect banking competition
can outweigh the macroeconomic efficiency loss.
Using data for EU and OECD countries during 1999-2016, I find supporting evidence
for the model’s prediction that when banks use retained earnings to build up their capital
buffer, less banking competition improves financial stability measured through banks’
default probabilities. I assess this prediction in two steps. First, bank concentration, an
inverse measure for banking competition, has a significant positive effect on the change
in bank equity. Second, banks’ equity ratios have a negative effect on their default
probabilities, which are proxied by the credit default swap spreads. Combining these two
steps into one step, I find that bank concentration has a significant negative effect on
banks’ default probabilities during the post-crisis period, which is consistent with the
model prediction.
As a result, this paper has shown from both a theoretical and empirical perspective
the importance of imperfect banking competition on financial stability.
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Chapter 4
Financial Frictions and Capital
Misallocation
4.1 Introduction
Capital misallocation has important implications on aggregate productivity (Hsieh and
Klenow, 2009; Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008) and understanding the causes of capital
misallocation is one of the central topics in the literature (Gopinath et al., 2017; Midrigan
and Xu, 2014; Bartelsman et al., 2013).1 Capital misallocation refers to the inefficient
distribution of existing capital stock across producers given their productivity. As a con-
tributing factor for capital misallocation, financial frictions or credit market imperfections
have received a lot of attention.2 More recently, there are a few papers aiming to quantify
the impact of financial frictions on capital misallocation by estimating a structural model
(Bai et al., 2018; David and Venkateswaran, 2017; Midrigan and Xu, 2014).
In this paper, I provide an alternative approach to quantify the impact of financial
frictions on capital misallocation, which requires fewer restrictive assumptions and uses
more information from large firm-level datasets. The approach consists of two steps.
First, firms are classified as financially constrained or unconstrained using a switching
regression approach. The idea is that the investment of the two types of firms follows two
different processes, since the investment of constrained firms should be more responsive to
cash flow than that of unconstrained firms. The probability of a firm being constrained is
used to classify firms and is jointly estimated with the two different investment regimes.
Second, assuming that the distribution of the observed marginal revenue product of
capital (MRPK) is a mixture of two distributions, one for each type of firm, this paper
provides a statistical decomposition of capital misallocation, which is measured by the
dispersion (variance) of MRPK. Since the efficient allocation of capital in a neoclassical
1See also Busso et al. (2013), Restuccia and Rogerson (2013).
2The potential impact of financial frictions on resource misallocation and total factor productivity
losses has received a lot of attention in the recent literature. See Gopinath et al. (2017), Gilchrist et al.
(2013), Banerjee and Duflo (2005), etc.
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Figure 4.1: Dispersions and Means of Marginal Revenue Product of Capital (MRPK) in 2015
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Note: The bar chart shows the cross-section variances (or dispersions) and means of the logarithm of the
MRPK for young firms (age 6 15 years) and old firms (age > 15 years) in each of the 20 selected
countries in 2015. Firm age is computed as the difference between the year (2015) and the incorporation
year plus one. MRPK (output elasticity of capital multiplied by output over capital stock based on a
Cobb-Douglas production function) is computed as the nominal revenue (proxy for output) divided by
fixed tangible assets (proxy for capital stock). Since the output elasticity of capital does not affect the
dispersion of the MRPK within a given industry, it is neglected in the computation of the MRPK.
Data source: Orbis
model indicates equalisation of the MRPK across firms, capital misallocation can be
indirectly measured by the dispersion of the MRPK across firms within a given industry
(Restuccia and Rogerson, 2017). The decomposition is motivated by the fact that younger
firms who are more likely to be financially constrained have a higher dispersion and mean
of MRPK than older firms, as can be seen in Figure 4.1. For most countries, it is highly
statistically significant that both the means and the dispersions of MRPK for the young
firms are larger than those for the old firms.3
Using the decomposition and the classified types estimated using large panels of
manufacturing firms for 20 countries from the 1990s to 2015, this paper finds that the
dispersions and means of MRPK for the financially constrained types are much larger
3One-sided t-tests and F-tests are used to test whether young firms have a higher mean and variance
of log MRPK than old firms respectively in each country. The p-values from the t-test are smaller than
0.001 for all countries except for France, Germany, Norway, the UK, while the p-values from the F-test
are smaller than 0.001 for all countries except for Croatia, Finland, Italy, Portugal, and Serbia. A small
p-value for the t-test (F-test) rejects the null hypothesis that the means (variances) of ln MRPK are
equal between the two types of firms.
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than those for the unconstrained firms. For most countries and two-digit industries,
more than a quarter of firms are classified as financially constrained and the presence of
constrained firms can account for more than half of the observed dispersion of MRPK
across firms.
This paper contributes to two strands of literature, namely, the macro literature
on capital misallocation and the empirical finance literature on the impact of financial
frictions on firm investment.
Financial frictions are often regarded as one of the leading contributing factors for
capital misallocation and there are a few papers attempting to quantify the impact
of financial frictions on capital misallocation by estimating a structural model. The
importance of financial frictions is either implied by the estimated parameters or the
predictions of quantitative models. However, whether financial frictions would cause large
aggregate productivity loss via the capital misallocation channel remains unclear (Wu,
2018), which is likely due to the different modelling assumptions and datasets used.
There is evidence that financial frictions play an important role in generating the
dispersion of MRPK in Spain and China. For instance, Gopinath et al. (2017) find that
a size-dependent borrowing constraint is essential in generating the large increase in the
dispersion of MRPK among Spanish manufacturing firms during 1999 and 2007. David
and Venkateswaran (2017) use a quantitative model to find that firm-specific factors
that are correlated with productivity, including financial frictions, account for around
47% of the MRPK dispersion using data for Chinese manufacturing plants from 1998
to 2009. Similar evidence can be found in Bai et al. (2018) who estimate their model
using Chinese private manufacturing plants during 1998-2007. However, there are also
papers showing that financial frictions only cause moderate efficiency losses through
capital misallocation.4 For instance, Midrigan and Xu (2014) calibrate their model using
Korean manufacturing plants during 1991-1996 and find that financial frictions in the
form of borrowing constraints do not lead to substantial aggregate productivity losses via
resource misallocation.
My paper contributes to this strand of literature by proposing a new method to
estimate the impact of financial frictions on capital misallocation, which relies on fewer
restrictive assumptions and thus can be readily applied to a large number of countries.
More specifically, I come up with a credit distortion measure using the decomposition of
the dispersion of MRPK, which measures the fraction of the dispersion of MRPK that
can be attributed to the presence of financially constrained firms. I then compute this
credit distortion measure in each two-digit manufacturing industry from 20 countries
during the period of the 1990s to 2015.
4Gilchrist et al. (2013) adopt a slightly different approach by applying an accounting framework (in
which firm-specific borrowing costs are mapped into measures of resource misallocation) to US listed
manufacturing firms and find that financial frictions are unlikely to be a major factor for resource
misallocation, which is not very surprising as large listed firms tend to have better access to credit than
small unlisted firms.
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I build a simple model of firm dynamics with capital adjustment costs in the form
of a one-period time to build for capital and a financial friction that gives rise to a
borrowing constraint (due to costly debt enforcement as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997))
to derive the empirical specifications in this paper. Based on the model, the investment
of an unconstrained firm is driven by its expected future sales or productivity growth,
while that of a constrained firm is driven by its cash flow. As a result, the MRPK for
constrained and unconstrained firms is determined by different processes.
Given the distribution of the observed MRPK is a mixture of two distributions, one
for each type of firms, I decompose the dispersion of MRPK across all firms into the
dispersions and means of MRPK within the unconstrained and constrained groups of
firms. This statistical decomposition gives new insights into the mechanisms through
which the presence of financially constrained firms affects the extent of the observed
dispersion of MRPK. While the usual mechanism emphasizes that the higher MRPK of
constrained firms relative to the unconstrained firms would lead to a higher dispersion
of MRPK, the decomposition in this paper shows that the dispersions of MRPK within
different groups of firms also matter.5 More importantly, this paper provides a new
credit distortion measure using this decomposition, which measures the fraction of the
dispersion of MRPK that is caused by the presence of constrained firms, but requires
information on firms’ financially constrained status.
The empirical finance literature on financial frictions and firm investment has proposed
various ways to classify firms into constrained and unconstrained groups.6 One common
approach is to divide firms based on one indirect proxy for financial constraints, such
as dividend payout, age, size or leverage (e.g., Moshiriana et al., 2017; Carpenter and
Guariglia, 2008; Alti, 2003; Hubbard et al., 1995; Fazzari et al., 1988). As a direct
extension of this approach, there are a lot of index-based measures of financial constraints
that have been built on various combinations of firm characteristics (e.g., Mulier et al.,
2016; Hadlock and Pierce, 2010; Whited and Wu, 2006; Lamont et al., 2001).7
Alternatively, instead of identifying constrained firms based on some a priori criteria, a
switching regression model could be used to simultaneously estimate the probability that
5For example, the mechanism in Gopinath et al. (2017) operates through the increasing gap in the
MRPK between the constrained and unconstrained firms. In response to a decline in the real interest
rate, unconstrained firms increase their capital demand and experience a decline in their MRPK, while
the constrained firms are not able to invest more capital and their MRPK does not fall, leading to an
increased dispersion of the MRPK in the sector.
6To test whether financial frictions affect firm investment, classification of firms into constrained
and unconstrained groups is often a prerequisite step after which the differential investment behavior
between the two groups of firms can be tested.
7Lamont et al. (2001) construct the KZ index, which is a weighted sum of five accounting ratios,
using the regression coefficients from Kaplan and Zingales (1997) as the weights. An alternative index
measuring the degree of financial constraints (WW index) was constructed by Whited and Wu (2006),
based on estimating an investment Euler equation from a structural model. Hadlock and Pierce (2010)
question the validity of the KZ index and WW index and propose a new measure based on firm size and
age only, arguing that these two firm characteristics are particularly useful in predicting the levels of
financial constraints.
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firms are financially constrained and the two different investment regimes for constrained
and unconstrained firms (e.g., Almeida and Campello, 2007; Hovakimian and Titman,
2006; Hu and Schiantarelli, 1998). The two investment regimes differ in terms of the
sensitivity to cash flow. That is, firm investment should be more sensitive to cash flow
for constrained firms after controlling for the investment opportunity. The probability
estimated using this maximum likelihood approach can be used to classify firms into
constrained and unconstrained groups.
In fact, the switching regression model is closely related to the index-based approach.
The index-based measure of financially constrained status can also give the probability of
a firm being constrained via a logit or probit function. However, this probability does
not use any model structure or data information of the two investment regimes, unlike in
a switching regression. This paper builds on the switching regression model to classify
firms into constrained and unconstrained firms.
This paper contributes to this strand of the empirical finance literature by providing
evidence for unlisted firms and more countries, using new proxies for investment opportu-
nity that are motivated by the theoretical model. Existing literature often uses Tobin’s
q as a proxy for investment opportunity in a sample of US listed firms.8 However, q is
not available for unlisted firms, so this paper uses sales growth, value added growth and
productivity growth as different proxies for investment opportunity, in order to analyse
unlisted firms that are more likely to suffer from financial constraints. Furthermore,
instead of focusing on the US firms, this paper provides new evidence for manufacturing
firms in 20 countries from the 1990s to 2015.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 shows the theoretical
framework and the decomposition of the dispersion of MRPK. Section 4.3 describes the
data and the summary statistics. Section 4.4 shows two different empirical specifications
and the corresponding empirical results. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Theoretical Framework
This section builds a simple model of firm dynamics with one-period time to build
for capital and a borrowing constraint. The model is used to show that the capital
demand and hence the marginal revenue product of capital (MRPK) for unconstrained
and constrained firms are driven by different processes. I then decompose the dispersion
of MRPK across all firms into the dispersions and means within the two types of firms.
The model is also used to derive the two different investment equations for empirical
analysis in Section 4.4.
8In a model with convex capital adjustment costs, marginal q or the shadow value of one additional
unit of capital is a sufficient statistic for investment. However, as pointed out by Schiantarelli (1995),
stock markets may be inefficient and if stock prices are driven by fads, q may not be a good proxy for
investment opportunity.
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4.2.1 Modeling Preliminaries
Assume there are M monopolistically competitive firms in a specific subsector s of the
manufacturing industry, which are infinitely lived, each producing a differentiated product.
Firms are indexed by i, where i = 1, ...,M .9 For notational simplicity, sector subscripts
are suppressed in this theory section. The total industry output yt is a constant elasticity
of substitution (CES) aggregate of M differentiated products:
yt =
(
M∑
i=1
y
ϵ−1
ϵ
i,t
) ϵ
ϵ−1
(4.1)
where yi,t is the real output produced by firm i in period t, and ϵ > 1 is the elasticity of
substitution between varieties. Each firm i in period t produces output yi,t using capital
ki,t−1, which is predetermined (i.e., purchased and installed in period t− 1), materials
mi,t, and labor li,t via an industry-specific Cobb-Douglas production function:
yi,t = Ai,tkαki,t−1mαmi,t l
αl
i,t (4.2)
where Ai,t is the firm-specific physical productivity or total factor productivity (TFP),
and αk ∈ (0, 1), αm ∈ (0, 1) and αl ∈ (0, 1) are the industry-specific output elasticities of
capital, materials and labor, respectively. Assume constant returns to scale such that
αk + αm + αl = 1.
Firms engage in monopolistic competition and each of them charges a price pi,t for
their differentiated product i. Given the aggregate output index yt (4.1), it can be
calculated from the cost minimization problem of the buyers of the industry output that
each firm faces a downward-sloping demand with a constant elasticity ϵ > 1 for their
product:
yi,t =
(
pi,t
pt
)−ϵ
yt (4.3)
where both the industry output yt and the industry price pt are normalized to one in this
partial equilibrium model, following Gopinath et al. (2017). As a result, combining the
production function (4.2) and the demand for the firm’s product (4.3), the revenue-based
production function is:
pi,tyi,t = Zi,tkβki,t−1m
βm
i,t l
βl
i,t (4.4)
where Zi,t ≡ A
ϵ−1
ϵ
i,t is the revenue-based productivity or TFPR, and βk ≡ αk ϵ−1ϵ , βm ≡
αm
ϵ−1
ϵ
and βl ≡ αl ϵ−1ϵ are the industry-specific revenue elasticities of capital, materials
and labor respectively.10 The revenue-based production function is often used in the
9This partial equilibrium model can be used to describe firm dynamics within the manufacturing
industry, as well as any subsector of it, as used in the empirical analysis in Section 4.4.
10Note that βk + βm + βl = ϵ−1ϵ .
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literature because firm-level prices pi,t and output yi,t are often unavailable, while pi,tyi,t
can be empirically measured by nominal revenue or sales.11
Assume that the firm-specific revenue-based productivity can be decomposed into the
product of three independent components, so Zi,t ≡ Ztzizi,t, with a common trend Zt, a
firm-specific component zi and an idiosyncratic component zi,t, where the latter follows
an AR(1) process in logs:
lnzi,t = ρlnzi,t−1 + ei,t (4.5)
with ρ ∈ (0, 1) indicating the persistence of the process, and ei,t ∼ N(0, σ2z) being an
independent and identically normally distributed random variable with mean zero and
variance σ2z .
4.2.2 Firm’s Capital Choice and Financial Frictions
Assume firms own the capital, which depreciates at a rate δ ∈ [0, 1]. They also purchase
and install new capital each period for production in the following period. Assuming
they start with different levels of initial net worth ni,0 at t = 0, firms with low initial
net worth may need to borrow at an exogenous real gross interest rate R0 to finance
the purchase of physical capital ki,0. Similarly, firms with enough net worth to finance
the capital save at the same interest rate.12 Firms install the purchased capital ki,0, and
at the beginning of t = 1, the productivity shocks realize and output yi,1 is produced
using the installed capital ki,0, labor li,1 and materials mi,1. Assume firms hire labor and
acquire materials in a competitive market at an exogenous real wage rate wt and real
price of materials pm,t in each period t. Let ni,t denote the firm’s net worth before its
choice of ki,t and any borrowing bi,t in period t.
Financial friction is modelled via a costly debt enforcement problem, based on Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997). In other words, borrowers cannot be forced to repay unsecured debt.
Since creditors recognize the possibility of default by borrowers, they would never lend
more than what they can obtain in the case of default. Hence, each firm would face a
borrowing constraint that is tied to the value of their collateral, which is the value of
their undepreciated capital:
bi,t 6 φ(1− δ)ki,t (4.6)
where φ ∈ (0, 1) is the loan-to-value ratio.13 Assume firms are risk-neutral and in each
period t, after the production of output and the payments of wage, materials and debt,
there is a constant probability ϕ ∈ (0, 1) that the firm exits, in which case the firm
11The notion of TFPR was introduced by Foster et al. (2008). The heterogeneity in TFPR across
firms can reflect a combination of productivity differences and monopolistic pricing distortions.
12This paper abstracts from other financial frictions such as imperfect banking competition, as analysed
in Chapter 2 and 3.
13Since bi,t is used to buy part of the capital stock ki,t, ki,t is not observed at the time of borrowing
and there is a possibility that the firm absconds with the borrowed fund. To avoid this possibility,
assume that the loan is conditional on the firm using it to purchase capital.
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consumes its net worth ni,t. The surviving firms choose how much capital to purchase
in period t given their net worth ni,t. The exiting firms are replaced by new firms, with
random levels of initial net worth, such that the total number of firms in the industry
stays unchanged.14 Given the firm faces a borrowing constraint, it is reasonable to assume
that the firm delays consumption until the period it exits. Let η ∈ (0, 1) denote the firm’s
discount factor. Each firm i in period t chooses its capital ki,t, labor li,t and materials
mi,t to maximize the expected discounted terminal net worth:15
Et
∞∑
τ=0
ϕ(1− ϕ)τητni,t+1+τ (4.7)
subject to the borrowing constraint (4.6). The net worth ni,t+1 at the beginning of
period t+1 equals the sum of the revenue pi,t+1yi,t+1 and the undepreciated capital stock
(1− δ)ki,t, net of the real wage cost wt+1li,t+1, the real materials cost pm,t+1mt+1, and the
gross debt interest payment Rtbi,t:
ni,t+1 ≡ pi,t+1yi,t+1 − wt+1li,t+1 − pm,t+1mi,t+1 −Rtbi,t + (1− δ)ki,t (4.8)
Using the assumption that firms do not consume until the period they exit and (4.8),
it can be shown that the firm finances the purchase of capital using either the internal
financing (net worth) or external financing (debt):16
ki,t = ni,t + bi,t (4.9)
Using (4.9) to rewrite the borrowing constraint (4.6) in terms of net worth:
ki,t 6
ni,t
1− φ(1− δ) (4.10)
Let λi,t denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the borrowing constraint (4.10),
and let kUi,t and kCi,t denote firm i’s unconstrained capital demand and constrained capital
demand, respectively. It is shown in Appendix C.1.3 and C.1.5 that the firm’s capital
demand ki,t is:
ki,t =
k
U
i,t if λi,t = 0
kCi,t if λi,t > 0
(4.11)
14One example to justify this assumption is that in each period, a random fraction of households start
new firms using their savings as initial net worth.
15In period 0, the firm only chooses capital ki,0 because there is no capital yet to produce.
16Suppose firm i consumes ci,t+1 in period t+ 1, then the firm faces the following budget constraint:
ci,t+1 + ki,t+1 = bi,t+1 + pi,t+1yi,t+1 − wt+1li,t+1 − pm,t+1mt+1 −Rtbi,t + (1− δ)ki,t ≡ bi,t+1 + ni,t+1
Given that the firm does not consume until the period of exit, ci,t+1 = 0 and hence ki,t+1 = bi,t+1+ni,t+1.
In the terminal period T , bi,T = ki,T = 0, so ci,T = ni,T .
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where the log of the capital demand of a constrained firm i is:
lnkCi,t = lnni,t − ln[1− φ(1− δ)] (4.12)
and the log of the capital demand of an unconstrained firm i is:
lnkUi,t =ϵρlnzi,t + (1 + ϵβk)
{
ln
(
βkβ
ϵβl
1+ϵβk
l β
ϵβm
1+ϵβk
m
)
− ln(rt + δ)
+lnEt

 Zt+1
wβlt+1p
βm
m,t+1
 ϵ1+ϵβk
+ ϵ1 + ϵβk lnzi + σ
2
zϵ
2
2(1 + ϵβk)2

(4.13)
where rt ≡ Rt − 1 is the net real interest rate. Since productivity is assumed to follow
an AR(1) process, the expected future productivity can be written in terms of the
current productivity zi,t. As can be seen, the capital demand of the unconstrained firm is
increasing in its idiosyncratic transitory productivity zi,t, permanent productivity zi, and
the expected future common productivity Zt+1, and decreasing in the net real interest
rate rt and the expected factor prices (wt+1 and pm,t+1). Intuitively, higher (expected)
firm productivity (both common, permanent and idiosyncratic) leads to a higher demand
for physical capital. A higher net interest rate increases the marginal cost of capital
and thus reduces the capital demand. A higher real wage or price of materials reduces
the demand for labor and materials respectively, leading to a lower marginal revenue
product of capital (MRPK). Hence, capital demand falls to ensure that the expected
MRPK equals the user cost of capital (rt + δ). By contrast, the constrained firm cannot
operate at an optimal scale and its capital demand is constrained by its net worth ni,t,
as shown in (4.12).
4.2.3 Dispersion in Marginal Revenue Product of Capital
Define firm i’s period-t marginal revenue product of capital MRPKi,t as:
MRPKi,t ≡ ∂pi,tyi,t
∂ki,t−1
= βkZi,tkβk−1i,t−1 l
βl
i,tm
βm
i,t = βk
pi,tyi,t
ki,t−1
(4.14)
where pi,tyi,t denotes the nominal revenue. Based on the model, if all firms were financially
unconstrained, their expected MRPK is identical, as they face the same interest rate.
There is still dispersion in ex post MRPK due to the different realizations of the produc-
tivity shocks across firms, but this source of dispersion is not treated as misallocation
in the literature, since the allocation of capital is efficient ex ante (e.g., Restuccia and
Rogerson, 2017; Asker et al., 2014). Hence, capital misallocation should be measured by
the dispersion of the expected MRPK.
However, it is difficult to measure the expected MRPK, so this paper measures capital
misallocation by the static dispersion of MRPK across firms within a given two-digit
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industry.17 As a result, capital misallocation may be overestimated if production inputs
(such as capital in this paper) are chosen before the shock realizes. However, this paper
does not attempt to disentangle the efficient causes of the dispersion. Assuming capital
adjustment costs affect constrained and unconstrained firms equally, this paper only aims
to estimate the proportion of the dispersion caused by the financial friction.
The static dispersion of MRPK across all firms, as shown in Appendix C.1.2, can be
written as:
Vari(lnMRPKi,t) =ψ1Vari(lnzi) + ψ1Vari(ei,t) + ψ1ρ2Vari(lnzi,t−1) + ψ2Vari(lnki,t−1)
− ψ3Covi(lnzi + ρlnzi,t−1, lnki,t−1)
(4.15)
where Vari and Covi denote the cross-section variance and covariance across firms in a
given time period, and ψ1 ≡
(
ϵ
1+ϵβk
)2
, ψ2 ≡
(
1
1+ϵβk
)2
, and ψ3 ≡ 2 ϵ(1+ϵβk)2 are positive
coefficients. This is a general decomposition that holds regardless of the types of firms.
In general, capital misallocation measured by the static dispersion of MRPK depends
on the cross-section dispersions of idiosyncratic permanent productivity Vari(lnzi), the
productivity innovation Vari(ei,t), the past productivity Vari(lnzi,t−1), and installed
capital stock Vari(lnki,t−1), and the cross-section covariance between the firm’s capital
and different components of the firm’s productivity, as shown in (4.15). There is no
dispersion of the marginal revenue product of labor (MRPL) in this model, as MRPLi,t =
βl
pi,tyi,t
li,t
= wt, using the first order condition with respect to labor from the model.
In the absence of the one-period time to build and financial frictions, it can be shown
that there is no dispersion of MRPK in this model.18 In other words, there are two causes
for the dispersion of MRPK: time-to-build for capital and financial frictions. First, due
to a one-period time to build, ki,t is chosen based on the expected future productivity
EtZi,t+1. Hence, any realized productivity Zi,t+1 that differs from the expectation would
cause the MRPK to differ across firms ex post.19 This explains why the cross-section
dispersion in the productivity innovation Vari(ei,t) causes dispersion of MRPK. In fact,
if all firms are unconstrained (i.e., without the financial frictions), Vari(ei,t) is the only
source of dispersion of MRPK. Let Vari(lnMRPKUi,t) denote the cross-section variance of
the log MRPK across financially unconstrained (U) firms, then it is shown in Appendix
17Note that ki,t−1 is used in the model to reflect that capital is chosen in period t− 1, but only used in
period t. In empirical analysis, fixed tangible asset in period t is used to measure ki,t−1, so the dispersion
of MRPK (4.14) is still the static dispersion of MRPK.
18If firms are unconstrained and capital adjusts immediately in response to productivity shocks, firms
can always borrow to finance their optimal demand for capital and their MRPK will be equalised within
a given industry, as they face the same interest rate: MRPKi,t = (rt + δ).
19Restuccia and Rogerson (2017) note that one problem with measuring misallocation using the
dispersion of marginal products is that when inputs are chosen before firm-specific shocks realize, the
marginal products across firms may not equalize in every time period even under efficient allocation.
Similarly, Asker et al. (2014) pointed out that in the presence of capital adjustment costs, the ex ante
efficient choice of capital can be inefficient ex post.
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C.1.4 that:
Vari(lnMRPKUi,t) =ψ1Vari(ei,t) (4.16)
where the superscript U denotes unconstrained firms. As can be seen, the dispersion of
MRPK for unconstrained firms is purely driven by the cross-section dispersion in the
productivity innovation Vari(ei,t).
Second, financial frictions in the form of a collateral constraint also cause MRPK
to differ across firms. Using the first order condition for capital, financially constrained
firms have higher expected MRPK than unconstrained firms as they cannot borrow
enough to finance their optimal capital demand, as shown in Appendix C.1. As a result,
the differences of MRPK between constrained and unconstrained firms contribute to
the overall dispersion of MRPK. Furthermore, this paper finds that the dispersion of
MRPK within constrained firms is also important for understanding the overall dispersion
of MRPK caused by financial frictions. Let Vari(lnMRPKCi,t) denote the cross-section
variance of the log MRPK across financially constrained (C) firms, then it is shown in
Appendix C.1.6 that:
Vari(lnMRPKCi,t) =ψ1Vari(lnzi) + ψ1Vari(ei,t) + ψ1ρ2Vari(lnzi,t−1) + ψ2Vari(lnni,t−1)
− ψ3Covi(lnzi + ρlnzi,t−1, lnni,t−1)
(4.17)
where the superscript C denotes constrained firms. Note that Vari(lnMRPKCi,t) now also
depends on the variances and covariances of the logs of zi, zi,t−1 and ni,t−1. Using (4.16)
and (4.17), it can be shown that constrained firms have a higher dispersion of MRPK
than unconstrained firms.20 As can be seen from (4.17), the dispersion of MRPK for
constrained firms is lower when firms’ net worth and productivity are more positively
correlated. The firm’s productivity and net worth are expected to be positively correlated
since more productive firms tend to be more profitable, and thus accumulate more net
worth over time. Intuitively, firms with higher productivity (in period t−1 or permanently)
anticipate higher future productivity and hence would want to demand more capital.
Since more productive firms also tend to have more net worth, their borrowing capacity
is higher, which means they are able to borrow more while being constrained, and their
capital demand is closer to their optimal unconstrained capital demand, bringing down
their MRPK and thereby also the dispersion of MRPK among constrained firms.
This paper analyzes the impact of financial frictions on the dispersion of MRPK by
empirically estimating the percentage of the dispersion that can be attributed to the
presence of constrained firms. Suppose there are Nt unconstrained firms in an industry
20Rearranging (4.17) gives:
Vari(lnMRPKCi,t) =ψ1Vari(ei,t) +Vari(ψ
1
2
1 lnzi + ψ
1
2
1 ρlnzi,t−1 − ψ
1
2
2 lnni,t−1)
where the second term on the RHS, which is strictly positive, is the only difference from the dispersion
of MRPK for unconstrained firms (4.16). Hence, Vari(lnMRPKCi,t) > Vari(lnMRPKUi,t).
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in a given time period t, and the remaining Mt − Nt firms are constrained, then it is
shown in Appendix C.2 that the cross-section variance of MRPK across all firms can be
decomposed as follows:
Vari(lnMRPKi,t) =
Nt
Mt
Vari(lnMRPKUi,t) +
Mt −Nt
Mt
Vari(lnMRPKCi,t)
+ Nt(Mt −Nt)
M2t
[
Ei(lnMRPKUi,t)− Ei(lnMRPKCi,t)
]2 (4.18)
where the cross-section variances and means on the right hand side of (4.18) are defined
for the two subgroups of firms. For example, Ei(lnMRPKUi,t) denotes the cross-section
mean of MRPK across unconstrained firms only. As can be seen from (4.18), the overall
dispersion of MRPK equals a weighted average of the dispersion for unconstrained and
constrained firms plus a measure of distance between the mean for each group. It is
shown in (4.16) and (4.17) that the dispersion of MRPK within the unconstrained group
is driven by the dispersion in productivity innovation while that within the constrained
group is also driven by the dispersions in firms’ net worth ni,t−1, firms’ idiosyncratic
permanent productivity zi, the realized idiosyncratic transitory productivity zi,t−1, and
the covariance between their productivity and net worth.
Constrained firms have a higher MRPK than unconstrained firms because of the
lower level of capital that can be financed.21 As a result, the cross-section aver-
age of MRPK for constrained firms Ei(lnMRPKCi,t) is larger than that for the uncon-
strained firms Ei(lnMRPKUi,t).22 According to the decomposition of the variance of
MRPK (4.18), the larger the gap in mean MRPK between the two groups of firms[
Ei(lnMRPKUi,t)− Ei(lnMRPKCi,t)
]
, the higher the cross-section variance of MRPK at an
industry-year level. This resembles the usual mechanism that the presence of borrowing
constraints increases the dispersion of MRPK due to the differences in MRPK between
unconstrained and constrained firms.
More importantly, based on the decomposition (4.18), if financially constrained firms
can be identified empirically, then the proportion of the dispersion of MRPK that is
caused by the financial friction can be estimated by:
Credit Distortion ≡ Vari(lnMRPKi,t)−
Nt
Mt
Vari(lnMRPKUi,t)
Vari(lnMRPKi,t)
∈ [0, 1] (4.19)
where Vari(lnMRPKi,t) is observable in data, while Vari(lnMRPKUi,t) is the cross-section
variance defined over the unconstrained group of firms, which can only be calculated once
21This follows from the first order condition for capital as shown in Appendix C.1.
22As shown in (C.12) in Appendix C.1.1, on top of the effect of lower capital for constrained firms
on increasing their MRPK, the realizations of their productivity Zi,t are also different for constrained
and unconstrained firms. More specifically, when the realized Zi,t is sufficiently high, a firm is more
likely to be constrained as the firm demands more capital. As a result, the cross-section average
productivity for constrained firms is higher than that for unconstrained firms, and this further explains
why Ei(lnMRPKCi,t) > Ei(lnMRPKUi,t).
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the unconstrained firms are identified. Section 4.4.2 uses a switching regression approach
to identify the two groups of firms, following Hu and Schiantarelli (1998).
If the constrained firms were not present, so Nt = Mt and Vari(lnMRPKi,t) equals
Vari(lnMRPKUi,t) (as implied by (4.19)), then the credit distortion measure equals zero.
If all firms were constrained, so Nt = 0, then the credit distortion measure equals one.
Hence, the fraction of the dispersion of MRPK caused by the presence of constrained firms
is based on the difference between the observed Vari(lnMRPKi,t) and the counterfactual
variance of MRPK without constrained firms, Vari(lnMRPKUi,t), which is normalised by
the overall dispersion in MRPK.23
The credit distortion measure (4.19) may also capture any other structural differences
across the two types of firms that lead to different dispersions of MRPK within the
unconstrained and constrained firms. For instance, although this paper assumes a constant
markup (i.e., ϵ
ϵ−1 > 1) for all firms, in practice, larger firms tend to have higher markups,
while smaller firms tend to have lower markups as they are more likely to operate in an
environment that is close to perfect competition. If the markup dispersion is higher for
larger, unconstrained firms, then Vari(lnMRPKUi,t) is also higher, leading to a lower credit
distortion measure. The econometric analysis in Section 4.4.2 therefore aims to control
for other structural differences between the two types of firms, to mitigate this issue.
Furthermore, this paper only considers a quantity-based credit distortion measure
and does not incorporate any distortions in the price of credit such as the interest rate
wedge between the borrowing and saving rate caused by imperfect banking competition.24
Thus, the current measure of credit distortion is likely to underestimate the full impact
of credit distortions by neglecting that constrained firms also tend to face greater price
distortions.
In addition, this paper assumes that the revenue elasticity of capital βk is the same for
all firms within a subsector of the manufacturing industry. As a result, βk does not affect
the dispersion of MRPK and is neglected when computing the MRPK. However, if βk
differs across unconstrained and constrained firms, this also contributes to the dispersion
of MRPK for the two types of firms and thus affecting the credit distortion measure.
Using (4.14) and the first order condition for materials, MRPK can be equally measured
using nominal revenue pi,tyi,t or value added VAi,t:
MRPKi,t = βk
pi,tyi,t
ki,t−1
= βk1− βm
VAi,t
ki,t−1
(4.20)
where VAi,t ≡ pi,tyi,t − pm,tmi,t = (1− βm)pi,tyi,t. Using nominal value added over fixed
tangible assets to measure MRPK requires both the revenue elasticities of materials βm
and capital βk to be identical across firms, which is more restrictive. As a result, this
23Note that Vari(lnMRPKUi,t) is multiplied by the fraction of unconstrained firms NtMt to ensure that
the measure is always positive.
24The effect of imperfect banking competition on the interest rate wedge when borrowers are financially
constrained is analysed in Chapter 2.
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paper measures MRPK using nominal revenue over fixed tangible assets in the baseline
analysis and uses nominal value added to measure MRPK for robustness checks.
4.3 Data
The firm-level data for different countries used in this paper are from the Bureau van
Dijk’s Orbis historical financial database, which provides annual financial information
from firms’ balance sheets and income statements from early 1990s to 2015.25 The
financial variables extracted from the Orbis historical financial database are combined
with some time-invariant variables extracted from the Orbis rolling 10 years database.
After extracting the variables from these two databases, the dataset for each country is
cleaned following similar procedures as outlined in Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2015). The full
cleaning procedure and the summary statistics for the sample used for empirical analysis
are shown in Appendix C.4.
One major advantage of this database is that it contains both listed and unlisted
firms, unlike Compustat or Worldscope which only cover listed firms. Since unlisted firms
are more likely to suffer from financial constraints than listed firms which tend to be
larger, it is useful to study financial constraints using datasets that contain those unlisted
firms. The empirical analysis in this paper focuses on the manufacturing sector in each
country because the capital stock can be proxied by fixed tangible assets, whereas in other
industries, it is more difficult to define the capital stock.26 Within the manufacturing
sector, an industry is defined by either a two-digit or four-digit NACE Rev.2 code in this
paper.
Table 4.1 shows some basic information on the datasets of the manufacturing sector
for each of the 20 countries used in the baseline analysis, including the time period
covered, total number of observations, average number of firms per year, unique number
of four-digit industries, and the fraction of observations coming from unlisted firms.
Since value added is used to calculate the marginal revenue product of capital (MRPK)
for robustness checks and value added is often less available than sales, the countries
in the baseline sample are selected based on the total number of observations and the
availability of value added.27 The statistics reported in Table 4.1 are after dropping the
observations with missing operating revenue and missing or zero fixed tangible assets,
25The time series for some European countries start in 1990, while for many countries, the time series
are shorter.
26Based on the two-digit NACE Rev.2 code, the manufacturing sector is in the range of 10 to 33. The
descriptions for each two-digit industry can be found in Table C.5 in Appendix C.4.
27Countries are ranked according to their total number of observations and also their availability of
value added (in terms of the percentage of the total observations). The two ranks have equal weight and
the top 19 countries according to the weighted rank are selected plus Japan. Japan has low availability
for value added but it has a large number of observations and it is an important country to look at since
this paper focuses on the manufacturing firms. US is not selected due to the low availability of value
added and the relatively low number of observations.
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Table 4.1: Data Description for Each Country in the Baseline Sample
Country Period Observations Obs/Year Industries Unlisted Firms
Bulgaria 1995-2015 119,346 5,683 223 0.983
Croatia 1998-2015 124,184 6,899 220 0.981
Czech Republic 1994-2015 176,420 8,019 289 0.995
Finland 1995-2015 163,600 7,790 227 0.992
France 1995-2015 1,316,144 62,674 229 0.994
Germany 1990-2015 255,056 9,810 298 0.975
Italy 1995-2015 1,716,653 81,745 302 0.998
Japan 1989-2015 593,512 21,982 199 0.959
Korea 2001-2015 817,068 54,471 198 0.973
Norway 1996-2015 109,826 5,491 217 0.990
Poland 1994-2015 167,273 7,603 236 0.981
Portugal 1998-2015 372,214 20,679 227 0.999
Romania 1995-2015 558,739 26,607 231 0.984
Serbia 1999-2015 165,237 9,720 235 0.930
Slovakia 1995-2015 76,190 3,628 228 0.980
Slovenia 1997-2015 93,570 4,925 213 0.991
Spain 1994-2015 1,428,899 64,950 230 0.999
Sweden 1997-2015 299,408 15,758 229 0.988
Ukraine 2001-2015 422,144 28,143 227 0.985
United Kingdom 1994-2015 294,092 13,368 230 0.966
Note: The sample from each country consists of manufacturing firms only. Period shows the time period
covered in each cleaned country-specific dataset. Observations and Obs/year show the total number
of firm-year observations and the average number of firms respectively during the period covered in a
given country. Industries shows the number of unique four-digit NACE Rev.2 industries over the period
covered in each country. The last column shows the fraction of observations coming from unlisted firms.
but before dropping those with missing value added. As can be seen from Table 4.1, in
most countries, more than 98% of the observations are from unlisted firms.
Table 4.2 shows the medians of some main variables of interest in this paper. As can
be seen, the median number of employees is below 20 in 16 out of 20 countries, which
shows that the dataset contains a lot of small firms. The year-on-year change in the log
of fixed tangible assets FTA (proxy for capital stock) measures the firm net investment,
which is used as the dependent variable in the empirical analysis shown in Section 4.4.
The median value of ∆lnFTA is negative as small firms account for a large proportion of
the sample. The average ∆lnFTA is positive in most countries, as can be seen in Table
C.2 in Appendix C.4.
According to the model, the year-on-year change in the log of sales, the log of value
added, or the log of productivity can be used as different proxies for the investment
opportunity, as shown in (4.21) and (4.22) in Section 4.4.1. Nominal value added is
computed as the difference between operating revenue and material costs for most
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Table 4.2: Medians of Selected Variables for Each Country in the Baseline Sample
Country Employees Age ∆lnFTA ∆lnSales ∆lnVA ∆lnTFPR Var(logMRPK)
Bulgaria 14 9 -0.026 0.047 0.048 -0.002 2.86
Croatia 5 12 -0.038 0.020 0.031 -0.007 3.70
Czech Republic 23 12 -0.026 0.034 0.035 -0.001 2.80
Finland 8 15 -0.066 0.026 0.033 0.007 2.18
France 6 14 -0.102 0.024 0.026 0.004 1.76
Germany 27 21 -0.033 0.012 0.038 0.009 2.97
Italy 12 15 -0.033 0.020 0.026 0.001 3.23
Japan 17 32 -0.024 0.009 0.018 2.07
Korea 17 9 -0.000 0.084 0.101 0.005 2.79
Norway 9 12 -0.059 0.039 0.043 0.011 3.46
Poland 90 13 -0.019 0.048 0.052 0.003 2.34
Portugal 7 14 -0.074 0.012 0.019 0.001 2.47
Romania 6 9 -0.003 0.108 0.137 0.003 2.98
Serbia 5 11 -0.008 0.095 0.130 -0.008 3.94
Slovakia 15 10 -0.053 0.027 0.033 -0.001 2.92
Slovenia 5 15 -0.060 0.034 0.034 0.001 2.69
Spain 8 13 -0.038 0.027 0.034 -0.000 2.52
Sweden 5 17 -0.077 0.031 0.031 0.007 2.78
Ukraine 11 9 -0.040 0.076 0.109 -0.009 5.21
United Kingdom 76 17 -0.039 0.030 0.050 0.005 2.55
Note: The sample from each country consists of manufacturing firms only. All the statistics reported in the table
except for the last column are medians. Employees shows the number of employees for each country. Age is com-
puted as the difference between year and incorporation year plus one. ∆lnFTA, ∆lnSales, ∆lnVA, and ∆lnTFPR
denote the year-on-year change in the log fixed tangible assets, log sales, log value added and log productivity
respectively. TFPR is estimated using the Wooldridge (2009) approach. TFPR cannot be estimated for Japan
due to the lack of data on material costs. Var(lnMRPK) is the cross-section variance of the log marginal revenue
product of capital, where MRPK is computed as nominal revenue over fixed tangible assets. The variance reported
here is unconditional on industries.
countries.28 If firm productivity were estimated accurately, then this would be a more
exogenous measure than sales growth. However, there is no perfect measure for firm
productivity. This paper uses productivity growth as a robustness check, which is
estimated using the Wooldridge (2009) approach.29
The last column of Table 4.2 shows the dispersion in log marginal revenue product of
capital MRPK. According to (4.14), MRPKi,t is calculated as nominal revenue pi,tyi,t over
the capital stock ki,t−1.30 It can be seen that there is a large variation in the dispersion
28The original ‘value added’ variable in Orbis is the sum of taxation, profit/loss for the period
(equivalent to profit/loss after taxation plus the extraordinary and other profit/loss), cost of employees,
depreciation and interest paid. The computed value added is used if it has more observations. Except
for Germany, Japan (no data for materials costs), Portugal, Spain, and UK, the computed value added
is used in the other countries in the baseline sample.
29The details of this estimation approach can be found in Appendix C.3.
30According to (4.14), MRPKi,t also depends on the revenue elasticity of capital βk. However, since
βk is often estimated at a two-digit industry level to ensure enough number of observations and hence is
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of MRPK across countries. Ukraine has the highest dispersion of MRPK, followed by
Serbia and Croatia, whereas France has the lowest dispersion of MRPK.
Table 4.3: Medians of Selected Variables for Listed and Unlisted Firms
Employees Age ∆lnFTA ∆lnSales
Country Unlisted Listed Unlisted Listed Unlisted Listed Unlisted Listed
Bulgaria 13 201 8 46 -0.026 -0.026 0.047 0.027
Croatia 5 261 11 56 -0.039 -0.020 0.020 0.014
Czech Republic 23 750 12 14 -0.026 -0.024 0.034 0.026
Finland 8 957 15 26 -0.067 -0.004 0.025 0.042
France 6 342 14 26 -0.103 0.009 0.024 0.049
Germany 26 752 21 44 -0.035 0.005 0.012 0.039
Italy 12 413 15 27 -0.033 -0.003 0.020 0.034
Japan 15 784 31 61 -0.025 -0.009 0.008 0.025
Korea 15 168 8 21 -0.000 0.014 0.085 0.067
Norway 9 406 12 14 -0.059 0.000 0.039 0.068
Poland 87 225 13 20 -0.019 0.022 0.047 0.074
Portugal 7 336 14 41 -0.074 -0.033 0.012 0.018
Romania 5 231 8 14 -0.003 -0.004 0.108 0.083
Serbia 4 111 10 20 -0.009 -0.000 0.098 0.067
Slovakia 15 225 10 14 -0.054 -0.034 0.027 0.008
Slovenia 5 228 15 23 -0.060 -0.011 0.034 0.028
Spain 8 558 13 40 -0.039 0.002 0.027 0.046
Sweden 5 81 17 18 -0.078 -0.010 0.030 0.068
Ukraine 10 328 9 21 -0.041 -0.009 0.075 0.111
United Kingdom 73 470 16 21 -0.040 0.008 0.029 0.045
Note: The sample from each country consists of manufacturing firms only. The table shows the median values
of four variables computed using subsamples of unlisted and listed firms. Employees shows the median number
of employees for each country. Age is computed as the difference between year and incorporation year plus one.
∆lnFTA and ∆lnSales denote the year-on-year change in the log fixed tangible assets and log sales respectively.
Table 4.3 shows the median values computed using subsamples of unlisted and listed
firms. As can be seen, the median number of employees and age for listed firms are much
larger than for unlisted firms. The year-on-year change in the log of fixed tangible assets
∆lnFTA is also higher for listed firms except for Bulgaria and Romania. By contrast,
there is no clear pattern for the year-on-year change in the log of sales (i.e., sale growth)
between the listed and unlisted firms. In 8 out of 20 countries, the sales growth of unlisted
firms is higher than that of listed firms.
the same across firms within the industry, it does not matter for the dispersion of log MRPK within a
two-digit industry. As discussed in Section 4.4.1, when using value added to compute MRPK, βm is
assumed to be the same for each subsector as well, so it is better to use sales revenue to compute MRPK.
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4.4 Empirical Analysis
Starting from Fazzari et al. (1988), there is a large literature on testing whether firm
investment responds to cash flow fluctuations after controlling for the investment oppor-
tunity proxied by Tobin’s q. By dividing firms into different groups according to some
firm characteristics that can affect their constrained status, a higher investment-cash
flow sensitivity within the ‘constrained’ group relative to the ‘unconstrained’ group after
controlling for q would suggest the presence of financial frictions. Since the datasets
contain mostly unlisted firms for which q is not available, this paper uses sales growth,
value added growth and productivity growth as different proxies for the investment
opportunity. Section 4.4.1 shows that these proxies are motivated by the model in Section
4.2.
Using ex ante divisions of firms into constrained and unconstrained groups based on the
marginal revenue product of capital (MRPK), Section 4.4.1 shows some evidence that the
investment of constrained firms is more sensitive to their internal financing. Section 4.4.2
uses a switching regression model to classify firms into constrained and unconstrained firms,
where the probability of a firm being constrained depends on multiple firm characteristics
and is estimated jointly with two different investment regimes depending on the firm’s
constrained status.
4.4.1 Firm Investment and Financial Frictions
Following (4.13), the capital demand of an unconstrained firm is determined by its
productivity and the factor prices (rt, wt+1 and pm,t+1). Let ∆lnkUi,t ≡ lnkUi,t − lnkUi,t−1
denote the net capital investment of an unconstrained firm.31 It can be shown that:
∆lnkUi,t =ϵρ∆lnzi,t − (1 + ϵβk)∆ln(rt + δ) + (1 + ϵβk)∆lnEt

 Zt+1
wβlt+1p
βm
m,t+1
 ϵ1+ϵβk

(4.21)
where ∆lnzi,t is the idiosyncratic revenue-based total factor productivity growth that can
proxy for the firm’s investment opportunity. Note that ki,t−1 is the capital decided in
period t− 1 but used in period t, so it is measured by contemporaneous fixed tangible
assets FTAi,t in the data. As a result, (4.21) implies that ∆lnFTAi,t+1 depends positively
on productivity growth ∆lnzi,t and change in log expected future common productivity,
and negatively on change in log user cost of capital ∆ln(rt+δ) and change in log expected
future real wage and real price of materials. The last two terms in (4.21) are common
to all firms in each subsector, so they are absorbed by (four-digit) industry-year fixed
effects.
31Note that from the model, gross investment is ki,t − (1 − δ)ki,t−1. Since ∆lnki,t = ln ki,tki,t−1 =
ln
(
ki,t−ki,t−1
ki,t−1
+ 1
)
≈ ki,t−ki,t−1ki,t−1 , ∆lnki,t is a measure for growth rate of capital stock or net investment
normalised by the capital stock ki,t−1.
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The investment of unconstrained firms can also be written in terms of the expected
growth of the nominal revenue pi,tyi,t. Using the first order condition for capital, the
investment of an unconstrained firm is:
∆lnkUi,t = ∆lnEt [pi,t+1yi,t+1] + ln
rt−1 + δ
rt + δ
(4.22)
Since∆lnEt [pi,t+1yi,t+1] = ∆lnEt [(1− βm)pi,t+1yi,t+1], both the sales growth and the value
added growth can be used to proxy for ∆lnEt [pi,t+1yi,t+1]. If the firm’s productivity can
be estimated accurately, then it is a more exogenous measure for investment opportunity.
However, given the existing empirical methods may not perfectly back out the unobserved
firm’s revenue-based total factor productivity, I also use lagged sales growth and value
added growth to proxy for the investment opportunity in the regression analysis.32 Since
expected future sales or value added growth is unavailable in data and current growth is
likely to cause endogeneity problems, lagged growth is used instead under the assumption
that lagged growth can predict future growth.
Following (4.12), the capital demand of a constrained firm is only determined by its
net worth and hence its investment is determined by the growth in its net worth.
∆lnkCi,t = ∆lnni,t (4.23)
Alternatively, it can be expressed in terms of cash flow CFi,t, which is defined as the
revenue net of the wage payments, material costs and net interest payments on debt,
CFi,t ≡ pi,tyi,t − wtli,t − pm,tmi,t − rt−1bi,t−1, assuming that all debt is rolled over in each
period with no repayment of principal until the terminal period. It is shown in Appendix
C.1.5 that:
∆lnkCi,t ≈
kCi,t − kCi,t−1
kCi,t−1
= 11− φ(1− δ)
CFi,t
ki,t−1
− δ1− φ(1− δ) (4.24)
where the firm’s cash flow is the sum of its net income (equivalent to the change in net
worth ∆ni,t in this model setup) and depreciation of the capital stock. Since the capital
ki,t−1 decided in period t− 1 but used in period t is measured by contemporaneous fixed
tangible assets FTAi,t in the data, (4.24) implies that ∆lnFTAi,t+1 depends positively
on CFi,tFTAi,t . Regressing ∆lnFTAi,t on
CFi,t−1
FTAi,t−1 would cause simultaneity bias as FTAi,t−1
appears on both sides of the equation. Hence, I use lagged cash flow over twice lagged
fixed tangible assets CFi,t−1FTAi,t−2 in empirical analysis to prevent the simultaneity bias. This
paper uses cash flow to measure the availability of internal financing because it is likely
to be a more exogenous measure than net worth as capital stock forms part of the net
32 There is no need to deflate the nominal sales or nominal value added because four-digit industry*year
dummies are included in the regressions, which will absorb the deflators varying at the two-digit industry-
year level (as deflators are often only available at the two-digit industry level in the data).
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worth. As can be seen from (4.24), whenever the firm is constrained by external financing,
its investment is completely determined by the availability of internal financing.
According to the model, in the absence of any financial frictions, the investment in
capital should not be affected by the availability of internal financing, after controlling
for the investment opportunity. By contrast, when financial frictions exist so that some
firms are financially constrained due to low net worth, these firms’ investment is expected
to be sensitive to the availability of their internal financing.
However, there are two caveats to the above implication. First, a firm’s constrained
status can change over time. If a firm was constrained in the previous period but
becomes unconstrained this period, then the firm’s investment will still depend on the net
worth even after controlling for the investment opportunity.33 More importantly, since
there is no perfect empirical measure for the investment opportunity, the availability
of internal financing also captures current profitability and is thus related to expected
future profitability (due to persistence in zi,t). Hence, when running a regression with
the change in fixed tangible asset on investment opportunity and cash flow, it is likely
to get a significant effect on cash flow even for unconstrained firms. Nevertheless, if the
investment-cash flow sensitivity decreases with the factors that alleviate financial frictions,
then this sensitivity is likely to be linked to financial frictions (Ağca and Mozumdar,
2008).
To test this hypothesis, I use the model to identify firms that are likely to be
constrained. As explained in Section 4.2.3, with the financial frictions, a firm with a
higher MRPK is more likely to be constrained due to a lower level of capital. An indicator
variable d is created to indicate whether the firm belongs to the constrained group. I
then run the following regression for each country separately:
∆lnFTAi,s,t =γ0 + γ1Oppi,s,t−1 + γ2Oppi,s,t−1 ∗ di,s,t + γ3
CFi,s,t−1
FTAi,s,t−2
+ γ4
CFi,s,t−1
FTAi,s,t−2
∗ di,s,t
+ di,s,t + γi + γs,t + εi,s,t
(4.25)
where i, s, and t denote firm, (four-digit) industry and year, respectively, and Oppi,s,t−1
denotes the investment opportunity, which is proxied by lagged sales growth, value added
growth or productivity growth. The availability of internal financing CFi,s,t−1FTAi,s,t−2 is measured
by lagged cash flow over twice lagged fixed tangible assets FTAi,s,t−2, where cash flow is
the sum of profit for the period and depreciation. γi and γs,t represent firm and four-digit
industry*year fixed effects respectively.
Firms with higher MRPK are more likely to be financially constrained and hence
their investment should be more dependent on the availability of their internal financing
and thus more sensitive to cash flow, as shown in (4.24). As a result, γ4 is expected
to be significantly positive if di,s,t indicates these firms. Similarly, γ2 is expected to be
33Note that in this case, ∆lnki,t ≡ lnkUi,t − lnkCi,t, so the firm’s investment depends on lnzi,t and
lnni,t−1.
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significantly negative as the investment of the ‘constrained’ firms should be less affected
by investment opportunity than their unconstrained counterparts. However, lagged sales
or value added growth are noisy proxies for investment opportunity, so the results on
investment opportunity may not be reliable.
Table 4.4 shows the results from regressing firm investment ∆lnFTAi,t on lagged sales
growth ∆logSalesi,t−1 and lagged cash flow CFi,t−1 over twice lagged fixed tangible assets
FTAi,t−2 for each country separately, where both explanatory variables are interacted
with an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s lagged log of MRPK is in the top
30% and zero if otherwise, following the specification (4.25). A higher MRPK tends to
indicate a more constrained status. The effect of cash flow on investment is expected to
be larger for firms with higher MRPK. The effect of investment opportunity would only
be smaller for these firms if there were a perfect measure for investment opportunity.
As can be seen from Table 4.4, in all countries except for Japan, the coefficient for cash
flow interacted with the indicator variable for MRPK is highly significant and positive,
indicating that the investment of firms with higher MRPK is more sensitive to their
cash flow, as expected. In 9 out of 20 countries, these firms’ investment also responds
less to the investment opportunity, as shown by the significantly negative coefficient on
lagged sales growth interacted with the indicator variable. However, in Ukraine, the
coefficient for the interaction term between lagged sales growth and the indicator variable
is significantly positive, which is inconsistent with the hypothesis. Besides, in three
countries, the coefficient on lagged sales growth is significantly negative. These anomalous
findings on lagged sales growth are likely because lagged sales growth is a noisy proxy for
investment opportunity.
To interpret the coefficients in terms of their economic significance, I use France as
an example. More specifically, as shown in Table 4.4, the coefficient of cash flow is 0.017
for France, which means for older firms, when cash flow increases by 0.1 (or 6.3% from
its unconditional mean of 1.6), the capital growth increases by 0.0017 (or 8.1% from
its unconditional mean of -0.021). The coefficient of the cash flow interacted with the
age dummy of 0.006 means that for firms with MRPK in the top 30%, when cash flow
increases by 0.1, their investment increases by 0.0023 or 11% from its unconditional
mean. Similarly, the investment of older firms increases by 0.000074 or 0.4% from its
unconditional mean of -0.021 when the lagged sales growth rate increases by 0.001 (or
3.6% from its unconditional mean of 0.028). By contrast, for the same increase in the
lagged sales growth, the investment of firms with a higher MRPK increases by only
0.000035 or around 0.17% from its unconditional mean. The summary statistics of the
key variables can be found in Table C.2 and C.3 in Appendix C.4.
For robustness checks, I use different proxies for investment opportunity. Results
using lagged value added growth are very similar to the baseline results, so they are
not shown in the Appendix due to space limitations. Using lagged productivity growth
gives more insignificant or anomalous findings on the coefficient for the interaction term
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Table 4.4: Capital Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity and Marginal Revenue Product of Capital (MRPK)
Country ∆lnSales ∆lnSales ∗ d CFFTA CFFTA ∗ d d(MRPK > p70) Within R2 Observations
Bulgaria 0.001 -0.014 -0.001 0.022*** 0.400*** 0.0668 67,519
(0.0045) (0.0131) (0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0118)
Croatia 0.034*** 0.010 0.002 0.022*** 0.414*** 0.0687 82,909
(0.0047) (0.0144) (0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0103)
Czech Republic 0.012** -0.050*** 0.004*** 0.019*** 0.386*** 0.0657 119,733
(0.0048) (0.0142) (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0081)
Finland 0.018*** -0.018* 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.282*** 0.0535 118,999
(0.0041) (0.0108) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0060)
France 0.074*** -0.039*** 0.017*** 0.006*** 0.306*** 0.0693 1,011,014
(0.0030) (0.0076) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0021)
Germany 0.026*** -0.008 0.001 0.008*** 0.289*** 0.0516 68,887
(0.0087) (0.0187) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0094)
Italy 0.035*** 0.006 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.295*** 0.0514 1,282,096
(0.0016) (0.0039) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0020)
Japan -0.007 -0.053*** 0.042*** -0.007 0.235*** 0.0391 59,519
(0.0071) (0.0189) (0.0099) (0.0110) (0.0098)
Korea 0.018*** -0.060*** 0.004*** 0.028*** 0.588*** 0.1045 392,415
(0.0025) (0.0073) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0057)
Norway 0.037*** -0.017 0.006*** 0.010*** 0.363*** 0.0624 81,944
(0.0064) (0.0200) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0092)
Poland 0.018*** -0.027* 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.284*** 0.0505 87,532
(0.0059) (0.0150) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0081)
Portugal 0.039*** 0.008 0.005*** 0.014*** 0.305*** 0.0454 273,761
(0.0030) (0.0092) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0044)
Romania -0.006*** -0.009* 0.005*** 0.014*** 0.396*** 0.0541 367,514
(0.0020) (0.0049) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0046)
Serbia 0.023*** -0.003 0.005*** 0.019*** 0.384*** 0.0663 105,557
(0.0032) (0.0091) (0.0015) (0.0020) (0.0086)
Slovakia -0.019** -0.035* 0.005 0.026*** 0.457*** 0.0614 47,523
(0.0077) (0.0189) (0.0032) (0.0041) (0.0143)
Slovenia -0.118*** 0.014 0.001 0.031*** 0.422*** 0.0513 62,121
(0.0104) (0.0161) (0.0028) (0.0036) (0.0140)
Spain 0.021*** 0.002 0.012*** 0.017*** 0.276*** 0.0521 1,111,449
(0.0016) (0.0050) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0021)
Sweden 0.044*** -0.001 0.010*** 0.005*** 0.304*** 0.0488 237,819
(0.0038) (0.0110) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0051)
Ukraine 0.017*** 0.009** -0.001 0.008*** 0.313*** 0.0343 286,337
(0.0017) (0.0047) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0053)
United Kingdom 0.032*** -0.030*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.266*** 0.0432 200,281
(0.0047) (0.0106) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0051)
Note: The table shows the coefficients from regressing ∆lnFTAi,t on lagged sales growth ∆lnSalesi,t−1 and lagged cash flow
over twice lagged fixed tangible assets CFi,t−1FTAi,t−2 , and each of which interacted with a dummy that equals one if lagged log
MRPK is in the top 30% and zero if otherwise. The last column shows the number of firm-year observations used in each
regression. Firm and four-digit industry*year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm-level clustered standard
errors are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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between the lagged productivity growth and the indicator variable, but the coefficient on
the interaction term between cash flow and the indicator is still highly significant and
positive in all countries except for the UK, as shown in C.6 in Appendix C.6.
Instead of using MRPK, other variables could be used to try to identify constrained
firms, such as size or age.34 However, using di,s,t to indicate either small or young firms
yields inconclusive results.35 This is likely because firm size and age are imperfectly
related to MRPK which is the theoretical determinant for the firm’s constrained status.
4.4.2 Switching Regression Model
One problem with the specification (4.25) in Section 4.4.1 is that classifying firms as
constrained or unconstrained based on just one variable may not be sufficient. As a
result, more recent papers studying the investment-cash flow sensitivities tend to use
switching regression models of Maddala (1986) and jointly estimate the probability of a
firm being constrained and two different investment regimes depending on whether the
firm is constrained or not (e.g., Almeida and Campello, 2007; Hovakimian and Titman,
2006; Hu and Schiantarelli, 1998). The objective of these papers is to show that financial
frictions matter for firm investment, avoiding the use of ex ante classification of firms
based on one firm characteristic each time.
The main objective of this paper is to estimate the percentage of the dispersion of
MRPK that is caused by financial frictions or the presence of constrained firms based on
the decomposition (4.18), which requires classifying firms as constrained or unconstrained.
Consequently, this paper uses the switching regression model not only to show the
importance of financial frictions in affecting firm investment, but also to classify firms by
estimating the probability of each firm being constrained. The classification based on the
switching regression is likely to be more reliable than the simple ex ante division based on
one firm characteristic. Based on the firm classification, the percentage of the dispersion
of MRPK that can be explained by the presence of constrained firms can be estimated.
In the switching regression model shown below, the probability of firm i being
financially constrained or unconstrained is determined by the following selection equation:
s∗i,t = xS,i,tγS + εS,i,t (4.26)
where s∗i,t is a latent variable and xS,i,t is a row vector that contains variables affecting a
firm’s constrained status, including Agei,t, size measured by lnAssetsi,t−1, lnMRPKi,t−1,
inverse leverage measured by the net-worth-to-assets ratio
(
Shareholders’ Funds
Assets
)
i,t−1, and
34Beck et al. (2005) find that the smallest (largest) firms are affected the most (least) by financing
obstacles, using survey data from 54 countries in the late 1990s.
35For instance, using an indicator variable that equals one if age (or total assets) is below its 30th or
50th percentile, or if age is below an absolute value (e.g., age < 15 years), to indicate constrained firms
yields inconclusive results. The results are only consistent with the hypothesis that constrained firm’s
investment is more sensitive to cash flow in around ten or fewer countries.
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liquidity measured by cash-to-assets ratio
(
Cash
Assets
)
i,t−1. In addition, vector xS,i,t also
includes year dummies and four-digit industry dummies. The parameter γS is a column
vector of the corresponding coefficients for the variables in xS,i,t. The error term εS,i,t
has a logistic distribution with mean zero and variance σ2S.
Constrained and unconstrained firms follow two different investment regimes, as the
investment of the constrained firms should be more sensitive to fluctuations in internal
financing. Which investment regime a firm follows depends on the selection equation
(4.26). More specifically, the investment of a firm i follows the constrained (C) regime,
i.e., ∆lnFTAi,t = ∆lnFTACi,t, if the latent variable s∗i,t is positive:
∆lnFTACi,t = xC,i,tγC + εC,i,t if xS,i,tγS + εS,i,t > 0 (4.27)
But it follows the unconstrained (U) regime, i.e., ∆lnki,t = ∆lnkUi,t, if the latent variable
s∗i,t is nonpositive:
∆lnFTAUi,t = xU,i,tγU + εU,i,t if xS,i,tγS + εS,i,t 6 0 (4.28)
where xC,i,t and xU,i,t both contain the investment opportunity Oppi,t−1, the availability
of internal financing, year dummies, and four-digit industry dummies. As discussed in
Section 4.4.1, Oppi,t−1 is proxied by lagged sales growth, lagged value added growth,
or lagged productivity growth, and the availability of internal financing is proxied by
lagged cash flow over twice lagged capital stock. γC and γU are the corresponding
coefficients for the variables in vectors xC,i,t and xU,i,t respectively. The differences
between the parameters γC and γU reflect the differential investment behavior of firms in
the two regimes. The error terms are normally distributed with mean zero and standard
deviations of σC and σU , i.e., εC,i,t ∼ N(0, σ2C) and εU,i,t ∼ N(0, σ2U ), where εC,i,t and εU,i,t
are independent of εS,i,t. This paper uses an exogenous switching model as in Garcia et al.
(1997), because firms do not choose to become constrained or unconstrained. However, if
shocks to firms’ investment are correlated with shocks to the financial variables in the
selection equation (4.26), then an endogenous switching regression model, where εC,i,t
and εU,i,t are each allowed to be correlated with the error term in the selection equation
εS,i,t, may be more appropriate, as studied in Almeida and Campello (2007), Hovakimian
and Titman (2006), and Hu and Schiantarelli (1998), for example.
Although theoretically, the availability of internal financing only matters for the
constrained firms, as shown in (4.24), it is included in both investment regimes since
(4.21) and (4.24) only hold if a firm’s constrained status stays the same in two consecutive
periods.36 Furthermore, cash flow (as a proxy for the availability in internal financing)
captures current profitability which may capture information about the investment
opportunity that is not captured by the proxies such as lagged sales growth or productivity
36For example, if a firm is constrained in period t− 1 but becomes unconstrained in period t, then its
investment in period t still depends on its lagged net worth.
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growth, so it can be significant in both regimes. However, assuming that the proxies such
as lagged sales growth or productivity growth capture the investment opportunity equally
well for the two types of firms, the presence of financial frictions would be expected to
lead to a larger coefficient on cash flow and a lower coefficient on sales growth in the
constrained regime.
The switching regression itself does not automatically identify which investment regime
is associated with constrained firms. The identification of the constrained investment
regime requires theoretical priors on how certain firm characteristics indicate firms’
constrained status. Since both xC,i,t and xU,i,t contain the same variables, the constrained
regime is identified using some of the variables included in xS,i,t. In this paper, the
identification relies on the signs and the significance of the coefficients for age, size and
MRPK, since it is relatively unambiguous that firms with younger age, smaller size and
higher MRPK are more likely to be constrained. More specifically, if the coefficients
for these three variables are each significant at 10% level at least, then the regime is
classified as constrained if the probability for being in this regime increases in MRPK and
decreases in age and size at the same time. If not all three variables are each significant at
10% level at least, then the regime classification relies only on the signs of the significant
variables.
Although firm leverage and liquidity ratios are also included in the selection equation,
they are not used for the identification of the constrained regime because a priori, it is
ambiguous how firm leverage and liquidity indicate a firm’s constrained status. One the
one hand, firms with higher leverage could be more constrained as they have lower net
worth and thus lower borrowing capacity. On the other hand, they may be unconstrained
because the fact that they have higher leverage could mean they are able to borrow a lot
in the first place. Similarly, firms with high liquidity measured by cash over total assets
can be unconstrained if it indicates the firms are profitable and mature. However, it can
indicate that firms are constrained if firms cannot easily borrow from the credit market
and thus hold more cash as precautionary savings.
Although the financially constrained status of a firm is unobservable, according to
(4.26) and (4.27), the probability of a firm i being constrained in period t can be specified
as:
P (xS,i,tγS + εS,i,t > 0) = P (εS,i,t > −xS,i,tγS) (4.29)
Assuming the error term εS,i,t has a logistic distribution with mean zero and standard
deviation of σS, i.e., εS,i,t ∼ Logit(0, σ2S), then the probability of firm i being constrained
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in period t is determined by a logit function:37
P (εS,i,t > −xS,i,tγS) = P (εS,i,t < xS,i,tγS) = exp(xS,i,tγ
S)
1 + exp(xS,i,tγS)
(4.30)
The likelihood function of an observation Li,t is the weighted sum of the likelihoods
of being in each latent class (i.e., the constrained and unconstrained groups of firms),
where the weights are the associated latent class probabilities, P (εS,i,t > −xS,i,tγS) and
P (εS,i,t 6 −xS,i,tγS). It is shown in Appendix C.5 that:
Li,t = f(εC,i,t)P (εS,i,t > −xS,i,tγS) + f(εU,i,t)P (εS,i,t 6 −xS,i,tγS) (4.31)
where f(.) is the marginal normal density. It follows from (4.31) that the log-likelihood
function for all observations is:
L =
M∑
i=1
Ti∑
t=1
ln(Li,t) (4.32)
where M is the number of firms in each industry and Ti is the number of observations
for each firm i. By maximizing the log-likelihood function (4.32), the parameters γS, γC ,
γU , lnσC , and lnσU can be estimated. With the estimated parameters, it is possible to
calculate the posterior probability of each firm being in each of the two regimes. Once
the regimes are identified as constrained or unconstrained, the posterior probability
of a firm being in the constrained regime can be used to classify firms as constrained
or unconstrained for each period t. In this paper, if the posterior probability of a
firm being constrained is greater than 0.5 in any period, then this firm is classified
as constrained in that period. The posterior probability of a firm being constrained
P (εS,i,t > −xS,i,tγS|∆lnFTAi,t) takes into account the information about investment by
updating the prior probability based on Bayes’ rule:
f(εC,i,t|εS,i,t > −xS,i,tγS)P (εS,i,t > −xS,i,tγS)
f(εC,i,t|εS,i,t > −xS,i,tγS)P (εS,i,t > −xS,i,tγS) + f(εU,i,t|εS,i,t 6 −xS,i,tγS)P (εS,i,t 6 −xS,i,tγS)
(4.33)
where P (εS,i,t > −xS,i,tγS) is the prior probability for being constrained.
To control for unobserved firm heterogeneity, it would be desirable to add firm fixed
effects, but there are two difficulties with doing so in a switching regression. Although
adding firm dummies in all three equations (4.26)-(4.28) would control for the firm fixed
effects, this is computationally very costly. For instance, if there are 1000 firms, then
adding 1000 dummies into each of the three equations would result in 3000 additional
37Similarly, according to (4.26) and (4.28), the probability of firm i being unconstrained is:
P (xS,i,tγS + εS,i,t 6 0) = P (εS,i,t 6 −xS,i,tγS) = 1− P (εS,i,t 6 xS,i,tγS) = 11 + exp(xS,i,tγS)
where the last step uses (4.30).
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parameters to be estimated. Demeaning the two investment equations would impose a
rather strong assumption on the nature of the firm fixed effects, i.e., firm heterogeneity
in the two different regimes has the same impact on firm investment.
The second difficulty is that even if it is computationally feasible to include thousands
of firm dummies, the ‘incidental parameters problem’ (Neyman and Scott, 1948) still exists
in the nonlinear selection equation (4.26). This is because there are only Ti observations
to estimate each firm i’s dummy and the estimate of the firm dummy remains random
even as the number of firms N grows. This randomness cannot be averaged out due to the
nonlinearity, unlike in a linear model. Hence, in a nonlinear model with firm fixed effects
and a fixed time dimension, the maximum likelihood estimators of the firm dummies and
the explanatory variables are inconsistent (Greene, 2004; Chamberlain, 1980). Within
transformation or first-differencing will not eliminate the individual firm heterogeneity in
a nonlinear model either.38
Hu and Schiantarelli (1998) deal with the firm-fixed effects by modelling them as a
linear function of the means of the firm-specific variables in each investment equation and
the selection equation. They control for the means of these variables in each equation.
Hovakimian and Titman (2006) adopt a different approach to partially control for firm
fixed effects. They include the firm-specific variables and their lags in each equation and
also the lagged dependent variable in each investment equation before estimating the
switching regression. However, first differencing will not eliminate the unobserved firm
heterogeneity in a nonlinear model. So this paper follows the approach used in Hu and
Schiantarelli (1998) to control for firm fixed effects.
To further reduce the problem of unobserved firm heterogeneity, this paper applies the
switching regression model (4.26)-(4.28) to each two-digit industry in each country. The
existing literature that adopts the switching regression often uses US data only and runs
the switching regression on a country level after controlling for two-digit industry fixed
effects (e.g., Hu and Schiantarelli, 1998). Since this paper uses much larger datasets, where
countries have a large number of firms even at a two-digit industry level, it is possible to
run the switching regression at a more disaggregated level and then control for four-digit
industry fixed effects in order to mitigate the problem of unobserved firm heterogeneity.39
Restricting the sample to a two-digit industry also improves the reliability of the proxies
used for MRPK (i.e., nominal revenue or nominal value added over fixed tangible assets,
treating the revenue elasticity as a constant within a subsector), as it overcomes the
38In a few cases, including the logistic regression, the incidental parameters problem can be solved by
conditioning on a sufficient statistic for the incidental parameters. For instance, the sufficient statistic
is
∑Ti
t=1 si,t for a logit model, where si,t is the dependent variable that takes a value of zero or one.
However, this conditional maximum likelihood approach cannot be used here, because whether a firm is
constrained or not is unobserved (i.e., the value of si,t is unknown).
39As can be seen in Table 4.1, there are more than 200 four-digit industries in nearly all of the countries
in the baseline sample. If the switching regression model were run on the country level, then it would be
infeasible to control for four-digit industry fixed effects for the reasons discussed above.
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problem that the revenue elasticities βk and βm are likely to differ significantly across
two-digit industries.
Using lagged sales growth to proxy for investment opportunity and lagged cash flow
over twice lagged fixed tangible assets CFi,t−1FTAi,t−2 to proxy for the availability of internal
financing, Table 4.5 and 4.6 show the results from fitting the switching regression model
(4.26)-(4.28) to the fabricated metal products industry (two-digit NACE Rev.2 code =
25) for each country separately. This industry has the largest number of observations.40
Four-digit sector dummies and year dummies are included in each investment equation
and the selection equation. To address the firm fixed effects, mean lagged sales growth
and mean cash flow for each firm over time are included in the investment equations. The
means of firm-specific variables (apart from age due to collinearity) for each firm over
time in the selection equation are added as additional variables in the selection equation.
The switching regression itself does not automatically identify which investment regime
is associated with constrained firms. The identification of the constrained regime relies on
the theoretical priors that firms with higher MRPK, smaller size and younger age are more
likely to be constrained. Although more variables are included in the selection equation,
ex ante, variables such as leverage and liquidity ratios are ambiguous indicators for the
constrained status, as discussed before in this section. Let PC denote the probability of a
firm being constrained, then rearranging (4.30) gives the log odds ratio ln PC1−PC = xS,i,tγ
S.
As can be seen from this odds ratio, if the coefficient is positive, it means that when its
corresponding variable increases, the probability of being constrained PC also increases.
Hence, if the probability of being in regime C increases in MRPK, but decreases in size
and age, then regime C is the constrained regime.
Table 4.5 shows the coefficients for the key variables in the selection equation that
determine whether a given regime is for the constrained firms (4.29). As can be seen,
lagged log of MRPK is positive and significant in all countries, meaning that a higher
MRPK increases the probability of a firm being in the constrained regime. Similarly,
coefficients for age and size (proxied by log of total assets) are negative and highly
significant in all countries except for one, meaning that an older age and a larger size will
reduce (raise) the probability of a firm being constrained (unconstrained). This result is in
line with the findings in Beck et al. (2005) that the smallest (largest) firms are affected the
most (least) by financing obstacles. The coefficients for inverse leverage ratio measured
by the shareholders’ funds (net worth) to assets ratio have mixed signs across countries,
implying that leverage ratio is an ambiguous indicator for a firm’s constrained status,
40When summing or taking the mean of the number of observations across countries for a given industry,
industry 25 has the highest data availability. On average, industry 25 accounts for around 17% of the
total number of firm-year observations in the manufacturing sector in each country, while this percentage
for the other industries is below 11%. The full category of the two-digit manufacturing industries and
their descriptions can be found in Table C.5 in Appendix C.4. Industries such as the manufacture of
tobacco products, coke and refined petroleum products, and basic pharmaceutical products are quite
concentrated in the sample of 20 countries, so they do not have enough observations for the switching
regression.
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Table 4.5: The Selection Equation of the Switching Regression in Fabricated Metal Products Industry
Country Age ln(Assets) ln(MRPK) Net worthAssets
Cash
Assets Fraction
constrained
Bulgaria -0.024*** -0.846*** 0.656*** 0.581 1.949*** 0.39
(0.0063) (0.2097) (0.1116) (0.3773) (0.7238)
Croatia -0.021*** -0.871*** 1.027*** -0.117 0.981** 0.41
(0.0049) (0.0901) (0.0576) (0.2039) (0.4581)
Czech Republic -0.080*** -0.842*** 0.921*** 0.268* 1.912*** 0.41
(0.0047) (0.0770) (0.0479) (0.1601) (0.2661)
Finland -0.019*** -0.959*** 1.375*** 0.692*** 1.155*** 0.23
(0.0022) (0.0626) (0.0582) (0.1434) (0.2074)
France -0.014*** -1.094*** 2.089*** 1.043*** 1.884*** 0.24
(0.0009) (0.0412) (0.0297) (0.0936) (0.1150)
Germany -0.006*** -0.942*** 1.585*** 1.619*** 1.466** 0.26
(0.0013) (0.2625) (0.1432) (0.4629) (0.6148)
Italy -0.013*** -0.845*** 1.084*** -0.354*** 1.179*** 0.34
(0.0007) (0.0254) (0.0156) (0.0768) (0.1046)
Japan -0.016*** -0.579 1.388*** -0.179 1.607 0.25
(0.0032) (0.3534) (0.2184) (0.7774) (1.0320)
Korea -0.026*** -0.729*** 1.163*** 0.571*** 1.389*** 0.36
(0.0024) (0.0465) (0.0370) (0.1379) (0.2789)
Norway -0.017*** -0.608*** 1.016*** 0.093 0.626** 0.34
(0.0050) (0.0945) (0.0572) (0.2121) (0.2795)
Poland -0.031*** -1.074*** 1.129*** 0.310 2.135*** 0.27
(0.0062) (0.1130) (0.0856) (0.2258) (0.4190)
Portugal -0.031*** -0.931*** 1.315*** 0.506*** 1.329*** 0.37
(0.0019) (0.0626) (0.0400) (0.1223) (0.2196)
Romania -0.020*** -0.507*** 0.820*** -0.114** 1.370*** 0.44
(0.0036) (0.0322) (0.0299) (0.0542) (0.1720)
Serbia -0.005 -0.517*** 0.833*** -0.507*** 2.362*** 0.31
(0.0040) (0.0625) (0.0512) (0.1870) (0.5014)
Slovakia -0.066*** -1.290*** 1.092*** 0.394** 1.780*** 0.40
(0.0076) (0.1388) (0.0851) (0.1859) (0.4017)
Slovenia -0.039*** -1.565*** 1.350*** 0.989*** 3.177*** 0.32
(0.0055) (0.1349) (0.0949) (0.3471) (0.5918)
Spain -0.016*** -0.667*** 1.289*** 0.080 0.984*** 0.30
(0.0010) (0.0241) (0.0167) (0.0544) (0.0921)
Sweden -0.013*** -0.947*** 1.331*** 0.780*** 1.103*** 0.32
(0.0013) (0.0488) (0.0353) (0.1310) (0.1456)
Ukraine -0.017*** -0.448*** 0.605*** -0.103 0.575** 0.33
(0.0033) (0.0419) (0.0325) (0.0731) (0.2805)
United Kingdom -0.005*** -0.650*** 1.029*** 0.229 1.008*** 0.24
(0.0012) (0.0799) (0.0617) (0.1547) (0.2658)
Note: The table shows the coefficients for the key variables in the selection equation that determines the probability of a firm
being constrained, including age, log of assets, log of MRPK, net worth-to assets ratio, and cash-to-assets ratio, and the average
proportion of constrained firms over the sample period. All variables apart from age are lagged. Four-digit industry and year
fixed effects are included. To address firm fixed effects, the means of firm-specific variables (apart from age) are controlled in
the selection equation. The last column shows the average proportion of constrained firms over the sample period, where firms
are classified as constrained based on the estimated posterior probabilities. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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as expected. Higher liquidity proxied by cash-to-assets ratio increases the probability of
being constrained, reflecting that firms hold more cash for precautionary reasons due to
the lack of easy access to external financing.
Table 4.5 also shows the average proportion of constrained firms over the sample
period in the last column, where firms are classified as constrained based on the estimated
posterior probability. Using the posterior probability as shown in (4.33), a firm is classified
as constrained if the posterior probability of the firm being in the constrained regime is
greater than 0.5 and otherwise, the firm is classified as unconstrained. The probabilities
of being constrained and unconstrained sum to one for each firm. This average proportion
of constrained firms across time for each country can also be seen in graph (a) in Figure
4.3.
In Table 4.6, the coefficients for the lagged sales growth and the cash flow from two
different investment regimes, the constrained regime (4.27) and the unconstrained regime
(4.28), are reported. As can be seen, the coefficient for cash flow is significant and much
larger for constrained firms in all countries, whereas it is not significant for unconstrained
firms in 12 out of 20 countries. As discussed before, since cash flow captures the current
profitability and is positively related to expected future profitability due to persistence of
profitability, it can be significant even for unconstrained firms. This explains why in 6 out
of 20 countries, the coefficient on cash flow is highly significant for unconstrained firms.
However, the coefficient on cash flow is much larger for constrained firms in all countries,
so the results are consistent with the hypothesis that constrained firms’ investment should
be more sensitive to cash flow. In Romania, the coefficient on cash flow for unconstrained
firms is negative and significant at 10% level, which is likely due to the unobserved firm
heterogeneity not being fully controlled. The results without the firm fixed effects can be
found in Table C.11 and C.12 in Appendix C.6, which show that the coefficient on cash
flow for unconstrained firms can be negative without firm fixed effects.
The coefficient for lagged sales growth is significantly positive for unconstrained firms
in all countries except for Bulgaria, whereas it is not significant for constrained firms in
7 out of 20 countries. However, in 12 countries, the coefficient on lagged sales growth
for constrained firms is highly significant and larger than that for unconstrained firms,
which differs from the theoretical prediction. This is likely because lagged sales growth is
a poor proxy for investment opportunity, so the results on lagged sales growth are not
very reliable. If there were a perfect measure for investment opportunity, then testing
whether unconstrained firms’ investment is more responsive to investment opportunity
would be more meaningful.
I use a likelihood ratio test to test whether the switching regression model (less
restrictive) fits the data better than a single regime model estimated by OLS (more
restrictive). Following Hu and Schiantarelli (1998), the degrees of freedom equal the
number of constraints (that the coefficients in the two investment equations are equal)
plus the number of parameters in the selection equation, which are shown in the last
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Table 4.6: Switching Regression Model of Firm Investment in Fabricated Metal Products Industry
Unconstrained Regime Constrained Regime
Country ∆lnSalesi,t−1 CFi,t−1FTAi,t−2 ∆lnSalesi,t−1
CFi,t−1
FTAi,t−2 Observations Prob > Chi2 df
Bulgaria 0.010 0.007* 0.050 0.025*** 4,243 0.0000 76
(0.0060) (0.0042) (0.0410) (0.0066)
Croatia 0.014** -0.002 0.156*** 0.025*** 12,652 0.0000 76
(0.0057) (0.0015) (0.0277) (0.0038)
Czech Republic 0.021*** -0.002 0.023 0.031*** 25,421 0.0000 96
(0.0043) (0.0015) (0.0249) (0.0028)
Finland 0.024*** -0.000 0.007 0.033*** 27,429 0.0000 80
(0.0039) (0.0011) (0.0257) (0.0047)
France 0.111*** 0.010*** 0.124*** 0.039*** 170,850 0.0000 82
(0.0048) (0.0006) (0.0217) (0.0015)
Germany 0.067*** 0.003*** 0.073 0.018*** 12,100 0.0000 98
(0.0099) (0.0011) (0.0501) (0.0041)
Italy 0.020*** 0.002*** 0.123*** 0.045*** 246,989 0.0000 94
(0.0015) (0.0007) (0.0083) (0.0017)
Japan 0.013** 0.016 0.024 0.061* 6,830 0.0000 86
(0.0063) (0.0103) (0.0546) (0.0332)
Korea 0.009*** 0.000 0.064*** 0.059*** 55,900 0.0000 60
(0.0026) (0.0011) (0.0194) (0.0039)
Norway 0.028*** 0.001 0.136*** 0.028*** 12,676 0.0000 78
(0.0078) (0.0007) (0.0434) (0.0028)
Poland 0.036*** 0.004*** 0.023 0.022*** 13,237 0.0000 82
(0.0061) (0.0016) (0.0416) (0.0038)
Portugal 0.025*** -0.001 0.151*** 0.022*** 47,373 0.0000 76
(0.0037) (0.0017) (0.0191) (0.0023)
Romania 0.015*** -0.001* 0.046*** 0.021*** 44,863 0.0000 82
(0.0023) (0.0005) (0.0106) (0.0014)
Serbia 0.021*** 0.003*** 0.099*** 0.047*** 12,866 0.0000 74
(0.0035) (0.0012) (0.0235) (0.0056)
Slovakia 0.030*** -0.004 -0.041 0.040*** 10,806 0.0000 82
(0.0069) (0.0032) (0.0328) (0.0064)
Slovenia 0.020*** 0.002 0.075* 0.047*** 12,476 0.0000 66
(0.0071) (0.0025) (0.0419) (0.0063)
Spain 0.023*** 0.001 0.131*** 0.042*** 193,141 0.0000 84
(0.0016) (0.0005) (0.0124) (0.0017)
Sweden 0.054*** 0.003*** 0.110*** 0.031*** 56,662 0.0000 78
(0.0040) (0.0007) (0.0206) (0.0020)
Ukraine 0.011*** 0.002 0.100*** 0.009*** 20,782 0.0000 70
(0.0023) (0.0011) (0.0148) (0.0023)
United Kingdom 0.038*** 0.001 0.071** 0.013*** 26,117 0.0000 82
(0.0059) (0.0008) (0.0326) (0.0020)
Note: The dependent variable is firm investment ∆lnFTAi,t. The coefficients for lagged sales growth and lagged
cash flow in two different investment regimes are reported. Four-digit industry and year fixed effects are included
in the switching regression. Firm fixed effects are partially controlled by adding the means of the firm-specific
variables in each equation, whose coefficients are not reported here. The last two columns show the p-value for the
likelihood ratio test and the degrees of freedom for the χ2 distribution respectively. A small p-value suggests that
the switching regression (less restrictive model) fits the data significantly better than an OLS regression. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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column of Table 4.6. The right-tail p-values of the chi-squared statistic are also reported
in Table 4.6.41 The small p-values reject the null and suggest that the switching regression
model fits the data significantly better than the single regime model.
Figure 4.2: Dispersions and Means of Marginal Revenue Product of Capital in Fabricated
Metal Products Industry
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Note: The bar chart shows the cross-section variances (or dispersions) and means of the ln(MRPK) for
constrained firms and unconstrained firms in industry 25 (manufacture of fabricated metal products) by
NACE Rev.2 Code across 20 countries. The dispersions and means of MRPK are averaged over the
sample period. Constrained and unconstrained firms are identified using the results from the switching
regression model. MRPK is computed as the nominal revenue divided by tangible fixed assets.
Data source: Orbis
Figure 4.2 plots the cross-section variances (or dispersions) and means of ln(MRPK)
for each type of firms in the fabricated metal products industry in each country, where
the dispersions and means of ln(MRPK) are averaged over the sample period for each
country. It can be seen that the dispersions and means of MRPK for constrained firms
are much larger than those for unconstrained firms. These patterns are similar to those
shown in Figure 4.1, although the contrast between the two types of firms is much more
notable here. It is discussed in Section 4.2.3 that according to the model, constrained
firms are expected to have a higher cross-section variance and mean of MRPK than
unconstrained firms.
Figure 4.3 shows the proportion of constrained firms and credit distortion in the
fabricated metal products industry (industry 25 by NACE Rev.2 Code), which are
41The chi-squared statistic equals 2*(log likelihood of less restrictive model - log likelihood of more
restrictive model).
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Figure 4.3: Proportion of Constrained Firms and Credit Distortion in Fabricated Metal
Products Industry
(a) Proportion of Constrained Firms
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(b) Credit Distortion
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Note: In each graph, the corresponding measure is computed across all firms in a given sample and all
years. Three different samples of firms are used: all firms, unlisted firms and listed firms. The missing
bars for the listed firms are due to the number of observations being below 100 over the sample period.
Graph (a) plots the fraction of constrained firms in industry 25 (manufacture of fabricated metal
products) by NACE Rev.2 Code across 20 countries. Graph (b) plots the credit distortion in percent
points (i.e., the proportion of the observed dispersion (cross-section variance) of MRPK that is caused
by the presence of constrained firms) in industry 25, which is computed based on (4.19). MRPK is
computed as the nominal revenue divided by tangible fixed assets.
Data source: Orbis
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averaged over the sample period across all firms in a given sample (i.e., entire sample,
listed firms only, or unlisted firms only). Graph (a) shows that in most countries, the
average proportion of constrained firms across all firms and years is above 0.25 and this
proportion is much larger than the average proportion computed using the subsample of
listed firms over the sample period. For example, in the UK, there are around 25% of
firms classified as financially constrained across all firms and years, but less than 15% of
listed firms are classified as constrained on average across all listed firms and years. This
is consistent with the expectation that large listed firms are less likely to be financially
constrained.
The missing bars for the listed firms in some countries in Figure 4.3 are because
the number of observations for listed firms is below 100 over all years, in which case
the sample of listed firms is not representative and the two measures are not computed.
Fewer than 100 observations for the listed firms over the sample period implies that there
are around ten listed firms per year on average, given that most countries have more
than ten years of data, as can be seen from Table 4.1. Furthermore, graph (a) in Figure
4.3 shows that the proportion of constrained firms is slightly above 0.1 in many countries,
implying that only one out of the ten listed firms is classified as constrained, so this
sample is not representative.
Classifying firms into the constrained and unconstrained groups is only the first step.
The main objective of the paper is to estimate the impact of the financial constraints on
the dispersion of MRPK. Based on (4.19), the fraction of the dispersion of MRPK that
is caused by the presence of constrained firms can be computed. Graph (b) in Figure 4.3
plots the average credit distortion (in percent points) in the fabricated metal products
industry, which are averaged over the sample period across all firms in a given sample.
As shown in graph (b), the credit distortion ranges from 0.3 in Finland to around 0.7
in Czech Republic, Korea and Portugal, which means the presence of constrained firms
in this industry can explain around 30-70% of the dispersion of MRPK, depending on
different countries. Note that the average credit distortion computed using the subsample
of listed firms tends to be lower except for Sweden.
I apply the switching regression model in the baseline analysis to all the other
industries that have enough observations to run the switching regression.42 The results
for 14 different industries (including industry 25 in the baseline analysis) are summarized
in Table C.7 and C.8 in Appendix C.6. Each column in Table C.7 summarizes the average
proportion of constrained firms across all firms and years in a given industry for different
countries. The column for industry 25 in Table C.7 corresponds to the height of the first
bar in graph (a) in Figure 4.3. In addition, the last two rows of Table C.7 show the mean
42There are nine two-digit industries that do not have enough observations for most countries (i.e.,
industry 11, 12, 15, 17, 19, 21, 24, 29, and 30 by NACE Rev.2 code). Industry 33 (repair and installation
of machinery and equipment) is neglected since it is not a typical manufacturing industry. Industry 33
only accounts for around 4.5% of the total number of firm-year observations in the manufacturing sector
in each country on average.
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difference between the proportion of constrained firms in a sample of unlisted firms and
that in a sample of listed firms, and the number of countries used to calculate this mean
difference, respectively. For example, this mean difference across 11 countries is 0.18 for
industry 25 (fabricated metal products industry), as shown in Table C.7.
Similarly, each column in Table C.8 summarizes the credit distortion across all firms
and years in a given industry for different countries. The column for industry 25 in Table
C.8 corresponds to the height of the first bar in graph (b) in Figure 4.3. The last two
rows of Table C.8 show the mean difference between the credit distortion in a sample of
unlisted firms and the credit distortion in a sample of listed firms, and the number of
countries used to compute this mean difference, respectively.
As can be seen from Table C.7 and C.8, a general pattern is that for most two-digit
industries and countries, there is at least a quarter of firms being classified as financially
constrained and the presence of these firms explain more than half of the dispersion
of MRPK across all firms. In addition, for each reported industry, the proportion of
constrained firms within unlisted firms is larger than that within listed firms by around
0.15 except for industry 32 and the credit distortion within unlisted firms is higher by
around 0.2 except for industries 26 and 32 on average across countries.
For robustness checks, I also use nominal value added to compute MRPK and the
results for the proportion of constrained firms and credit distortion are summarized in
Table C.9 and C.10 in Appendix C.6, which are very similar to the baseline results. In
addition, I compare the baseline results with the case without trying to use the Hu and
Schiantarelli (1998) approach to control for firm fixed effects, so with only four-digit
industry and year dummies included. The coefficients for the investment equation and the
selection equation can be found in Table C.11 and C.12 in Appendix C.6. The negative
coefficients on cash flow for unconstrained firms are likely caused by the between variation
in cash flow when firm fixed effects are ignored. Despite the differences in the coefficients,
the results for the proportion of constrained firms and credit distortion are robust to
whether firm fixed effects are included, as shown in Figure C.1. Finally, I use different
proxies for investment opportunity, i.e., lagged value added growth and productivity
growth. The results for the proportion of constrained firms and credit distortion are
robust to whether lagged sales growth, value added growth or productivity growth is
used, except for Korea, as shown in Figure C.2.
4.5 Conclusions
This paper proposes a novel method for estimating the impact of financial frictions
on capital misallocation measured by the dispersion of the marginal revenue product
of capital (MRPK), which uses large firm-level datasets and requires fewer restrictive
assumptions. The key idea is that the observed dispersion of MRPK can be viewed in
terms of the dispersions and means for the financially constrained and unconstrained
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firms. Based on the decomposition of the dispersion of MRPK, this paper provides a
credit distortion measure, which measures the proportion of the observed dispersion of
MRPK that can be attributed to the presence of constrained firms.
A simple model of firm dynamics with a one-period time to build for capital and
borrowing constraints shows that the capital decisions and thus the MRPK for constrained
and unconstrained firms are driven by two different processes. While the capital investment
of an unconstrained firm is driven by the expected future investment opportunity, that of
a constrained firm is determined by the availability of its internal financing. As a result,
the distribution of MRPK across all firms is a mixture of two distributions, one for the
constrained firms and the other for the unconstrained firms.
By decomposing the dispersion of MRPK across all firms into the dispersions and
means of MRPK for the two types of firms, this paper provides new insights into the
mechanisms through which the borrowing constraint increases the dispersion of MRPK.
While the usual mechanism is through a higher MRPK of constrained firms relative to
the unconstrained firms, an often neglected mechanism is through the dispersions within
the constrained and unconstrained firms.
More importantly, this statistical decomposition provides a way to estimate the impact
of financial frictions on the dispersion of MRPK once the constrained firms are identified.
Using a switching regression model to identify the constrained firms in the manufacturing
industry for 20 countries from the 1990s to 2015, this paper finds that the dispersions
and means of MRPK within the group of constrained firms are much larger than those
within the group of unconstrained firms, which are consistent with the model predictions.
Furthermore, for most two-digit industries and countries, more than a quarter of firms are
classified as financially constrained and the presence of these constrained firms accounts
for more than half of the dispersion of MRPK.
Therefore, this paper has quantified the impact of financially constrained firms on the
allocation of physical capital.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Solving the Entrepreneur’s Problem
The proof resembles the approach used by Andrés and Arce (2012) in solving for cEt and
bt. Substitute λE1,t = 1cEt (2.15) and λ
E
2,t = 1cEt − β
EEt
[
1
cEt+1
Rb,t
πt+1
]
(2.16) into the first order
condition (2.18) with respect to kEt and rearrange:
qt −mk,tEt
[
qt+1(1−δ)πt+1
Rb,t
]
cEt
= βEEt
[
1
cEt+1
{
αyw,t+1
xt+1kEt
+ qt+1(1− δ)− mk,t
πt+1
Et[qt+1(1− δ)πt+1]
}]
(A.1)
Multiply both sides by kEt :
qtk
E
t −mk,tEt
[
qt+1kEt (1−δ)πt+1
Rb,t
]
cEt
=βEEt
[
1
cEt+1
{
αyw,t+1
xt+1
+ qt+1kEt (1− δ)−
mk,t
πt+1
Et[qt+1kEt (1− δ)πt+1]
}] (A.2)
Similarly, substitute the expressions for λE1,t and λE2,t into the first order condition (2.19)
with respect to hEt and rearrange:
qh,t −mh,tEt
[
qh,t+1πt+1
Rb,t
]
cEt
= βEEt
[
1
cEt+1
{
vyw,t+1
xt+1hEt
+ qh,t+1 − mh,t
πt+1
Et[qh,t+1πt+1]
}]
(A.3)
Multiply both sides by hEt :
qh,th
E
t −mh,tEt
[
qh,t+1hEt πt+1
Rb,t
]
cEt
= βEEt
[
1
cEt+1
{
vyw,t+1
xt+1
+ qh,t+1hEt −
mh,t
πt+1
Et[qh,t+1hEt πt+1]
}]
(A.4)
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Add equations (A.2) and (A.4), and substitute the binding borrowing constraint (2.23)
to simplify:
qtk
E
t + qh,thEt − bt
cEt
= βEEt
[
1
cEt+1
{
(α + v)yw,t+1
xt+1
+ qt+1kEt (1− δ) + qh,t+1hEt −
Rb,tbt
πt+1
}]
(A.5)
Recall the definition for the entrepreneur’s net worth nt and the rewritten budget
constraint:
nt ≡ (α + v)yw,t
xt
+ qt(1− δ)kEt−1 + qh,thEt−1 −
Rb,t−1bt−1
πt
(2.21)
cEt + qtkEt + qh,thEt = nt + bt (2.22)
Using (2.21) and (2.22), equation (A.5) can be written as:
nt − cEt
cEt
= βEEt
[
nt+1
cEt+1
]
(A.6)
Conjecture that cEt = γnt and substitute the conjecture into the equation above:
(1− γ)nt
γnt
= βEEt
[
nt+1
γnt+1
]
(A.7)
Hence, γ = (1− βE), so cEt = (1− βE)nt (2.24) and bt = qtkEt + qh,thEt − βEnt (2.25).
A.2 Calvo Pricing
A.2.1 Optimal Pricing Equation
Substitute in y∗t+s(j) and rearrange:
Maxp∗t (j)
∞∑
s=0
θsEt
Λt,t+s
(
p∗t (j)
pt+s
− 1
xt+s
)(
p∗t (j)
pt+s
)−ϵ
yt+s
 (A.8)
Take the first order condition:
∞∑
s=0
θsEtΛt,t+s
( 1
pt+s
)(
p∗t (j)
pt+s
)−ϵ
yt+s +
(
p∗t (j)
pt+s
− 1
xt+s
)
(−ϵ)
(
p∗t (j)
pt+s
)−ϵ−1
yt+s
pt+s
 = 0
(A.9)
Simplify the above equation:
∞∑
s=0
θsEtΛt,t+s
(1− ϵ)(yt+s
pt+s
)(
p∗t (j)
pt+s
)−ϵ
+ ϵ 1
xt+s
p∗t (j)−ϵ−1
(
1
pt+s
)−ϵ
yt+s
 = 0 (A.10)
116
Multiply by p
∗
t (j)ϵ+1
1−ϵ :
∞∑
s=0
θsEtΛt,t+s
p∗t (j)
(
1
pt+s
)1−ϵ
yt+s +
ϵ
1− ϵ
1
xt+s
(
1
pt+s
)−ϵ
yt+s
 = 0 (A.11)
Rearrange to solve for p∗t (j) and get the optimal pricing equation (2.35):
p∗t (j) =
ϵ
ϵ− 1
∑∞
s=0 θ
sEt
[
Λt,t+sx−1t+spϵt+syt+s
]
∑∞
s=0 θ
sEt
[
Λt,t+spϵ−1t+syt+s
] = ϵ
ϵ− 1
∑∞
s=0(βθ)sEt
[
u′(ct+s)x−1t+spϵt+syt+s
]
∑∞
s=0(βθ)sEt
[
u′(ct+s)pϵ−1t+syt+s
]
(A.12)
To numerically implement the optimal pricing equation in Dynare, summarize the equation
above with two recursive formulations such that:
p∗t =
ϵ
ϵ− 1
g1,t
g2,t
(A.13)
where
g1,t ≡ u′(ct)pϵtytx−1t + βθEt[g1,t+1] =
1
ct
pϵtytx
−1
t + βθEt[g1,t+1] (A.14)
g2,t ≡ u′(ct)pϵ−1t yt + βθEt[g2,t+1] =
1
ct
pϵ−1t yt + βθEt[g2,t+1] (A.15)
Let f1,t ≡ p−ϵt g1,t, then
f1,t ≡ p−ϵt g1,t =
1
ct
ytx
−1
t + βθEt[πϵt+1f1,t+1] (A.16)
Let f2,t ≡ p1−ϵt g2,t, then
f2,t ≡ p1−ϵt g2,t =
1
ct
yt + βθEt[πϵ−1t+1f2,t+1] (A.17)
The optimal pricing equation p∗t = ϵϵ−1
g1,t
g2,t
becomes:
p∗t =
ϵ
ϵ− 1
f1,tp
ϵ
t
f2,tp
ϵ−1
t
= ϵ
ϵ− 1
f1,t
f2,t
pt (A.18)
Divide both sides by pt−1 and let π∗t =
p∗t
pt−1
denote the gross reset price inflation rate to
eliminate the price levels:
π∗t =
p∗t
pt−1
= ϵ
ϵ− 1
f1,t
f2,t
πt (A.19)
A.2.2 Aggregate Price Evolution
Rearrange the aggregate price index (30):
p1−ϵt =
∫ 1
0
pt(j)1−ϵdj (A.20)
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Following Sims (2014),1 the above integral can be broken up into two parts by ordering
the retailers along the unit interval:
p1−ϵt =
∫ 1−θ
0
(p∗t )1−ϵdj +
∫ 1
1−θ
pt−1(j)1−ϵdj = (1− θ)(p∗t )1−ϵ +
∫ 1
1−θ
pt−1(j)1−ϵdj (A.21)
Given the assumptions that the price-adjusting retailers in each period are randomly
chosen and the number of retailers is large, the integral of individual prices over [1− θ, 1]
of the unit interval is equal to a proportion θ of the integral over the entire unit interval,
where θ is the length of the subset [1− θ, 1]. That is,
∫ 1
1−θ
pt−1(j)1−ϵdj = θ
∫ 1
0
pt−1(j)1−ϵdj = θp1−ϵt−1 (A.22)
Hence, the aggregate price level evolves according to (2.36):
p1−ϵt = (1− θ)(p∗t )1−ϵ + θp1−ϵt−1 (2.36)
To compute the model numerically, it is necessary to rewrite the price evolution in terms
of the inflation rates because the price level may not be stationary. Eliminating the price
levels in the equation above by dividing both sides by p1−ϵt−1:
(
pt
pt−1
)1−ϵ
= θ + (1− θ)
(
p∗t
pt−1
)1−ϵ
(A.23)
Let πt ≡ ptpt−1 and π∗t ≡
p∗t
pt−1
denote the gross inflation rate and the gross reset price
inflation rate respectively, then the equation above can be rewritten as:
π1−ϵt = θ + (1− θ)(π∗t )1−ϵ (A.24)
A.2.3 Price Dispersion
Use the Calvo assumption to break up the integral into two parts by ordering the retailers
along the unit interval:
f3,t ≡
∫ 1
0
[
pt(j)
pt
]−ϵ
dj =
∫ 1−θ
0
(
p∗t
pt
)−ϵ
dj +
∫ 1
1−θ
[
pt−1(j)
pt
]−ϵ
dj (A.25)
Rearrange and simplify by using the definitions for πt and π∗t :
f3,t =
∫ 1−θ
0
(
p∗t
pt−1
pt−1
pt
)−ϵ
dj+
∫ 1
1−θ
[
pt−1(j)
pt−1
pt−1
pt
]−ϵ
dj = (1−θ)(π∗t )−ϵπϵt+πϵt
∫ 1
1−θ
[
pt−1(j)
pt−1
]−ϵ
dj
(A.26)
1https://www3.nd.edu/~esims1/new_keynesian_2014.pdf
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Use the same method as in Appendix A.2.2 to simplify the last term in the equation
above: ∫ 1
1−θ
[
pt−1(j)
pt−1
]−ϵ
dj = θ
∫ 1
0
[
pt−1(j)
pt−1
]−ϵ
dj = θf3,t−1 (A.27)
Hence, the price dispersion f3,t can be written recursively:
f3,t = (1− θ)(π∗t )−ϵπϵt + πϵtθf3,t−1 (A.28)
As can be seen, the index j has been eliminated in the above expression. Consequently,
there is no need to keep track of the individual prices. Using (2.37), (A.25) and (A.28),
the final consumption good output yt is:
yt =
yw,t
f3,t
= yw,t(1− θ)(π∗t )−ϵπϵt + πϵtθf3,t−1
(A.29)
The real profit ΠRt made by the continuum of unit mass retailers is:
ΠRt =
∫ 1
0
[
pt(j)
pt
yt(j)− 1
xt
yt(j)
]
dj =
∫ 1
0
pt(j)
pt
yt(j)dj − 1
xt
∫ 1
0
yt(j)dj (A.30)
Use retailer j′s individual demand function yt(j) =
[
pt(j)
pt
]−ϵ
yt (2.31), the wholesale good
output expression yw,t =
∫ 1
0 yt(j)dj (2.37), the aggregate price index pt =
[∫ 1
0 pt(j)1−ϵdj
] 1
1−ϵ
(2.32), and (A.29) to get (2.38):
ΠRt =
∫ 1
0
pt(j)
pt
[
pt(j)
pt
]−ϵ
ytdj−yw,t
xt
= ytpϵ−1t
∫ 1
0
pt(j)1−ϵdj−yw,t
xt
= yt−yw,t
xt
=
(
1
f3,t
− 1
xt
)
yw,t
(2.38)
A.3 Elasticity of Loan Demand
A.3.1 Elasticities of Capital and Housing Demand to the Loan
Rate
Use (2.8) to rewrite the first order condition (A.1) with respect to kEt as:
qt −mk,tEt
[
qt+1(1− δ)πt+1
Rb,t
]
= βEEt
[
cEt
cEt+1
αzt+1(lEt+1)1−α−v
xt+1
]
(kEt )α−1(hEt )v
+ βEEt
[
cEt
cEt+1
{
qt+1(1− δ)− mk,t
πt+1
Et[qt+1(1− δ)πt+1]
}]
(A.31)
Use notations Ak,t, Bk,t and Ck,t to simplify the above expression:
Ak,t ≡ qt −mk,tEt
[
qt+1(1− δ)πt+1
Rb,t
]
(A.32)
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Bk,t ≡ βEEt
[
cEt
cEt+1
αzt+1(lEt+1)1−α−v
xt+1
]
> 0 (A.33)
Ck,t ≡ βEEt
[
cEt
cEt+1
{
qt+1(1− δ)− mk,t
πt+1
Et[qt+1(1− δ)πt+1]
}]
(A.34)
So (A.31) can be rewritten as:
Ak,t = Bk,t(kEt )α−1(hEt )v + Ck,t (A.35)
Similarly, rewrite the first order condition (A.3) with respect to hEt using the following
notations:
Ah,t ≡ qh,t −mh,tEt
[
qh,t+1πt+1
Rb,t
]
(A.36)
Bh,t ≡ βEEt
[
cEt
cEt+1
vzt+1(lEt+1)1−α−v
xt+1
]
> 0 (A.37)
Ch,t ≡ βEEt
[
cEt
cEt+1
{
qh,t+1 − mh,t
πt+1
Et[qh,t+1πt+1]
}]
(A.38)
Hence, (A.3) can be written as:
Ah,t = Bh,t(kEt )α(hEt )v−1 + Ch,t (A.39)
Rearrange (A.35) and substitute into the above equation:
Ah,t = Bh,t
(
Ak,t − Ck,t
Bk,t
) α
α−1
(hEt )
αv
1−α (hEt )v−1 + Ch,t (A.40)
Rearrange the equation above to solve for hEt :
hEt =
(
Ah,t − Ch,t
Bh,t
) 1−α
v−1+α
(
Ak,t − Ck,t
Bk,t
) α
v−1+α
=
(
Ah,t − Ch,t
Bh,t
)u1 (Ak,t − Ck,t
Bk,t
)u2
(A.41)
where
u1 ≡ − 1− α1− v − α < 0 (A.42)
u2 ≡ − α1− v − α < 0 (A.43)
Substitute the expression (A.41) for hEt into (A.35):
kEt =
(
Ak,t − Ck,t
Bk,t
) 1
α−1
(
Ah,t − Ch,t
Bh,t
) v
v−1+α
(
Ak,t − Ck,t
Bk,t
) αv
(v−1+α)(1−α)
=
(
Ak,t − Ck,t
Bk,t
)u3 (Ah,t − Ch,t
Bh,t
)u4 (A.44)
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where
u3 ≡ − 11− α
(
1 + αv1− v − α
)
= − 1− v1− v − α < 0 (A.45)
u4 ≡ − v1− v − α < 0 (A.46)
Note that Rb,t is present in both Ah,t and Ak,t. Use (A.41) and (A.44) to differentiate
the two choice variables hEt and kEt with respect to Rb,t:
∂hEt
∂Rb,t
=u1
(
Ah,t − Ch,t
Bh,t
)u1−1 (Dh,t
Bh,t
)(
Ak,t − Ck,t
Bk,t
)u2
+
(
Ah,t − Ch,t
Bh,t
)u1
u2
(
Ak,t − Ck,t
Bk,t
)u2−1 (Dk,t
Bk,t
)
=
(
u1
Dh,t
Ah,t − Ch,t + u2
Dk,t
Ak,t − Ck,t
)
hEt < 0 (A.47)
∂kEt
∂Rb,t
=u4
(
Ah,t − Ch,t
Bh,t
)u4−1 (Dh,t
Bh,t
)(
Ak,t − Ck,t
Bk,t
)u3
+
(
Ah,t − Ch,t
Bh,t
)u4
u3
(
Ak,t − Ck,t
Bk,t
)u3−1 (Dk,t
Bk,t
)
=
(
u4
Dh,t
Ah,t − Ch,t + u3
Dk,t
Ak,t − Ck,t
)
kEt < 0 (A.48)
where
Dh,t ≡ mh,tEt
[
qh,t+1πt+1
R2b,t
]
> 0 (A.49)
Dk,t ≡ mk,tEt
[
qt+1(1− δ)πt+1
R2b,t
]
> 0 (A.50)
Note that it can be seen from (A.47) and (A.48) that ∂h
E
t
∂Rb,t
< 0 and ∂k
E
t
∂Rb,t
< 0 if
Ah,t − Ch,t > 0 and Ak,t − Ck,t > 0. These sufficient conditions hold, as can be seen from
(A.35) and (A.39). As a result, it follows from (2.50) that the market loan demand is
downward-sloping: ∂bt
∂Rb,t
< 0.
Note that this method of solving for ∂h
E
t
∂Rb,t
and ∂k
E
t
∂Rb,t
is the same as doing implicit
differentiation in the two first order conditions, (A.1) and (A.3).
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A.3.2 Elasticity of Loan Demand to the Loan Rate
To derive the elasticity PEDt of market loan demand to the loan rate, use (2.50) to get:
PEDt ≡ −Rb,t
bt
∂bt
∂Rb,t
= −Rb,t
bt
{
− bt
Rb,t
+mh,tEt
[
qh,t+1πt+1
Rb,t
]
∂hEt
∂Rb,t
+mk,tEt
[
qt+1(1− δ)πt+1
Rb,t
]
∂kEt
∂Rb,t
}
= 1− Rb,t
bt
mh,tEt
[
qh,t+1πt+1
Rb,t
]
∂hEt
∂Rb,t
− Rb,t
bt
mk,tEt
[
qt+1(1− δ)πt+1
Rb,t
]
∂kEt
∂Rb,t
= 1− Rb,t
bt
bh,t
hEt
∂hEt
∂Rb,t
− Rb,t
bt
bk,t
kEt
∂kEt
∂Rb,t
= 1 + bh,t
bt
PEHt +
bk,t
bt
PEKt > 0
(A.51)
where PEHt ≡ − ∂h
E
t
∂Rb,t
Rb,t
hEt
and PEKt ≡ − ∂k
E
t
∂Rb,t
Rb,t
kEt
denote the elasticities of housing and
capital demand to the loan rate, respectively, and
bh,t ≡ mh,tEt
[
qh,t+1h
E
t πt+1
Rb,t
]
> 0 (A.52)
bk,t ≡ mk,tEt
[
qt+1k
E
t (1− δ)πt+1
Rb,t
]
> 0 (A.53)
bt ≡ bh,t + bk,t > 0 (A.54)
The elasticity of loan demand to the loan rate is positive PEDt > 0 because the
entrepreneur’s demand for housing and physical capital decreases with the loan rate (i.e.,
∂hEt
∂Rb,t
< 0 and ∂k
E
t
∂Rb,t
< 0), as shown in Appendix A.3.1.
To find ∂h
E
t
∂Rb,t
Rb,t
hEt
, use the expressions for ∂h
E
t
∂Rb,t
(A.47), (A.39), Bh,t (A.37), Dh,t
(A.49), (A.35), Bk,t (A.33), Dk,t (A.50), bh,t ≡ mh,tEt
[
qh,t+1hEt πt+1
Rb,t
]
(A.52) and bk,t ≡
mk,tEt
[
qt+1kEt (1−δ)πt+1
Rb,t
]
(A.53) to get:
∂hEt
∂Rb,t
Rb,t
hEt
=
(
u1
Dh,t
Ah,t − Ch,t + u2
Dk,t
Ak,t − Ck,t
)
Rb,t
=
(
u1
Dh,t
Bh,t(kEt )α(hEt )v−1
+ u2
Dk,t
Bk,t(kEt )α−1(hEt )v
)
Rb,t
=
u1mh,tEt
[
qh,t+1πt+1R
−1
b,t
]
βEEt
[
cEt
cEt+1
vzt+1(lEt+1)1−α−v
xt+1
]
(kEt )α(hEt )v−1
+
u2mk,tEt
[
qt+1(1− δ)πt+1R−1b,t
]
βEEt
[
cEt
cEt+1
αzt+1(lEt+1)1−α−v
xt+1
]
(kEt )α−1(hEt )v
=
u1mh,tEt
[
qh,t+1πt+1
Rb,t
]
Et
[
ΛEt,t+1MPHt+1
] + u2mk,tEt
[
qt+1(1−δ)πt+1
Rb,t
]
Et
[
ΛEt,t+1MPKt+1
] < 0
(A.55)
122
where ΛEt,t+1 ≡ βE u
′(cEt+1)
u′(cEt )
= βE c
E
t
cEt+1
, MPHt+1 ≡ vzt+1(l
E
t+1)1−α−v(kEt )α(hEt )v−1
xt+1
and MPKt+1 ≡
αzt+1(lEt+1)1−α−v(kEt )α−1(hEt )v
xt+1
denote the marginal products of housing and capital in terms
of the final good, respectively. ∂h
E
t
∂Rb,t
Rb,t
hEt
is negative because u1 ≡ − 1−α1−v−α < 0 and
u2 ≡ − α1−v−α < 0.
Using (A.55) and the definitions for u1 and u2, the elasticity of the entrepreneur’s
housing demand to the loan rate PEHt is:
PEHt ≡ − ∂h
E
t
∂Rb,t
Rb,t
hEt
=
mh,tEt
[
qh,t+1πt+1
Rb,t
]
1−α
1−v−α
Et
[
ΛEt,t+1MPHt+1
] + mk,tEt
[
qt+1(1−δ)πt+1
Rb,t
]
α
1−v−α
Et
[
ΛEt,t+1MPKt+1
] > 0
(A.56)
Similarly, use the expressions for ∂k
E
t
∂Rb,t
(A.48), (A.39), Bh,t (A.37), Dh,t (A.49), (A.35),
Bk,t (A.33),Dk,t (A.50), bh,t ≡ mh,tEt
[
qh,t+1hEt πt+1
Rb,t
]
(A.52) and bk,t ≡ mk,tEt
[
qt+1kEt (1−δ)πt+1
Rb,t
]
(A.53) to get:
∂kEt
∂Rb,t
Rb,t
kEt
=
u4mh,tEt
[
qh,t+1πt+1
Rb,t
]
Et
[
ΛEt,t+1MPHt+1
] + u3mk,tEt
[
qt+1(1−δ)πt+1
Rb,t
]
Et
[
ΛEt,t+1MPKt+1
] < 0 (A.57)
where u4 ≡ − v1−v−α < 0 and u3 ≡ − 1−v1−v−α < 0.
Using (A.57) and the definitions for u4 and u3, the elasticity of the entrepreneur’s
capital demand to the loan rate PEKt is:
PEKt ≡ − ∂k
E
t
∂Rb,t
Rb,t
kEt
=
mh,tEt
[
qh,t+1πt+1
Rb,t
]
v
1−v−α
Et
[
ΛEt,t+1MPHt+1
] + mk,tEt
[
qt+1(1−δ)πt+1
Rb,t
]
1−v
1−v−α
Et
[
ΛEt,t+1MPKt+1
] > 0
(A.58)
As can be seen from (A.56) and (A.58), both PEHt and PEKt depend positively on
the pledgeability ratios (mh,t and mk,t) and the expected discounted values of the future
prices of housing Et
[
qh,t+1πt+1
Rb,t
]
and capital Et
[
qt+1πt+1
Rb,t
]
. Besides, they depend negatively
on the expected discounted values of the marginal products of housing Et
[
ΛEt,t+1MPHt+1
]
and capital Et
[
ΛEt,t+1MPKt+1
]
in terms of the final good.
Substituting PEHt (A.56) and PEKt (A.58) into PEDt (A.51) gives:
PEDt =1 +
mh,tEt
[
qh,t+1πt+1
Rb,t
] (
bh,t
bt
1−α
1−v−α +
bk,t
bt
v
1−v−α
)
Et
[
ΛEt,t+1MPHt+1
]
+
mk,tEt
[
qt+1(1−δ)πt+1
Rb,t
] (
bh,t
bt
α
1−v−α +
bk,t
bt
1−v
1−v−α
)
Et
[
ΛEt,t+1MPKt+1
]
=1 +
mh,tEt
[
qh,t+1πt+1
Rb,t
] (
bh,t
bt
+ v1−v−α
)
Et
[
ΛEt,t+1MPHt+1
] + mk,tEt
[
qt+1(1−δ)πt+1
Rb,t
] (
bk,t
bt
+ α1−v−α
)
Et
[
ΛEt,t+1MPKt+1
] > 0
(A.59)
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where the last step uses bt ≡ bh,t + bk,t (A.54). It can be seen from (A.59) that higher
expected discounted values of marginal products of capital and housing and lower
expected discounted values of prices of housing and capital (i.e., lower Et
[
qh,t+1πt+1
Rb,t
]
and
Et
[
qt+1(1−δ)πt+1
Rb,t
]
) reduce the elasticity of the loan demand PEDt. Besides, a decrease
in mh,t or mk,t (e.g., after a negative collateral shock) directly reduces PEDt, as shown
in (A.59), and indirectly through raising the expected marginal products of capital and
housing and lowering the expected asset prices.
A.4 Calibration and Steady State Values
Table A.1: Calibration of Parameters in Baseline Analysis
Parameter Value Description
Households
β 0.995 Subjective discount factor
φl 1.45 Relative utility weight on leisure time
φh 0.1 Relative utility weight on housing
Entrepreneurs
βE 0.97 Subjective discount factor
α 0.33 Physical capital share
v 0.05 Housing share
δ 0.025 Depreciation rate for physical capital
Capital producers
χ 10 Investment adjustment cost
Retailers
ϵ 6 Elasticity of substitution between retail goods
θ 0.75 Probability of not adjusting price
Banking sector
N 4 Number of banks
mh 0.8 Loan-to-value ratio for housing
mk 0.5 Loan-to-value ratio for physical capital
Central bank
ρr 0.8 Interest rate smoothing
κπ 1.5 Feedback coefficient on inflation
κy 0 Feedback coefficient on output
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Table A.2: Steady State Values of Variables for Baseline Calibration
Perfect Competition Imperfect Competition
Gross Inflation Rate π 1 1
Productivity z 1 1
Housing Pledgeability Ratio mh 0.5 0.8
Capital Pledgeability Ratio mk 0.5 0.8
Output y 0.801 0.737
Consumption c 0.573 0.546
Investment i 0.127 0.109
Physical Capital k 5.081 4.358
Real Price of Capital q 1 1
Real Price of Housing qh 14.694 12.896
Bank Loan b 5.042 3.668
Labor l 0.333 0.325
Real Wage w 1.244 1.172
Gross Real Deposit Rate Rr 1.005 1.005
Gross Real Loan Rate Rrb 1.005 1.011
Entrepreneur’s Housing hE 0.220 0.154
Entrepreneur’s Net Worth n 3.378 2.754
Leverage Ratio qhhE+qk
n
2.463 2.302
Lagrange Multiplier λE2 0.248 0.229
Loan Demand Elasticity PED 59.886 39.528
Capital Demand Elasticity PEK 24.089 20.607
Housing Demand Elasticity PEH 92.157 62.538
Note: The table shows the steady state values of selected variables under two types of banking
competition: perfect banking competition and Cournot banking competition (N = 4). The steady
state values for gross inflation rate, productivity and the two pledgeability ratios are exogenously set.
The steady state values of all other variables are determined in equilibrium, based on the parameter
values in Table A.1.
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A.5 Dynare Model Block
Households
Household intertemporal consumption Euler equation (2.6)
Household intratemporal consumption-labor choice (2.4)
Household demand for real estate (2.5)
Marginal utility of the household’s consumption (2.3)
Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneur’s utility maximization with respect to kEt (2.18) and lEt (2.17)
Entrepreneur’s borrowing bt = qtkEt + qh,thEt − βEnt (2.25)
Binding borrowing constraint (2.23)
Wholesale good output yw,t (2.8)
Entrepreneur’s consumption (2.24)
Entrepreneur’s net worth (2.21)
Lagrange multiplier associated with the borrowing constraint (2.16)
Marginal utility of the entrepreneur’s consumption (2.15)
AR(1) processes for log productivity (2.9), log pledgeability ratio for housing (2.13), and
log pledgeability ratio for capital (2.14)
Retailers
f1,t (A.16) and f2,t (A.17) in optimal price rule
Gross reset price inflation rate (A.19)
Aggregate price evolution (written in terms of gross inflation rates) (2.36)
Recursive form of price dispersion f3,t (A.28)
Capital Producers
Real price of capital (2.29) and gross investment in physical capital (2.26)
Banking Sector
Perfectly competitive banks’ profit maximization with respect to bt (2.43)
Elasticity of loan demand to the loan rate PEDt ≡ − ∂bt∂Rb,t
Rb,t
bt
(A.59)
Bank j’s profit maximization with respect to bt(j) under Cournot competition (2.51)
Real loan rate Rrb,t = Et
[
Rb,t
πt+1
]
and real deposit rate Rr,t (2.45)
Real loan margin RLMt = Rrb,t −Rr,t
Central Bank
Taylor rule (2.44)
Market Clearing
Final consumption good output yt (A.29)
Aggregate resource constraint (2.52)
Housing market clearing condition ht + hEt = 1 (total housing supply normalised to 1)
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A.6 Robustness Checks
Figure A.1: Impulse Responses for Different Shocks without Interest Rate Smoothing
(ρr = 0)
Note: Horizontal axis shows quarters after the shock that occurs at the beginning of period 1. Vertical
axis shows the percentage deviation from the steady state for variables other than the real loan margin,
which is expressed in deviations from the steady state in percent points. The blue dashed line
corresponds to perfect banking competition. The pink solid line corresponds to imperfect banking
competition. Each row shows the impulse responses of four variables after a given type of shock: a 10
basis-point contractionary monetary policy shock, a one-standard-deviation negative productivity shock,
and one-standard-deviation negative shocks to the pledgeability ratios mh and mk.
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Figure A.2: Impulse Responses for Different Shocks when κπ = 3
Note: Horizontal axis shows quarters after the shock that occurs at the beginning of period 1. Vertical
axis shows the percentage deviation from the steady state for variables other than the real loan margin,
which is expressed in deviations from the steady state in percent points. The blue dashed line
corresponds to perfect banking competition. The pink solid line corresponds to imperfect banking
competition. Each row shows the impulse responses of four variables after a given type of shock: a 10
basis-point contractionary monetary policy shock, a one-standard-deviation negative productivity shock,
and one-standard-deviation negative shocks to the pledgeability ratios mh and mk.
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Figure A.3: Impulse Responses for Different Shocks when κy = 0.2
Note: Horizontal axis shows quarters after the shock that occurs at the beginning of period 1. Vertical
axis shows the percentage deviation from the steady state for variables other than the real loan margin,
which is expressed in deviations from the steady state in percent points. The blue dashed line
corresponds to perfect banking competition. The pink solid line corresponds to imperfect banking
competition. Each row shows the impulse responses of four variables after a given type of shock: a 10
basis-point contractionary monetary policy shock, a one-standard-deviation negative productivity shock,
and one-standard-deviation negative shocks to the pledgeability ratios mh and mk.
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Figure A.4: Impulse Responses for Different Shocks when mh = 0.8 and mk = 0.3
Note: Horizontal axis shows quarters after the shock that occurs at the beginning of period 1. Vertical
axis shows the percentage deviation from the steady state for variables other than the real loan margin,
which is expressed in deviations from the steady state in percent points. The blue dashed line
corresponds to perfect banking competition. The pink solid line corresponds to imperfect banking
competition. Each row shows the impulse responses of four variables after a given type of shock: a 10
basis-point contractionary monetary policy shock, a one-standard-deviation negative productivity shock,
and one-standard-deviation negative shocks to the pledgeability ratios mh and mk.
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Figure A.5: Impulse Responses for Different Shocks when mh = 0.5 and mk = 0.5
Note: Horizontal axis shows quarters after the shock that occurs at the beginning of period 1. Vertical
axis shows the percentage deviation from the steady state for variables other than the real loan margin,
which is expressed in deviations from the steady state in percent points. The blue dashed line
corresponds to perfect banking competition. The pink solid line corresponds to imperfect banking
competition. Each row shows the impulse responses of four variables after a given type of shock: a 10
basis-point contractionary monetary policy shock, a one-standard-deviation negative productivity shock,
and one-standard-deviation negative shocks to the pledgeability ratios mh and mk.
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Figure A.6: Impulse Responses for Different Shocks when v = 0.15
Note: Horizontal axis shows quarters after the shock that occurs at the beginning of period 1. Vertical
axis shows the percentage deviation from the steady state for variables other than the loan margin,
which is expressed in deviations from the steady state in percent points. The blue dashed line
corresponds to perfect banking competition. The pink solid line corresponds to imperfect banking
competition. Each row shows the impulse responses of four variables after a given type of shock: a 10
basis-point contractionary monetary policy shock, a one-standard-deviation negative productivity shock,
and one-standard-deviation negative shocks to the pledgeability ratios mh and mk.
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Figure A.7: Impulse Responses for Different Shocks when φh = 0.3
Note: Horizontal axis shows quarters after the shock that occurs at the beginning of period 1. Vertical
axis shows the percentage deviation from the steady state for variables other than the real loan margin,
which is expressed in deviations from the steady state in percent points. The blue dashed line
corresponds to perfect banking competition. The pink solid line corresponds to imperfect banking
competition. Each row shows the impulse responses of four variables after a given type of shock: a 10
basis-point contractionary monetary policy shock, a one-standard-deviation negative productivity shock,
and one-standard-deviation negative shocks to the pledgeability ratios mh and mk.
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Figure A.8: Impulse Responses for Different Shocks and Investment Adjustment Cost χ
Note: Horizontal axis shows quarters after the shock that occurs at the beginning of period 1. Vertical
axis shows the percentage deviation from the steady state. Each line corresponds to a different
calibration for χ under Cournot banking competition (N = 4). Each row shows the impulse responses of
four variables after a given type of shock: a 10 basis-point contractionary monetary policy shock, a
one-standard-deviation negative productivity shock, and one-standard-deviation negative shocks to the
pledgeability ratios mh and mk.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Solving the Entrepreneur’s Problem
B.1.1 The Slope of the Loan Demand Curve
Rewrite the entrepreneur’s expected profit (3.4) as:
Et
[∫ ∞
ω¯t+1(Rb,t,kt,ϵt+1)
ωϵt+1Ak
α
t dF (ω)−
∫ ∞
ω¯t+1(Rb,t,kt,ϵt+1)
Rb,tktdF (ω)
]
=Et
[
ϵt+1Ak
α
t
∫ ∞
ω¯t+1(Rb,t,kt,ϵt+1)
ωf(ω)dω −Rb,tkt[1− F (ω¯t+1(Rb,t, kt, ϵt+1))]
] (B.1)
where f(.) is the probability density function (p.d.f.) of the distribution for ω. Recall the
condition that determines the entrepreneur’s default threshold:
ω¯t+1 =
Rb,tk
1−α
t
ϵt+1A
(3.2)
Since ω¯t+1 is a function of kt, when choosing kt, the entrepreneur needs to consider the
effect of kt on their default probability F (ω¯t+1). For simplicity, write ω¯t+1(Rb,t, kt, ϵt+1) as
ω¯t+1 from here onwards. The gross loan rate Rb,t is determined by the Cournot banking
sector and taken as given by the entrepreneur. Then the first order condition of (B.1)
with respect to kt gives:
Et
[
ϵt+1Aαk
α−1
t
∫ ∞
ω¯t+1
ωf(ω)dω − ϵt+1Akαt ω¯t+1f(ω¯t+1)
∂ω¯t+1
∂kt
−Rb,t[1− F (ω¯t+1)] +Rb,tktf(ω¯t+1)∂ω¯t+1
∂kt
]
= 0
(B.2)
Using ϵt+1Akαt ω¯t+1 = Rb,tkt (3.2), (B.2) can be simplified to:
Et
[
ϵt+1Aαk
α−1
t
∫ ∞
ω¯t+1
ωf(ω)dω −Rb,t[1− F (ω¯t+1)]
]
= 0 (B.3)
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Substitute ϵt+1Akα−1t =
Rb,t
ω¯t+1
(3.2) into (B.3) and divide each term by Rb,t to get:
Et
[
α
ω¯t+1
∫ ∞
ω¯t+1
ωf(ω)dω − [1− F (ω¯t+1)]
]
= 0 (B.4)
The optimal level of kt for a given Rb,t can be solved implicitly from this first order condi-
tion. The entrepreneur’s default threshold can then be written as ω¯t+1(Rb,t, kt(Rb,t), ϵt+1).
To check the second order condition, differentiate the LHS of (B.4) with respect to kt
again:
Et
[
− α
ω¯2t+1
∂ω¯t+1
∂kt
∫ ∞
ω¯t+1
ωf(ω)dω − α
ω¯t+1
ω¯t+1f(ω¯t+1)
∂ω¯t+1
∂kt
+ f(ω¯t+1)
∂ω¯t+1
∂kt
]
=Et
[
− α
ω¯2t+1
∂ω¯t+1
∂kt
∫ ∞
ω¯t+1
ωf(ω)dω + (1− α)f(ω¯t+1)∂ω¯t+1
∂kt
]
=Et
[
− α
ω¯t+1
(1− α)k−1t
∫ ∞
ω¯t+1
ωf(ω)dω + (1− α)2f(ω¯t+1)ω¯t+1k−1t
] (B.5)
where the last step uses ϵt+1ω¯t+1Akα−1t = Rb,t (3.2), (3.3), and hence ∂ω¯t+1∂kt =
(1−α)Rb,tk−αt
ϵt+1A
=
(1− α)ω¯t+1k−1t . The second order condition is negative if:
α
1− α >
Et[f(ω¯t+1)ω¯t+1]
Et
[
1
ω¯t+1
∫∞
ω¯t+1 ωf(ω)dω
] (B.6)
When this condition is satisfied, a unique maximum kt for a given Rb,t can be solved
from the first order condition (B.4). Under the calibration in this paper, this condition is
always satisfied. Besides, this condition is satisfied if ω has a uniform distribution.
Using the first order condition (B.4) and defining g(ω¯t+1) ≡ αω¯t+1
∫∞
ω¯t+1 ωf(ω)dω −
[1− F (ω¯t+1)], the slope of the loan demand curve (3.5) can be found using the implicit
function theorem:
dkt
dRb,t
= −
Et
[
∂g(ω¯t+1)
∂Rb,t
]
Et
[
∂g(ω¯t+1)
∂kt
] = −Et
[
∂g(ω¯t+1)
∂ω¯t+1
∂ω¯t+1
∂Rb,t
]
Et
[
∂g(ω¯t+1)
∂ω¯t+1
∂ω¯t+1
∂kt
] = − Et
[
∂g(ω¯t+1)
∂ω¯t+1
k1−αt
ϵt+1A
]
Et
[
∂g(ω¯t+1)
∂ω¯t+1
(1−α)k−αt Rb,t
ϵt+1A
] = − kt(1− α)Rb,t < 0
(3.5)
B.1.2 Relationship between the Entrepreneur’s Default Thresh-
old and the Gross Loan Rate
Use ω¯t+1(Rb,t, kt(Rb,t), ϵt+1), where the optimal kt is a function of Rb,t, and (3.5) to get
(3.6):
dω¯t+1
dRb,t
= ∂ω¯t+1
∂Rb,t
+ ∂ω¯t+1
∂kt
dkt
dRb,t
= k
1−α
t
ϵt+1A
− (1− α)k
−α
t Rb,t
ϵt+1A
kt
(1− α)Rb,t = 0 (3.6)
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Hence, the gross loan rate does not affect the entrepreneur’s default threshold when
the entrepreneur is choosing kt optimally. Alternatively, as can be seen from the total
derivative of kt with respect to Rb,t (3.5), a one percent increase in Rb,t leads to a 11−α
percent decrease in kt. Given the expression for the threshold ω¯t+1 = Rb,tk
1−α
t
ϵt+1A
(3.2),
changes in Rb,t will be offset by the endogenous response of kt, resulting in no overall
impact of Rb,t on ω¯t+1. In other words, after substituting the optimal kt for a given level
of Rb,t into the expression for ω¯t+1, the default threshold ω¯t+1(Rb,t, kt(Rb,t), ϵt+1) can be
simplified to one that only depends on the aggregate shock, i.e., ω¯t+1(ϵt+1). This result
holds more generally if the entrepreneur is assumed to have full liability, as shown below.
Extension: Entrepreneurs with Full Liability
With full liability, the entrepreneur maximizes the following expected profit with respect
to physical capital kt:
Et
[∫ ∞
0
ωϵt+1Ak
α
t dF (ω)−Rb,tkt
]
= Akαt −Rb,tkt (B.7)
where the expectation operator Et[.] is taken over the distribution of the aggregate shock
ϵt+1 and Et[ϵt+1] = 1. Take the first order condition of (B.7) with respect to kt:
Aαkα−1t −Rb,t = 0 (B.8)
In this case, the expression of optimal capital demand can be explicitly found from
(B.8), which is kt =
(
Aα
Rb,t
) 1
1−α . The slope of the loan demand curve under full liability is
identical to the limited liability case, which can be seen by differentiating the optimal
capital demand with respect to Rb,t. In this case, using the functional form of the default
threshold ω¯t+1 (3.2) and the optimal capital demand, the entrepreneur’s default threshold
can be written as:
ω¯t+1 =
α
ϵt+1
(B.9)
As can be seen, the entrepreneur’s default threshold is still independent of Rb,t.
To see how the optimal kt under full liability differs from the one under limited
liability, the first order condition under limited liability (B.3) can be rewritten as:
Aαkα−1t −Rb,t = Et
[
ϵt+1Aαk
α−1
t
∫ ω¯t+1
0
ωf(ω)dω −Rb,tF (ω¯t+1)
]
(B.10)
As can be seen, under limited liability of the entrepreneur, the RHS of (B.10) is no longer
zero, unlike under full liability of the entrepreneur, when (B.8) holds. Since Aαkα−1t −Rb,t
decreases in kt, if the RHS is negative, then kt under limited liability is larger than its
counterpart under full liability.
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Simplify the RHS of (B.10) using ϵt+1Akα−1t =
Rb,t
ω¯t+1
(3.2):
Et
[
αRb,t
ω¯t+1
∫ ω¯t+1
0
ωf(ω)dω −Rb,tF (ω¯t+1)
]
= Et
[
Rb,tF (ω¯t+1)
(
αE[ω|ω < ω¯t+1]
ω¯t+1
− 1
)]
< 0
(B.11)
which is negative as E[ω|ω<ω¯t+1]
ω¯t+1
< 1. As a result, kt under limited liability is larger than
its counterpart under full liability. Hence, limited liability leads to a higher ω¯t+1 and
thus a higher default probability F (ω¯t+1) than full liability.
B.2 Solving the Bank’s Problem
B.2.1 The Equilibrium Gross Loan Rate
Simplify bank j’s net profit (3.7) using ϵt+1Akα−1t =
Rb,t
ω¯t+1
(3.2) to get:
πBj,t+1 =
∫ ∞
ω¯t+1(ϵt+1)
Rb,tkj,tdF (ω) +
kj,t
kt
(1− µ)
∫ ω¯t+1(ϵt+1)
0
ϵt+1ωAk
α
t dF (ω)
−Rt(kj,t − nj,t)− τjkj,t − nj,t
=Rb,tkj,t[1− F (ω¯t+1(ϵt+1))] + kj,t(1− µ)
∫ ω¯t+1(ϵt+1)
0
ϵt+1ωAk
α−1
t dF (ω)
−Rt(kj,t − nj,t)− τjkj,t − nj,t
=Rb,tkj,t[1− F (ω¯t+1(ϵt+1))] +Rb,tkj,t (1− µ)
ω¯t+1(ϵt+1)
∫ ω¯t+1(ϵt+1)
0
ωdF (ω)
−Rt(kj,t − nj,t)− τjkj,t − nj,t
=Rb,tkj,t
[
[1− F (ω¯t+1(ϵt+1))] + (1− µ)
ω¯t+1(ϵt+1)
∫ ω¯t+1(ϵt+1)
0
ωdF (ω)
]
−Rt(kj,t − nj,t)− τjkj,t − nj,t
=Rb,tkj,tG(ϵt+1)−Rt(kj,t − nj,t)− τjkj,t − nj,t (3.8)
where
G(ϵt+1) ≡ [1− F (ω¯t+1(ϵt+1))] + 1− µ
ω¯t+1(ϵt+1)
∫ ω¯t+1(ϵt+1)
0
ωf(ω)dω (B.12)
= [1− F (ω¯t+1(ϵt+1))] + (1− µ)E[ω|ω 6 ω¯t+1(ϵt+1)]
ω¯t+1(ϵt+1)
F (ω¯t+1(ϵt+1))
= 1− F (ω¯t+1(ϵt+1))
[
1− (1− µ)E[ω|ω 6 ω¯t+1(ϵt+1)]
ω¯t+1(ϵt+1)
]
< 1
G(ϵt+1) < 1 since µ ∈ [0, 1] and E[ω|ω<ω¯t+1(ϵt+1)]ω¯t+1(ϵt+1) < 1. G(ϵt+1) denotes the fraction of gross
loan return Rb,tkj,t that can be obtained by bank j.
ω¯t+1 is a function in terms of only the aggregate shock when the entrepreneur chooses
kt optimally, as shown in (3.6). Due to this result, it is shown below that bank j’s choice
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of loan quantity kj,t does not affect the entrepreneur’s default threshold ω¯t+1 in this
model, which greatly simplifies the bank’s problem. Since the total loan demand kt is
equal to the total loan supply from the j banks, i.e., kt = kj,t +
∑
m̸=j km,t, it follows that
under Cournot competition,
dkt
dkj,t
= 1 (B.13)
Hence, using the fact that ω¯t+1 is independent of Rb,t (3.6), the entrepreneur’s default
threshold is independent of bank j’s loan quantity choice kj,t when the entrepreneur is
choosing the optimal amount of borrowing:
dω¯t+1
dkj,t+1
= dω¯t+1
dRb,t
dRb,t
dkt
dkt
dkj,t
= 0 (B.14)
A further implication from (B.13) is that the effect of kj,t on the gross loan rate is
equivalent to the slope of the downward-sloping inverse demand curve for loans, that is,
dRb,t
dkj,t
= dRb,t
dkt
dkt
dkj,t
= dRb,t
dkt
(B.15)
Using the above three key elements that a) kt = kj,t +
∑
m̸=j km,t, b)
dRb,t
dkj,t
= dRb,t
dkt
and c)
dω¯t+1
dkj,t
= 0, take the first order condition of the expected net profit Et[πBj,t+1] based on
(3.8) with respect to kj,t:(
Rb,t + kj,t
dRb,t
dkj,t
)
Et
[
[1− F (ω¯t+1(ϵt+1))] + 1− µ
ω¯t+1(ϵt+1)
∫ ω¯t+1(ϵt+1)
0
ωf(ω)dω
]
−Rt−τj = 0
(B.16)
Use (B.15) to replace dRb,t
dkj,t
and sum (B.16) over all N banks to get:
(
NRb,t + kt
dRb,t
dkt
)
Et
[
[1− F (ω¯t+1(ϵt+1))] + 1− µ
ω¯t+1(ϵt+1)
∫ ω¯t+1(ϵt+1)
0
ωf(ω)dω
]
−NRt −
N∑
j=1
τj = 0
(B.17)
Since banks have different intermediation costs τj, each of them has a different market
share in the Cournot equilibrium, depending on their inefficiency indicated by τj. Unlike
the symmetric case with identical banks where an equilibrium condition kj,t = ktN can be
imposed, here it is necessary to solve for the equilibrium loan rate and the equilibrium
aggregate loan quantity first before knowing the market share of each bank.
Use dRb,t
dkt
= − (1−α)Rb,t
kt
from (3.5) and the definition of G(ϵt+1) in (B.12) to simplify
(B.17):
Rb,t (N − 1 + α)Et [G(ϵt+1)]−NRt −
N∑
j=1
τj = 0 (B.18)
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Rearrange to get the equilibrium gross loan interest rate R∗b,t (3.15):
R∗b,t =
NRt +
∑N
j=1 τj
(N − 1 + α)Et [G(ϵt+1)] =
Rt + τ¯(
1− 1−α
N
)
Et[G(ϵt+1)]
(3.15)
where τ¯ ≡ 1
N
∑N
j=1 τj denotes the mean marginal intermediation cost across the N banks.
It can be seen that R∗b,t > Rt since
(
1− 1−α
N
)
6 1 and Et[G(ϵt+1)] < 1.
B.2.2 Parameter Restriction on τj
Since τj is randomly drawn from an exogenous distribution and the number of banks N
is exogenously given, there needs to be a restriction on the value of τj to ensure that each
of the N banks makes a positive expected profit. More specifically, assume banks are
subject to a participation constraint:1
Rb,tkj,tEt[G(ϵt+1)]−Rt(kj,t − nj,t)− τjkj,t > Rtnj,t (B.19)
where Et[G(ϵt+1)] = Et
[
[1− F (ω¯t+1(ϵt+1))] + 1−µω¯t+1(ϵt+1)
∫ ω¯t+1(ϵt+1)
0 ωf(ω)dω
]
. The above
condition means that bank j with equity nj,t has an incentive to operate only if the profit
earned from lending is not less than the opportunity cost of its own funds. Simplify
(B.19) to get:
Rt + τj < Rb,tEt[G(ϵt+1)] (B.20)
Substitute the equilibrium loan rate (3.15) to get:
Rt + τj <
Rt + τ¯(
1− 1−α
N
) (3.17)
which means bank j’s marginal cost (the sum of the gross deposit rate and the marginal
intermediation cost) cannot be larger than a factor 1(1− 1−αN )
> 1 of the mean marginal
cost across banks. Note that when banks have identical marginal intermediation cost
(i.e., τj = τ¯ ∀j), the above condition is always satisfied given α < 1.
B.2.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Assume the distribution for τ does not change with the number of banks, so the average
marginal intermediation cost across banks τ¯ = 1
N
∑N
j=1 τj is an exogenous constant. This
is a convenient assumption since the baseline framework focuses on the effect of changing
competition (or number of banks) on variables of interest for a given distribution of bank
1Banks do not make entry decisions since this paper abstracts away from endogenous entry dynamics.
For a given level of N , each operating bank’s inefficiency or intermediation cost τj is assumed to be
within the range that allows each bank to make a positive expected profit.
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efficiency. Differentiate the equilibrium loan rate (3.15) with respect to N :
dR∗b,t
dN
= − Rt + τ¯(1− 1−α
N
)2Et [G(ϵt+1)]
1− α
N2
= − (1− α)R
∗
b,t
N(N − 1 + α) < 0
(B.21)
where the second step uses the equilibrium loan rate (3.15). It is straightforward to see
that this result is identical to the symmetric case where banks have the same level of
efficiency τj = τ¯ ∀j.
Given the equilibrium loan rate (3.15), the equilibrium total loan quantity k∗t is also
known. It can be shown that k∗t increases in N :
dk∗t
dN
= dk
∗
t
dR∗b,t
dR∗b,t
dN
= − k
∗
t
(1− α)R∗b,t
dR∗b,t
dN
= k
∗
t
N(N − 1 + α) > 0 (B.22)
Using (3.1), it can be seen that the expected output is Akαt , as entrepreneurs are ex
ante identical. It follows from dk
∗
t
dN
> 0 that the expected output A(kt∗)α in terms of the
optimal k∗t also increases in N .
Extension: Distribution Mean for τ Changes with N
When the distribution of the marginal intermediation cost τ is allowed to change with N ,
how the equilibrium loan rate R∗b,t changes with N depends on the efficiency of the new
entrants. Using the expression for the equilibrium loan rate (3.15), the change in R∗b,t
when N increases by one is:2
R∗b,t(N + 1)−R∗b,t(N) =
(N + 1)Rt + N+1∑
j=1
τj −NRt −
N∑
j=1
τj
 1
(N + α)Et[G(ϵt+1)]
+
NRt + N∑
j=1
τj
[ 1
(N + α)Et[G(ϵt+1)]
− 1(N − 1 + α)Et[G(ϵt+1)]
]
= (Rt + τN+1)(N + α)Et[G(ϵt+1)]
− (NRt +
∑N
j=1 τj)
(N + α)(N − 1 + α)Et[G(ϵt+1)]
=
(N − 1 + α)τN+1 − (1− α)Rt −∑Nj=1 τj
(N + α)(N − 1 + α)Et[G(ϵt+1)]
(B.24)
where τN+1 denotes the marginal intermediation cost of the new entrant. As can be
seen, the sign of R∗b,t(N + 1)−R∗b,t(N) depends on the magnitude of the efficiency of the
2 Using the product rule for discrete functions (sequences) u(x) and v(x), where x denotes the inputs
for the discrete functions.
∆(u(x)v(x)) = ∆u(x)∆v(x) + ∆u(x)v(x) + u(x)∆v(x) = v(x+ 1)∆u(x) + u(x)∆v(x) (B.23)
where ∆u(x) = u(x+ 1)− u(x) and ∆v(x) = v(x+ 1)− v(x) are the discrete counterparts of dudx and dvdx .
In this case, let x = N , u(x) = NRt +
∑N
j=1 τj , v(x) = 1(N−1+α)Et[G(ϵt+1)] .
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(N +1)-th bank, τN+1. This paper focuses on changes in the degree of market power from
changes in competition by assuming that the distribution mean for τ is unaffected by N .
B.2.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Once the equilibrium loan rate and the equilibrium aggregate loan quantity are known,
each bank j’s equilibrium loan quantity k∗j,t (3.18) can be found by using
dRb,t
dkj,t
= dRb,t
dkt
(B.15), bank j’s first order condition (B.16), dk
∗
t
dR∗
b,t
= − k∗t(1−α)R∗
b,t
(3.5), and R∗b,t (3.15):
k∗j,t =
 Rt + τj
Et
[
[1− F (ω¯t+1(ϵt+1))] + 1−µω¯t+1(ϵt+1)
∫ ω¯t+1(ϵt+1)
0 ωf(ω)dω
] −R∗b,t
 dk∗t
dR∗b,t
= −
 Rt + τj
Et
[
[1− F (ω¯t+1(ϵt+1))] + 1−µω¯t+1(ϵt+1)
∫ ω¯t+1(ϵt+1)
0 ωf(ω)dω
] −R∗b,t
 k∗t
(1− α)R∗b,t
= − k
∗
t
1− α
 Rt + τj
Et
[
[1− F (ω¯t+1(ϵt+1))] + 1−µω¯t+1(ϵt+1)
∫ ω¯t+1(ϵt+1)
0 ωf(ω)dω
]
R∗b,t
− 1

= k
∗
t
1− α
[
1− (1−
1−α
N
)(Rt + τj)
(Rt + τ¯)
]
(3.18)
Note that in a Cournot equilibrium with heterogeneous banks, bank j’s equilibrium
market share is no longer equal to 1
N
. According to (3.18), bank j’s equilibrium market
share ms∗j,t is:
ms∗j,t ≡
k∗j,t
k∗t
= 11− α
[
1− (1−
1−α
N
)(Rt + τj)
(Rt + τ¯)
]
(B.25)
As can be seen from (B.25), if all banks have the same marginal intermediation cost (i.e.,
τj = τ ∀j), each bank j has a market share of 1N . In fact, when the bank has a below
average marginal intermediation cost (τj < τ¯), its market share is larger than 1N . Given
the condition (3.17), bank j’s equilibrium market share is positive. Since ms∗j,t > 0 and∑N
j=1ms
∗
j,t = 1, each bank’s market share is less than 1.
Assume the distribution mean for τ does not change with N , it is shown below that
each bank’s market share falls with N :
dms∗j,t
dN
= − 11− α
(1−α
N2 )(Rt + τj)
Rt + τ¯
= − Rt + τj
N2(Rt + τ¯)
< 0 (B.26)
As can be seen, if bank j is more inefficient relative to the average bank (i.e., τj is larger
than τ¯), then bank j’s market share falls by more when N increases. When N is already
large, the responsiveness of ms∗j,t to a further increase in N is much smaller.
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B.2.5 Proof of Proposition 3
When banks have the same level of efficiency, each bank’s loan quantity unambiguously
decreases with the number of banks N for N > 1. In this case, use k∗j,t = ms∗j,tk∗t ,
dk∗t
dN
= k
∗
t
N(N−1+α) (B.22) and ms
∗
j,t = 1N to get:
dk∗j,t
dN
=ms∗j,t
dk∗t
dN
+
dms∗j,t
dN
k∗t
= 1
N
k∗t
N(N − 1 + α) −
1
N2
k∗t
=
( 1
N − 1 + α − 1
)
k∗t
N2
< 0 if N > 1
(B.27)
By contrast, when banks have different levels of efficiency, how each individual bank’s
loan quantity changes with N is unclear, depending on the balance between an increasing
aggregate loan quantity k∗t and the falling equilibrium market share when N increases
(Proposition 2). Using k∗j,t = ms∗j,tk∗t , the expressions for ms∗j,t (B.25),
dk∗t
dN
(B.22) and
dmsj,t
dN
∗ (B.26), it is shown below that the sign of dk
∗
j,t
dN
is ambiguous:
dk∗j,t
dN
=ms∗j,t
dk∗t
dN
+
dms∗j,t
dN
k∗t
=
k∗j,t
k∗t
k∗t
N(N − 1 + α) −
Rt + τj
N2(Rt + τ¯)
k∗t
= 11− α
[
1− (1−
1−α
N
)(Rt + τj)
(Rt + τ¯)
]
k∗t
N(N − 1 + α) −
Rt + τj
N2(Rt + τ¯)
k∗t
=
[Rt + τ¯ − (1− 1−αN )(Rt + τj)]k∗t − N−1+αN (1− α)(Rt + τj)k∗t
(1− α)(Rt + τ¯)N(N − 1 + α)
=
[Rt + τ¯ − (2− α)(1− 1−αN )(Rt + τj)]k∗t
(1− α)(Rt + τ¯)N(N − 1 + α)
(B.28)
It follows from (B.28) that dk
∗
j,t
dN
< 0 when the numerator is negative:
Rt + τ¯ − (2− α)
(
1− 1− α
N
)
(Rt + τj) < 0 (B.29)
or equivalently after rearranging,
Rt + τj >
Rt + τ¯
(2− α)(1− 1−α
N
) (B.30)
Since Rt+τ¯(2−α)(1− 1−α
N
) is strictly smaller than the upper bound
Rt+τ¯
(1− 1−α
N
) (3.17), there is a
positive probability that dk
∗
j,t
dN
is negative for some banks and positive for others depending
on the bank’s relative efficiency. More specifically, dk
∗
j,t
dN
< 0 when
Rt + τ¯
(2− α)(1− 1−α
N
) < Rt + τj <
Rt + τ¯
(1− 1−α
N
) (B.31)
143
and dk
∗
j,t
dN
> 0 when
Rt + τj <
Rt + τ¯
(2− α)(1− 1−α
N
) (B.32)
Intuitively, although each bank’s market share falls with N (Proposition 2), this
effect of market share reduction can be offset by the increase in total loan quantity as
N increases, leading to an increase in bank j’s loan quantity. According to (B.26), the
market shares of more efficient banks with low τj relative to the mean are less sensitive
to changes in N . So an increase in aggregate loan quantity as N increases can be large
relative to a small drop in market share of a more efficient bank, resulting in an increase
in the bank’s loan quantity.
B.2.6 Proof of Proposition 4
It can be shown that the effect of changes in k∗j,t in response to an increase in N is
dominated by the effect of the fall in R∗b,t, so the expected net profit Et[πBt+1] decreases
with N . Following (3.8), the expected net profit in equilibrium is:
Et[πBj,t+1] ≡ R∗b,tk∗j,tEt[G(ϵt+1)]−Rt(k∗j,t − nj,t)− τjk∗j,t − nj,t (B.33)
Differentiate Et[πBj,t+1] with respect to N and use the expressions for
dR∗b,t
dN
(B.21) and dk
∗
j,t
dN
(B.28) to get:
dEt[πBj,t+1]
dN
=
dR∗b,t
dN
k∗j,tEt[G(ϵt+1)] +
dk∗j,t
dN
(
R∗b,tEt[G(ϵt+1)]−Rt − τj
)
=− (1− α)R
∗
b,tk
∗
j,tEt[G(ϵt+1)]
N(N − 1 + α)
+
(
k∗j,t
N(N − 1 + α) −
(Rt + τj)
N2(Rt + τ¯)
k∗t
)(
R∗b,tEt[G(ϵt+1)]−Rt − τj
)
=
αR∗b,tk
∗
j,tEt[G(ϵt+1)]− (Rt + τj)k∗j,t
N(N − 1 + α) −
(Rt + τj)
N2(Rt + τ¯)
k∗t
(
R∗b,tEt[G(ϵt+1)]−Rt − τj
)
< 0
(B.34)
Proof for dEt[π
B
t+1]
dN
< 0:
1) According to (B.20):
R∗b,tEt[G(ϵt+1)]−Rt − τj > 0 (B.20)
2) Using ms∗j,t (B.25), the fact that ms∗j,t < 1 gives:
(1− 1−α
N
)(Rt + τj)
(Rt + τ¯)
> α (B.35)
Substitute R∗b,tEt[G(ϵt+1)] = Rt+τ¯1− 1−α
N
(3.15) into the above inequality and rearrange to get:
αR∗b,tk
∗
j,tEt[G(ϵt+1)]− (Rt + τj)k∗j,t < 0 (B.36)
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B.2.7 Proof of Proposition 5
Given the predetermined equity nj,t, bank j chooses the loan quantity kj,t to maximize
Et[πBj,t+1]. In the presence of an adverse aggregate shock in period t+ 1, the net profit
πBj,t+1 can be negative and if the loss is too large to be absorbed by the equity nj,t, the
pre-dividend equity nj,t + πBj,t+1 in period t+ 1 would be negative in which case bank j
defaults. More specifically, if the realized value of the aggregate shock ϵt+1 is below bank
j’s default threshold ϵ¯j,t+1, then bank j becomes insolvent, where ϵ¯j,t+1 is determined by
the condition (3.21):
nj,t + πBj,t+1(ϵ¯j,t+1) = R∗b,tk∗j,tG(ϵ¯j,t+1)−Rt(k∗j,t − nj,t)− τjk∗j,t = 0 (3.21)
where G(ϵ¯j,t+1) ≡
[
[1− F (ω¯t+1(ϵ¯j,t+1))] + 1−µω¯t+1(ϵ¯j,t+1)
∫ ω¯t+1(ϵ¯j,t+1)
0 ωf(ω)dω
]
< 1. G(ϵ¯j,t+1)
is a fraction of the contractual gross loan revenue Rb,tkj,t that can be earned by bank j
when the realized aggregate shock takes a value of ϵ¯j,t+1. This condition shows that the
pre-dividend equity in period t+ 1 is zero when the realized value of the aggregate shock
is ϵ¯j,t+1. It can be shown that G′(ϵ¯j,t+1) is positive:
G′(ϵ¯j,t+1) = −f(ω¯t+1) ∂ω¯t+1
∂ϵ¯j,t+1
− 1− µ
ω¯2t+1
∂ω¯t+1
∂ϵ¯j,t+1
∫ ω¯t+1
0
ωf(ω)dω + 1− µ
ω¯t+1
ω¯t+1f(ω¯t+1)
∂ω¯t+1
∂ϵ¯j,t+1
= ∂ω¯t+1
∂ϵ¯j,t+1
[
−f(ω¯t+1)− 1− µ
ω¯2t+1
∫ ω¯t+1
0
ωf(ω)dω + (1− µ)f(ω¯t+1)
]
= − ∂ω¯t+1
∂ϵ¯j,t+1
[
1− µ
ω¯2t+1
∫ ω¯t+1
0
ωf(ω)dω + µf(ω¯t+1)
]
> 0
(B.37)
where ∂ω¯t+1
∂ϵ¯j,t+1
< 0, as can be seen from the entrepreneur’s ex post default threshold
ω¯t+1(ϵ¯j,t+1) =
Rb,tk
∗1−α
j,t
ϵ¯j,t+1A
based on (3.2), when the realized aggregate shock is ϵ¯j,t+1. Intu-
itively, a higher realized aggregate shock reduces the entrepreneur’s default threshold
and thus default probability. Hence, G(.) increases in ϵ¯j,t+1, implying higher realized
aggregate shock raises the fraction of R∗b,tk∗j,t that can be obtained by bank j. Bank’s
default condition (3.21) shows that when the realized aggregate shock is below ϵ¯j,t+1, the
loan revenue R∗b,tk∗j,tG(ϵ¯j,t+1) is too low and hence the net profit is too negative to be
absorbed by nj,t such that bank j has to default.
Banks have different default thresholds due to different marginal intermediation costs
τj and the predetermined equity nj,t. Divide each term in (3.21) by kj,t to get (3.22):
R∗b,tG(ϵ¯j,t+1)− (Rt + τj) +Rt
nj,t
k∗j,t
= 0 (3.22)
Implicitly differentiate (3.22) with respect to the equity ratio κj,t = nj,tk∗j,t to get:
R∗b,tG
′(ϵ¯j,t+1)
dϵ¯j,t+1
dκj,t
+Rt = 0 (B.38)
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Rearrange to get:
dϵ¯j,t+1
dκj,t
= − Rt
R∗b,tG′(ϵ¯j,t+1)
< 0 (B.39)
B.2.8 Proof of Proposition 6
As can be seen from (3.22), a change in the number of banks N can affect bank j’s default
threshold via the profit margin [Rb,tG(ϵ¯j,t+1)− (Rt + τj)], which resembles the margin
effect. A lower N raises Rb,t and hence the profit margin for an exogenous marginal cost
(Rt + τj), resulting in a lower default threshold (margin effect). The equity ratio nj,tk∗j,t
present in (3.22) reflects the equity ratio effect. A higher equity ratio lowers the default
threshold since the bank is still able to survive with a lower realized aggregate shock. A
lower N can lead to a larger kj,t (Proposition 3) and thus a lower equity ratio nj,tkj,t since
nj,t is predetermined. This short-run equity ratio effect tends to raise the bank’s default
threshold as N decreases, which opposes the margin effect. Note that if nj,t = 0, the
short-run equity ratio effect is absent and an increase in N unambiguously raises bank
j’s default threshold. A formal proof is shown below. Totally differentiate (3.22) with
respect to N :
R∗b,tG
′(ϵ¯j,t+1)
dϵ¯j,t+1
dN
+
dR∗b,t
dN
G(ϵ¯j,t+1) +Rt
1
k∗j,t
dnj,t
dN
−Rt nj,t(k∗j,t)2
dk∗j,t
dN
= 0 (B.40)
Rearrange to get (3.23):
dϵ¯j,t+1
dN
=
Rt
nj,t
k∗j,t
dk∗j,t
dN
1
k∗j,t
− dR
∗
b,t
dN
G(ϵ¯j,t+1)−Rt 1k∗j,t
dnj,t
dN
R∗b,tG′(ϵ¯j,t+1)
(3.23)
Since equity in period t is predetermined and is not affected by changes in N in period t,
dnj,t
dN
= 0. However, future equity levels will be affected by changes in N , so do future
default probabilities. Hence, the last term in the numerator refers to the long-run equity
ratio effect.
As can be seen from (3.23), when nj,t = 0, the sign of dϵ¯j,t+1dN is unambiguously positive
due to the margin effect. When nj,t ̸= 0, the sign of dϵ¯j,t+1dN is ambigous, as proved below.
Use the expression for dk
∗
j,t
dNt
(B.28) and k∗j,t (3.18) to get:
dk∗j,t
dN
1
k∗j,t
=
[Rt + τ¯ − (2− α)(1− 1−αN )(Rt + τj)]k∗t
(1− α)(Rt + τ¯)N(N − 1 + α)
1− α
k∗t
Rt + τ¯
Rt + τ¯ − (1− 1−αN )(Rt + τj)
=
Rt + τ¯ − (2− α)(1− 1−αN )(Rt + τj)
N(N − 1 + α)[Rt + τ¯ − (1− 1−αN )(Rt + τj)]
(B.41)
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Substitute (B.41) and the expression for dR
∗
b,t
dN
(B.21) into (3.23):
dϵ¯j,t+1
dN
=
Rt
nj,t
k∗j,t
Rt+τ¯−(2−α)(1− 1−αN )(Rt+τj)
N(N−1+α)[Rt+τ¯−(1− 1−αN )(Rt+τj)]
+ (1−α)R
∗
b,t
N(N−1+α)G(ϵ¯j,t+1)
R∗b,tG′(ϵ¯j,t+1)
=
Rt
nj,t
k∗j,t
Rt+τ¯−(2−α)(1− 1−αN )(Rt+τj)
N(N−1+α)[Rt+τ¯−(1− 1−αN )(Rt+τj)]
+ (1−α)
N(N−1+α)
[
Rt(1− nj,tk∗j,t ) + τj
]
R∗b,tG′(ϵ¯j,t+1)
=
Rt
nj,t
k∗j,t
1
N(N−1+α)
[
Rt+τ¯−(2−α)(1− 1−αN )(Rt+τj)
[Rt+τ¯−(1− 1−αN )(Rt+τj)]
− (1− α)
]
+ (1−α)
N(N−1+α)(Rt + τj)
R∗b,tG′(ϵ¯j,t+1)
=
Rt
nj,t
k∗j,t
α(Rt+τ¯)−(1− 1−αN )(Rt+τj)
Rt+τ¯−(1− 1−αN )(Rt+τj)
+ (1− α)(Rt + τj)
N(N − 1 + α)R∗b,tG′(ϵ¯j,t+1)
(B.42)
where the second step uses (3.22). Since G′(ϵ¯j,t+1) > 0 (B.37), dϵ¯j,t+1dN (B.42) is negative
(short-run equity ratio effect dominates the margin effect) if the numerator of (B.42) is
negative, or equivalently,
nj,t
k∗j,t
>
(1− α)(Rt + τj)[Rt + τ¯ − (1− 1−αN )(Rt + τj)]
Rt[(1− 1−αN )(Rt + τj)− α(Rt + τ¯)]
> 0 (B.43)
where Rt + τ¯ − (1 − 1−αN )(Rt + τj) > 0 (3.17) and (1 − 1−αN )(Rt + τj) − α(Rt + τ¯) > 0
(B.35). Rearrange (3.19) to get:
α(Rt + τ¯) <
(
1− 1− α
N
)
(Rt + τj) < Rt + τ¯ (3.19)
So the ratio Rt+τ¯−(1−
1−α
N
)(Rt+τj)
(1− 1−α
N
)(Rt+τj)−α(Rt+τ¯) on the right hand side of the inequality (B.43) can be
larger or smaller than one depending on the value of τj . If τj is relatively large, the ratio
is smaller and it is more likely for the inequality (B.43) to hold. This means when N is
lower, the default thresholds of relatively inefficient banks are more likely to increase due
to a stronger short-run equity ratio effect (kj,t increases more after a decrease in N) and
a weaker margin effect (profit margin is smaller due to higher τj).
B.3 Simulation
B.3.1 Reverse Bounded Pareto Distribution for τ
Suppose τ has a Pareto distribution, then the p.d.f. fτ (τ) and c.d.f. Fτ (τ) are:
fτ (τ) =
aτas
τa+1
(B.44)
Fτ (τ) = 1−
(
τs
τ
)a
(B.45)
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where τs > 0 is the scale parameter and a > 0 is the shape parameter and the support is
τ ∈ [τs,∞). Bounded (truncated) Pareto distribution is a conditional distribution that
results from restricting the domain of Pareto distribution. By restricting the domain
of the Pareto distribution to (L,H], the p.d.f. fτB(τ) and c.d.f. FτB(τ) of the bounded
Pareto distribution are respectively:
fτB(τ) =
fτ (τ)
Fτ (H)− Fτ (L) =
aτas
τa+1
1−
(
τs
H
)a − [1− ( τs
L
)a
]
= aL
aτ−a−1
1−
(
L
H
)a (B.46)
FτB(τ) =
Fτ (τ)− Fτ (L)
Fτ (H)− Fτ (L) =
1−
(
τs
τ
)a − [1− ( τs
L
)a
]
1−
(
τs
H
)a − [1− ( τs
L
)a
]
= 1− L
aτ−a
1−
(
L
H
)a (B.47)
where the support is τ ∈ (L,H]. The bounded Pareto distribution is positively skewed
with a long right tail in the domain of (L,H]. To generate a market share distribution
that contains a few large banks and a lot of small banks, this distribution for τ needs to
be reversed such that it is negatively skewed with a long left tail since small τ implies
large equilibrium market share. So the p.d.f. of the bounded Pareto distribution is flipped
around the y-axis and then shifted to the right by L+H, leading to a reverse bounded
Pareto distribution that lies within the same domain (L,H]. Using (B.46), the p.d.f. of
the reverse distribution fτBR(τ) becomes:
fτBR(τ) ≡ fτB(−τ +H + L) = aL
a(H + L− τ)−a−1
1−
(
L
H
)a (B.48)
Hence, the c.d.f. of the reverse distribution FτBR(τ) is:
FτBR(τ) =
∫ τ
L
aLa(H + L− τ)−a−1
1−
(
L
H
)a dτ = La(H + L− τ)−a − LaH−a
1−
(
L
H
)a (B.49)
τj is drawn from the reverse bounded Pareto distribution FτBR(τ) with domain (L,H].
Applying the inverse-transform method, this distribution can be generated using a uniform
distribution Uniform[0, 1]. Let U denote a random variable with the continuous uniform
distribution over the interval [0, 1], τj can be drawn from F−1τBR(U), where F−1τBR(.)
represents the inverse function. The inverse transform method can be used as long as
there is an explicit expression for F−1τBR(.) in closed form. Using the expression for (B.49),
U = L
a(H + L− τ)−a − LaH−a
1−
(
L
H
)a (B.50)
Rearrange the above equation for τ :
τ = H + L− [UL−a − UH−a +H−a]− 1a (B.51)
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In simulation, random numbers are first generated from a uniform distribution U [0, 1],
then τj is obtained using (B.51).
B.3.2 Calibration
Table B.1: Baseline Calibration of Parameters
Parameter Value
Germany
Number of banks N 60
Capital share α 0.3
Desired equity ratio κ∗ 0.072
Collection cost µ 0.04
Support for bounded Pareto distribution of τ [0.001, 0.04]
Shape for bounded Pareto distribution of τ 0.1
Mean of log-normal distribution of ω -0.15
Variance of log-normal distribution of ω 0.3
Mean of log-normal distribution of ϵ -0.14
Variance of log-normal distribution of ϵ 0.28
B.4 Data
B.4.1 Data Cleaning
Credit Default Swaps from the Thomson Reuters
Banks with 5-year CDS traded are identified by their names or Ticker in EIKON database.
From the download for all 5-year CDS data at a quarterly frequency, there are 306 banks
from all countries and 218 unique banks in EU or OECD countries. Each bank can
have multiple CDS securities, with different seniorities, currencies, restructuring events,
or data providers, which are uniquely identified by RIC (Reuters instrument code) in
EIKON database.3 There are 4103 unique RIC (CDS securities) from all countries and
3534 unique RIC for banks in EU or OECD countries from the download.
After dropping the missing CDS midspread data (302 banks left), the following steps
are taken to make sure only one CDS security is kept for each bank:
1) Keep only one type of seniority for each bank. There are 4 types of issue seniority:
junior, secured, senior unsecured (67%) and subordinated (≈33%). The last two types
3Restructuring event is one type of credit events that triggers settlement under the CDS contract.
Restructuring event is a “soft event” as the loss to the owner of the specific bond referenced in the CDS
contract is not obvious.
149
account for the majority of the data points. For each bank, keep the seniority type that
occurs most frequently throughout time to maximize the number of data points. After
this step, only two types of seniority are left: senior unsecured (≈ 96%) and subordinated
(≈ 4%), and 300 banks are left.
2) For each bank, keep the restructuring event that appears most frequently throughout
time. After this step, 296 banks are left.
3) Keep only one type of currency for each bank. There are 18 different currencies,
with Euro and US dollar accounting for approximately 46% and 40% of the data points
respectively. For each bank, keep the currency that occurs most frequently throughout
time. After this step, 4 types of currencies (Australian Dollar, British Pound Sterling,
Euro, Japanese Yen, and US Dollar) and 292 banks are left.
4) Keep only one data contributor for each bank. There are 12 different data
contributors. GFI FENICS (≈ 36%), Thomson Reuters EOD (≈ 24%), and Markit
Intraday (≈ 11%) account for the majority of the data points, with numbers inside
the brackets indicating their shares of the observations. Keep only one type of data
contributor for each bank based on the number of observations. After this step, 8 different
data contributors are left, with GFI FENICS accounting for around 78% of the data and
Thomson Reuters EOD for around 14%. 289 banks are left and 205 are in EU or OECD
countries.
Out of these 205 banks, 174 can be matched to Bankscope. Using ISIN number and
Ticker can only match a limited number of banks since some banks are unlisted. So I
manually match the banks from EIKON to the identifier (bvdid) in Bankscope using
bank names, ISIN number and Ticker.
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B.4.2 Data Sources
Table B.2: Data Sources
Data Descriptions Source
Concentration measures HHI and 5-bank concentration ra-
tio based on total assets of credit
institutions
ECB
Concentration measures HHI and 5-bank concentration ra-
tio based on total assets of 6 types
of banks
Bankscope annual state-
ments, own calculation
Monetary and financial institu-
tions (MFI) interest rates
harmonised monthly (annualised)
lending rates and deposit rates on
new business with an initial rate
fixation period of 1 year
ECB
Credit default swap spreads 5-year CDS quarterly end spreads Thomson Reuters EIKON
Quarterly bank-level variables total assets, total equity Bankscope quarterly state-
ments
Annual bank-level variables total assets, total equity, loan im-
pairment charge, net income, etc.
Bankscope annual state-
ments
Country-level macro variables real GDP growth rate, inflation
rate (growth rate of GDP deflator)
World Bank
Country-level macro variables quarterly real GDP growth rate OECD
Country-level total credit total credit of domestic banks to
private non-financial sector
BIS
Country-level total assets of credit
institutions
total assets (in euros) of credit
institutions including domestic
banking groups and stand alone
banks, foreign (EU and non-EU)
controlled subsidiaries and for-
eign (EU and non-EU) controlled
branches
ECB
Dollar/Euro exchange rate used to convert the total assets of
credit institutions in euros from
the ECB into dollars
Federal Reserve Bank of St
Louis (FRED)
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B.4.3 Summary Statistics
Annual Bankscope Data
Table B.3: Summary Statistics of Key Variables by Groups of Countries
Percentiles
Mean Median 1st 25th 75th 99th Obs.
EU countries
change in equity/lagged assets 0.01 0.00 -0.08 -0.00 0.01 0.17 50,482
loan impairment ratio 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.08 51,326
GDP growth rate 0.01 0.02 -0.06 0.00 0.03 0.07 56,942
inflation rate 0.02 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.02 0.07 56,942
HHI (ECB) 0.11 0.10 0.02 0.06 0.12 0.40 56,307
HHI (Bankscope) 0.17 0.15 0.04 0.10 0.21 0.52 56,942
5-bank ratio (ECB) 0.59 0.59 0.20 0.47 0.71 0.99 56,350
5-bank ratio (Bankscope) 0.72 0.74 0.34 0.61 0.85 1.00 56,934
OECD countries
change in equity/lagged assets 0.01 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.01 0.15 209,680
loan impairment ratio 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.06 221,648
GDP growth rate 0.02 0.02 -0.05 0.01 0.03 0.05 232,203
inflation rate 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 232,203
HHI (Bankscope) 0.16 0.14 0.01 0.08 0.20 0.52 232,203
5-bank ratio (Bankscope) 0.69 0.72 0.20 0.57 0.83 1.00 232,195
Note: The table shows the summary statistics of the key variables used in the regression of change
in equity on concentration. Change in total equity over lagged total assets is the dependent variable.
Loan impairment ratio is calculated as loan impairment charge over gross loans. Variables apart
from the concentration measures and GDP growth rate are winsorized for the top and bottom 1%
of the distribution by a given group of countries (i.e., variables in the upper part of the table are
winsorized by the pooled sample of EU countries). Statistics are shown after the winsorization.
Statistics for concentration measures (country-year level) are computed using country-year level
data, although bank-year observations are shown under “Obs.”.
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Table B.4: Data Description for EU/OECD Countries in Bankscope
Country Period Obs Obs/Year Commercial Savings Cooperative BHC Other
Australia 2005-2014 394 39 31 1 7 5 31
Austria 2000-2014 3,599 240 86 141 119 8 30
Belgium 1999-2014 963 60 53 16 9 11 24
Bulgaria 1999-2014 317 20 26 1 1 1 4
Canada 2010-2014 417 83 44 4 36 7 13
Chile 1999-2007 206 23 29 0 0 0 2
Croatia 1999-2014 567 35 50 1 1 0 16
Cyprus 1999-2014 225 14 22 1 2 4 0
Czech Republic 2004-2014 302 27 24 0 2 0 17
Denmark 1999-2014 1,654 103 66 60 10 5 20
Estonia 1999-2014 84 5 8 0 0 1 0
Finland 2005-2014 270 27 30 16 2 2 11
France 1999-2014 4,998 312 200 49 131 9 150
Germany 1999-2014 27,244 1,703 200 685 1,502 17 141
Greece 2005-2014 176 18 19 1 1 1 4
Hungary 1999-2014 411 26 38 1 1 0 22
Iceland 2003-2014 159 13 6 24 0 0 10
Ireland 2002-2014 253 19 21 0 0 4 27
Israel 1999-2014 187 12 17 0 0 1 3
Italy 2005-2014 6,282 628 143 53 508 14 66
Japan 1999-2014 10,621 664 175 0 673 33 65
Latvia 1999-2014 304 19 24 0 0 0 1
Lithuania 1999-2014 156 10 13 0 0 0 0
Luxembourg 1999-2014 1,229 77 132 2 2 11 11
Malta 2000-2014 131 9 12 1 1 0 2
Mexico 1999-2014 1,127 70 63 11 5 18 101
Netherlands 1999-2014 740 46 48 2 1 20 30
New Zealand 2006-2014 167 19 15 1 6 2 10
Norway 2006-2014 1,318 146 22 124 0 5 28
Poland 2004-2014 407 37 54 1 1 2 8
Portugal 2005-2014 648 65 28 84 4 7 14
Romania 1999-2014 312 20 31 3 1 0 7
Slovakia 2005-2014 142 14 14 2 0 1 6
Slovenia 2005-2014 183 18 15 2 2 0 5
South Korea 2010-2014 213 43 16 6 1 5 29
Spain 2005-2014 1,642 164 71 66 82 5 27
Sweden 1999-2014 1,387 87 34 81 1 10 25
Switzerland 1999-2014 5,372 336 216 251 10 28 24
Turkey 2006-2014 576 64 34 0 0 5 68
United Kingdom 2005-2014 2,316 232 145 4 1 44 143
United States 1999-2014 156,212 9,763 9,220 1,037 40 3,048 98
Note: “Obs” shows the total number of observations in a sample of six types of banks (i.e., bank holding companies,
commercial banks, savings banks, cooperative banks, finance companies, and real estate & mortgage banks) for each
country. “Obs/Year” shows the average number of observations in each year across the period covered in each country.
The last five columns show the number of banks under each type category (i.e., commercial banks, savings banks,
cooperative banks, bank holding companies and others). “Other” includes the other two types of banks.
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Table B.5: Bankscope Data Compared with the Aggregates from ECB/BIS
Country Share of Total Assets (ECB) Period Share of Total Credit (BIS) Period
Australia - 0.96 2005-2014
Austria 0.62 2008-2014 1.13 2000-2014
Belgium 1.12 2007-2014 2.25 1999-2014
Bulgaria 0.85 2007-2014 -
Canada - 1.29 2010-2014
Chile - 1.04 1999-2007
Croatia 0.95 2013-2014 -
Cyprus 0.61 2008-2014 -
Czech Republic 0.90 2007-2014 1.13 2004-2014
Denmark 1.13 2008-2014 1.31 1999-2014
Estonia 0.48 2008-2014 -
Finland 1.08 2007-2014 1.17 2005-2014
France 1.49 2007-2014 1.60 1999-2014
Germany 0.93 2008-2014 1.33 1999-2014
Greece 0.75 2008-2014 0.92 2005-2014
Hungary 0.63 2008-2014 0.72 1999-2014
Iceland - -
Ireland 0.60 2008-2014 1.19 2002-2014
Israel - 0.95 1999-2014
Italy 1.04 2007-2014 1.21 2005-2014
Japan - 1.25 1999-2014
Latvia 0.85 2008-2014 -
Lithuania 0.84 2007-2014 -
Luxembourg 0.72 2008-2014 4.76 2003-2014
Malta 0.36 2007-2014 -
Mexico - 1.76 1999-2014
Netherlands 0.84 2008-2014 0.86 1999-2014
New Zealand - 0.88 2006-2014
Norway - 1.10 2006-2014
Poland 0.72 2007-2014 0.81 2004-2014
Portugal 0.94 2007-2014 0.96 2005-2014
Romania 0.75 2007-2014 -
Slovakia 0.71 2007-2014 -
Slovenia 0.82 2007-2014 -
South Korea - 0.65 2010-2014
Spain 0.77 2008-2014 1.04 2005-2014
Sweden 0.64 2007-2014 0.99 1999-2014
Switzerland - 1.09 1999-2014
Turkey - 1.32 2006-2014
United Kingdom 0.75 2008-2014 1.49 2005-2014
United States - 2.01 1999-2014
Data sources: Bankscope, ECB, BIS, FRED
Note: Share of total assets (ECB) is computed by dividing total assets of all sampled banks in Bankscope data by
total assets of credit institutions from ECB. The numbers reported are mean values over the period indicated in
the third column. Share of total credit (BIS) is computed by dividing total gross loans of all sampled banks in
Bankscope by total credit of domestic banks to private non-financial sector from BIS. The numbers reported are
mean values over the period indicated in the last column.
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Merged Sample of Quarterly CDS Spreads and Bankscope Data
Table B.6: Description for the Merged Sample
(quarterly CDS data merged with quarterly Bankscope data)
Country Period Obs Obs/Year Banks Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Australia 2005-2016 154 13 8 0 68 3 83
Austria 2004-2016 126 10 5 25 36 29 36
Belgium 2005-2016 43 4 3 0 20 0 23
Canada 2010-2016 151 22 6 36 36 37 42
Chile 2011-2016 23 4 1 6 6 6 5
Denmark 2004-2016 49 4 1 13 12 12 12
Finland 2008-2016 17 2 1 0 9 0 8
France 2004-2016 230 18 11 22 91 25 92
Germany 2003-2016 208 15 7 44 62 43 59
Greece 2008-2016 108 12 4 26 28 27 27
Hungary 2008-2016 29 3 1 7 7 7 8
Ireland 2004-2016 86 7 4 0 42 1 43
Italy 2005-2016 234 20 6 48 62 58 66
Japan 2003-2016 368 26 19 53 134 49 132
Netherlands 2004-2016 133 10 7 11 56 4 62
Norway 2006-2016 81 7 2 19 22 20 20
Portugal 2004-2016 126 10 4 28 37 26 35
South Korea 2009-2016 157 20 7 34 41 33 49
Spain 2004-2016 260 20 9 53 72 57 78
Sweden 2005-2016 202 17 5 50 52 51 49
Switzerland 2003-2016 99 7 2 25 25 24 25
Turkey 2007-2016 86 9 4 15 26 20 25
United Kingdom 2004-2016 264 20 14 21 102 22 119
United States 2003-2016 983 70 26 239 244 248 252
Note: The table shows the number of observations for the merged sample of banks in OECD/EU
countries. “Period” shows the time coverage for each country. “Obs” shows the total number
of observations for each country. “Banks” shows the number of banks present in the sample.
Columns Q1-Q4 show the number of total observations in each quarter.
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Table B.7: Summary Statistics of Key Variables in the Merged Sample by Country
CDS (decimals) Equity Ratio
Country 1st 50th 99th 1st 50th 99th Obs.
Australia 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.15 154
Austria 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.09 126
Belgium 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.09 43
Canada 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.06 151
Chile 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.09 0.09 23
Denmark 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 49
Finland 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.06 17
France 0.00 0.01 0.05 -0.00 0.03 0.10 230
Germany 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.07 208
Greece 0.01 0.09 0.26 -0.03 0.06 0.13 108
Hungary 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.12 0.15 29
Ireland 0.00 0.04 0.23 -0.01 0.04 0.12 86
Italy 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.14 234
Japan 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.09 368
Netherlands 0.00 0.01 0.18 0.02 0.04 0.34 133
Norway 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.07 81
Portugal 0.00 0.04 0.18 0.03 0.05 0.10 126
South Korea 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.12 157
Spain 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.06 0.08 260
Sweden 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.06 202
Switzerland 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.06 99
Turkey 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.15 86
United Kingdom 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.08 264
United States 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.20 983
Note: The table shows the summary statistics CDS spreads and equity-to-
total assets ratio for each country in the merged sample. Numbers reported
are in decimal places, e.g., CDS spread of 0.01 refers to 100 basis points, equity
ratio of 0.02 means 20%. For each variable, the 1st, 50th, 99th percentiles
are reported. “Obs.” shows the number of bank-quarter observations in each
country.
158
B.5 Robustness Checks
Table B.8: The Effect of Concentration (5-Bank Asset Concentration Ratio) on Change
in Total Equity over Lagged Total Assets during 1999-2014
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EU EU EU EU OECD OECD
L.5-bank ratio (ECB) 0.06∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
L.5-bank ratio (Bankscope) -0.01 -0.00 0.02∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L.loan impairment ratio -0.06∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
L.GDP growth rate 0.10∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
inflation rate 0.09∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Observations 44,499 44,499 45,026 45,026 199,310 199,310
No.banks 4,915 4,915 4,936 4,936 19,230 19,230
Adjusted R2 0.275 0.281 0.264 0.274 0.104 0.111
Within R2 0.010 0.018 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.008
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-level clustered standard errors in parentheses
Data sources: Bankscope annual data, ECB, World Bank
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table shows the results from regressing change in total equity over lagged total assets on
lagged 5-bank asset concentration ratio and lagged loan impairment ratio (computed as loan impairment
charge/gross loans), controlling for lagged real GDP growth and inflation rate (i.e., growth rate of GDP
deflator). 5-bank ratio (ECB) is the ECB estimate of 5-bank asset concentration based on the total
assets of credit institutions in EU countries. 5-bank ratio (Bankscope) is calculated using 6 types of
banks (i.e., bank holding companies, commercial banks, cooperative banks, finance companies, real
estate & mortgage banks, and savings banks) from annual Bankscope data.
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Table B.10: The Effect of Concentration (Herfindahl Hirschman Index HHI) on
Pre-dividend Change in Equity over Lagged Total Assets during 1999-2014
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EU EU EU EU OECD OECD
L.HHI (ECB) 0.16∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
L.HHI (Bankscope) 0.06∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
L.loan impairment ratio -0.07∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
L.GDP growth rate 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
inflation rate 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Observations 44,340 44,340 44,950 44,950 199,129 199,129
No.banks 4,870 4,870 4,930 4,930 19,223 19,223
Adjusted R2 0.290 0.298 0.285 0.295 0.178 0.184
Within R2 0.004 0.016 0.002 0.015 0.001 0.009
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-level clustered standard errors in parentheses
Data sources: Bankscope annual data, ECB, World Bank
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table shows the results from regressing pre-dividend change in equity (i.e., change in eq-
uity plus the cash dividends) over lagged total assets on lagged concentration index HHI and lagged
loan impairment cost (computed as loan impairment charge/gross loans), controlling for lagged real
GDP growth and inflation rate (i.e., growth rate of GDP deflator). HHI (ECB) is the ECB estimate
of HHI based on the total assets of credit institutions in EU countries. HHI (Bankscope) is calcu-
lated using 6 types of banks (i.e., bank holding companies, commercial banks, cooperative banks,
finance companies, real estate & mortgage banks, and savings banks) from annual Bankscope data.
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Table B.11: The Effect of Concentration (Herfindahl Hirschman Index HHI) on Change in Equity
over Lagged Total Assets during 1999-2014
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EU EU EU EU EU EU
1999-2006 2006-2014 2010-2014 1999-2006 2006-2014 2010-2014
L.HHI (ECB) 0.01 0.18∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.01 0.14∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
L.loan impairment ratio -0.03 -0.05∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
L.GDP growth rate 0.02 0.09∗∗∗ 0.01
(0.04) (0.01) (0.02)
inflation rate -0.01 0.16∗∗∗ -0.04
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Observations 16,771 30,970 17,176 16,771 30,970 17,176
No.banks 3,111 4,322 3,818 3,111 4,322 3,818
Adjusted R2 0.350 0.243 0.220 0.350 0.253 0.226
Within R2 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.018 0.009
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-level clustered standard errors in parentheses
Data sources: Bankscope annual data, ECB, World Bank
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table shows the results from regressing change in total equity over lagged total assets on lagged concentra-
tion index HHI and lagged loan impairment cost (computed as loan impairment charge/gross loans), controlling for
lagged real GDP growth and inflation rate (i.e., growth rate of GDP deflator). HHI (ECB) is the ECB estimate of
HHI based on the total assets of credit institutions in EU countries. The sample is divided into different subgroups
conditioning on time period.
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Table B.12: The Effect of Bank Equity Ratio on Bank CDS Spread during Different Time Periods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EU EU Eurozone Eurozone OECD OECD
2003-2011 2011-2016 2003-2011 2011-2016 2003-2011 2011-2016
L.equity ratio -0.14 -0.34∗∗∗ -0.13 -0.32∗∗ -0.38∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.12) (0.17) (0.12) (0.17) (0.10)
L.loan impairment ratio 2.40∗∗∗ 0.26 2.94∗∗ 0.34∗ 0.99∗∗ 0.18
(0.83) (0.17) (1.12) (0.18) (0.39) (0.16)
L.GDP growth rate -0.64∗∗∗ -0.95∗∗∗ -0.84∗∗∗ -1.35∗∗∗ -0.44∗∗ -0.52∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.25) (0.17) (0.26) (0.18) (0.15)
Observations 582 862 434 636 1,195 1,933
Number of Banks 38 47 29 35 83 101
Adjusted R2 0.685 0.824 0.708 0.831 0.641 0.819
Within R2 0.164 0.197 0.181 0.236 0.153 0.163
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-level clustered standard errors in parentheses
Data sources: Thomson Reuters EIKON, Bankscope quarterly data, OECD
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table shows the results from regressing 5-year CDS spreads on banks’ equity ratios, controlling for loan
impairment charge to gross loans ratios, and real GDP growth rate. Bank, country and quarter fixed effects are included
in all regressions. Quarterly data are used and all variables are in decimal places. Lagged explanatory variables are
used. The sample is divided into different subgroups according to regions and time periods.
Table B.13: The Effect of Bank Equity Ratio on Bank CDS Spread during 2003-2016
Using Annual Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EU EU Eurozone Eurozone OECD OECD
L.equity ratio -0.21∗∗∗ -0.05 -0.20∗∗∗ -0.02 -0.20∗∗∗ -0.08∗
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04)
L.loan impairment ratio 0.43∗ 0.49∗ 0.48∗∗
(0.25) (0.28) (0.22)
L.GDP growth rate -0.29∗∗ -0.34∗∗ -0.16∗∗
(0.11) (0.14) (0.07)
Observations 628 627 461 461 1,181 1,145
Number of Banks 74 74 54 54 144 141
Adjusted R2 0.634 0.675 0.640 0.684 0.632 0.667
Within R2 0.028 0.140 0.025 0.149 0.041 0.135
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-level clustered standard errors in parentheses
Data sources: Thomson Reuters EIKON, Bankscope annual data, World Bank
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table shows the results from regressing 5-year CDS spreads on banks’ equity ratios, controlling
for loan impairment charge to gross loans ratios, and real GDP growth rate. Bank, country and year fixed
effects are included in all regressions. Annual data are used and all variables are in decimal places. Lagged
explanatory variables are used. The sample is divided into different subgroups according to regions.
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Table B.14: The Effect of Bank Equity Ratio on Bank CDS Spread during 2003-2016 Using
Different Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EU EU Eurozone Eurozone OECD OECD
L.equity ratio -0.14∗ -0.11∗ -0.15∗ -0.11∗ -0.20∗∗ -0.25∗
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.13)
L.loan impairment ratio 0.13 0.14 0.16∗∗
(0.11) (0.12) (0.08)
L.GDP growth rate -0.24∗∗∗ -0.28∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Observations 1,343 1,339 997 993 3,001 2,864
Number of Banks 50 50 38 38 107 103
Adjusted R2 0.861 0.863 0.856 0.859 0.821 0.828
Within R2 0.012 0.031 0.012 0.032 0.046 0.059
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country*Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-level clustered standard errors in parentheses
Data sources: Thomson Reuters EIKON, Bankscope quarterly data, OECD
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table shows the results from regressing 5-year CDS spreads on banks’ equity ratios, controlling for
loan impairment charge to gross loans ratios, and real GDP growth rate. Bank fixed effects and country*year
fixed effects are included in all regressions. Quarterly data are used and all variables are in decimal places.
Lagged explanatory variables are used. The sample is divided into different subgroups according to regions.
Table B.15: Direct Relationship between CDS Spread and Concentration Measures in EU Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EU EU EU EU EU EU
2003-2016 2003-2011 2011-2016 2003-2016 2003-2011 2011-2016
L.HHI (Bankscope) -0.06 -0.03 -0.30∗∗
(0.07) (0.10) (0.12)
L.equity ratio -0.06 -0.36∗ 0.03 -0.07 -0.37∗ -0.01
(0.06) (0.19) (0.08) (0.06) (0.19) (0.08)
L.loan impairment ratio 0.44∗ 1.12∗∗∗ 0.15 0.47∗ 1.11∗∗∗ 0.14
(0.26) (0.35) (0.13) (0.26) (0.35) (0.14)
L.GDP growth rate -0.29∗∗ -0.30∗∗ -0.27∗∗∗ -0.30∗∗∗ -0.30∗∗ -0.31∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.15) (0.09) (0.11) (0.14) (0.09)
L.5-bank ratio (Bankscope) -0.06∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗ -0.11∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
Observations 621 336 350 621 336 350
Number of Banks 74 65 74 74 65 74
Adjusted R2 0.675 0.605 0.849 0.682 0.608 0.845
Within R2 0.145 0.252 0.210 0.162 0.257 0.185
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-level clustered standard errors in parentheses
Data sources: Thomson Reuters EIKON, Bankscope annual data, World Bank
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table shows the results from regressing 5-year CDS spreads on concentration index HHI or 5-bank concentration
ratio, controlling for banks’ equity ratios, loan impairment charge to gross loans ratios, and real GDP growth rate and
including bank, country and year fixed effects. Annual data are used and all variables are in decimals. Lagged explanatory
variables are used. The sample consists of EU banks and is divided into different sub-samples based on time periods.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 4
C.1 Solving Firm’s Problem
Let λi,t denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the borrowing constraint (4.10)
of firm i in period t. Using (4.7), (4.8), (4.9) and (4.10), form the Lagrangian:
L =Et
∞∑
τ=0
ϕ(1− ϕ)τητ {pi,t+1+τyi,t+1+τ − wt+1+τ li,t+1+τ − pm,t+1+τmi,t+1+τ
−Rt+τ (ki,t+τ − ni,t+τ ) + (1− δ)ki,t+τ + λi,t+τ
[
ni,t+τ
1− φ(1− δ) − ki,t+τ
]} (C.1)
Using (4.4) and (C.1), the first-order conditions with respect to the firm’s capital demand
ki,t, labor demand li,t and materials demand mi,t are respectively:
Et
[
βk
pi,t+1yi,t+1
ki,t
−Rt + (1− δ)
]
= λi,t (C.2)
βl
pi,tyi,t
li,t
= wt (C.3)
βm
pi,tyi,t
mi,t
= pm,t (C.4)
The nominal value added VAi,t is equivalent to a fraction of the nominal revenue pi,tyi,t,
using (4.4) and (C.4):
VAi,t ≡ pi,tyi,t − pm,tmi,t = (1− βm)pi,tyi,t (C.5)
C.1.1 Marginal Revenue Product of Capital
Divide (C.3) by (C.4) to get the materials-to-labor ratio:
mi,t
li,t
= βmwt
βlpm,t
(C.6)
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Use (4.4) and the first order condition with respect to labor (C.3) to write the optimal
labor demand li,t+1 in terms of wt+1, Zi,t+1, ki,t and mi,t+1:
li,t+1 =
 wt+1
βlZi,t+1k
βk
i,tm
βm
i,t+1
 1βl−1 = ( βl
wt+1
) 1
1−βl
Z
1
1−βl
i,t+1k
βk
1−βl
i,t m
βm
1−βl
i,t+1 (C.7)
Use (C.6) and (C.7) to get:
li,t+1 =
(
βl
wt+1
) 1
1−βl
Z
1
1−βl
i,t+1k
βk
1−βl
i,t
(
βmwt+1
βlpm,t+1
li,t+1
) βm
1−βl (C.8)
Rearrange to get the optimal labor demand in terms of wt+1, pm,t+1, Zi,t+1, and ki,t:
li,t+1 =
(
βl
wt+1
) 1−βm
1−βl−βm
(
βm
pm,t+1
) βm
1−βl−βm
Z
1
1−βl−βm
i,t+1 k
βk
1−βl−βm
i,t (C.9)
Use (C.6) and (C.9) to write the optimal materials demand in terms of wt+1, pm,t+1,
Zi,t+1, and ki,t:
mi,t+1 =
(
βl
wt+1
) βl
1−βl−βm
(
βm
pm,t+1
) 1−βl
1−βl−βm
Z
1
1−βl−βm
i,t+1 k
βk
1−βl−βm
i,t (C.10)
The expressions for labor and materials demand hold for both unconstrained and con-
strained firms. Substitute (C.9) and (C.10) into the production function (4.4) to write
pi,t+1yi,t+1 in terms of wt+1, pm,t+1, Zi,t+1, and ki,t:
pi,t+1yi,t+1 =
(
βl
wt+1
) βl
1−βl−βm
(
βm
pm,t+1
) βm
1−βl−βm
Z
1
1−βl−βm
i,t+1 k
βk
1−βl−βm
i,t (C.11)
Use MRPKi,t = βk pi,tyi,tki,t−1 (4.14), (C.11), and βk + βl + βm =
ϵ−1
ϵ
to write the log of the
marginal revenue product of capital in terms of wt, pm,t, Zi,t, and ki,t−1:
lnMRPKi,t =
ϵ
1 + ϵβk
lnZi,t − 11 + ϵβk lnki,t−1 −
ϵβl
1 + ϵβk
lnwt − ϵβm1 + ϵβk lnpm,t
+ ln
(
βkβ
ϵβl
1+ϵβk
l β
ϵβm
1+ϵβk
m
) (C.12)
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C.1.2 Dispersion of MRPK across All Firms
Using (C.12), the cross-section dispersion of the marginal revenue product of capital
Vari(lnMRPKi,t) within a given industry in period t can be written as:
Vari(lnMRPKi,t) =
(
ϵ
1 + ϵβk
)2
Vari(lnZi,t) +
(
1
1 + ϵβk
)2
Vari(lnki,t−1)
− 2 ϵ(1 + ϵβk)2Covi(lnZi,t, lnki,t−1)
=ψ1Vari(lnZi,t) + ψ2Vari(lnki,t−1)− ψ3Covi(lnZi,t, lnki,t−1)
(C.13)
where ψ1 ≡
(
ϵ
1+ϵβk
)2
, ψ2 ≡
(
ϵ
1+ϵβk
)2
, and ψ3 ≡ 2 ϵ(1+ϵβk)2 . Rewrite the dispersion of
MRPK in terms of the exogenous or predetermined variables by using Zi,t ≡ Ztzizi,t and
the AR(1) process for lnzi,t (4.5):
Vari(lnMRPKi,t) =ψ1Vari(lnZt + lnzi + ρlnzi,t−1 + ei,t) + ψ2Vari(lnki,t−1)
− ψ3Covi(lnZt + lnzi + ρlnzi,t−1 + ei,t, lnki,t−1)
=ψ1Vari(lnzi) + ψ1Vari(ei,t) + ψ1ρ2Vari(lnzi,t−1) + ψ2Vari(lnki,t−1)
− ψ3Covi(lnzi + ρlnzi,t−1, lnki,t−1)
(4.15)
This is a general decomposition and holds even in the presence of constrained firms. Since
ki,t is driven by different processes for unconstrained and constrained firms, by replacing
lnki,t by lnkUi,t (4.13) or lnkCi,t (4.12), it is possible to find the dispersion of MRPK within
the two subgroups of firms, i.e., Vari(lnMRPKUi,t) and Vari(lnMRPKCi,t).
C.1.3 Capital Demand of Financially Unconstrained Firms
If firm i is unconstrained in period t (i.e., λi,t = 0), then the first order condition (C.2)
can be simplified to:
Et
[
βk
pi,t+1yi,t+1
ki,t
]
= Rt − (1− δ) = rt + δ (C.14)
where rt ≡ Rt− 1 is the net real interest rate. Rearrange (C.14) to get the unconstrained
capital demand in terms of the expected revenue:
kUi,t =
βk
rt + δ
Et [pi,t+1yi,t+1] (C.15)
Hence,
∆lnkUi,t ≡ lnkUi,t − lnkUi,t−1 = ln
rt−1 + δ
rt + δ
+∆lnEt [pi,t+1yi,t+1] (C.16)
As can be seen above, the investment of an unconstrained firm is driven by the change
in the net real interest rate and the growth in expected sales pi,t+1yi,t+1 or value added
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(1− βm)pi,t+1yi,t+1. Alternatively, substitute (C.11) into (C.15) to get:
kUi,t =
βk
rt + δ
Et
( βl
wt+1
) βl
1−βl−βm
(
βm
pm,t+1
) βm
1−βl−βm
Z
1
1−βl−βm
i,t+1 k
βk
1−βl−βm
i,t
 (C.17)
Rearrange to solve for the following optimal unconstrained capital demand chosen in
period t:
(kUi,t)
1−βl−βm−βk
1−βl−βm = βk
rt + δ
Et
( βl
wt+1
) βl
1−βl−βm
(
βm
pm,t+1
) βm
1−βl−βm
Z
1
1−βl−βm
i,t+1
 (C.18)
Use Zi,t+1 ≡ Zt+1zizi,t+1 and the assumption that the idiosyncratic transitory productivity
zi,t+1 is independent from the trend Zt+1 or the idiosyncratic permanent productivity zi,
to get:
lnkUi,t =(1 + ϵβk)
{
ln
(
βkβ
ϵβl
1+ϵβk
l β
ϵβm
1+ϵβk
m
)
− ln(rt + δ)
+lnEt

 Zt+1
wβlt+1p
βm
m,t+1
 ϵ1+ϵβk
+ lnEt [z ϵ1+ϵβki,t+1 ]+ ϵ1 + ϵβk lnzi

(C.19)
According to (4.5), the firm’s productivity zi,t+1 follows the AR(1) process:
zi,t+1 = zρi,texp(ei,t+1) (C.20)
where ei,t+1 i.i.d.∼ N(0, σ2z), so
Et
[
z
ϵ
1+ϵβk
i,t+1
]
= Et
[
z
ρϵ
1+ϵβk
i,t exp
(
ei,t+1ϵ
1 + ϵβk
)]
= z
ρϵ
1+ϵβk
i,t Et
[
exp
(
ei,t+1ϵ
1 + ϵβk
)]
(C.21)
Since ei,t+1 is normally distributed, exp
(
ei,t+1ϵ
1+ϵβk
)
has a log-normal distribution. Let x
denote ei,t+1ϵ1+ϵβk , then x ∼ N
(
0, σ2zϵ2(1+ϵβk)2
)
and exp(x) ∼ LogNormal
(
0, σ2zϵ2(1+ϵβk)2
)
. Use the
fact that E[exp(x)] = exp(E[x] + 12Var[x]), so
Et
[
exp
(
ei,t+1ϵ
1 + ϵβk
)]
= exp
(
σ2zϵ
2
2(1 + ϵβk)2
)
(C.22)
Substitute (C.22) into (C.21) and take logs to get:
lnEt
[
z
ϵ
1+ϵβk
i,t+1
]
= ρϵ1 + ϵβk
lnzi,t +
σ2zϵ
2
2(1 + ϵβk)2
(C.23)
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Finally, substitute (C.23) into (C.19) to get (4.13):
lnkUi,t =ϵρlnzi,t + (1 + ϵβk)
{
ln
(
βkβ
ϵβl
1+ϵβk
l β
ϵβm
1+ϵβk
m
)
− ln(rt + δ)
+lnEt

 Zt+1
wβlt+1p
βm
m,t+1
 ϵ1+ϵβk
+ ϵ1 + ϵβk lnzi + σ
2
zϵ
2
2(1 + ϵβk)2

(4.13)
C.1.4 Dispersion of MRPK within Unconstrained Firms
Using (4.13) and (C.12), the marginal revenue product of capital of an unconstrained
firm is:
lnMRPKUi,t =
ϵ
1 + ϵβk
ln(Ztzizi,t)− ϵρ1 + ϵβk lnzi,t−1 − ln
(
βkβ
ϵβl
1+ϵβk
l β
ϵβm
1+ϵβk
m
)
+ ln(rt−1 + δ)− lnEt−1
( Zt
wβlt p
βm
m,t
) ϵ
1+ϵβk
− ϵ1 + ϵβk lnzi − σ
2
zϵ
2
2(1 + ϵβk)2
− ϵβl1 + ϵβk lnwt −
ϵβm
1 + ϵβk
lnpm,t + ln
(
βkβ
ϵβl
1+ϵβk
l β
ϵβm
1+ϵβk
m
)
= ϵ1 + ϵβk
(lnzi,t − ρlnzi,t−1) + ln
(
Zt
wβlt p
βm
m,t
) ϵ
1+ϵβk − lnEt−1
( Zt
wβlt p
βm
m,t
) ϵ
1+ϵβk

+ ln(rt−1 + δ)− σ
2
z
2(1− βl − βm)2
= ϵ1 + ϵβk
ei,t + ln
(
Zt
wβlt p
βm
m,t
) ϵ
1+ϵβk − lnEt−1
( Zt
wβlt p
βm
m,t
) ϵ
1+ϵβk
+ ln(rt−1 + δ)
− σ
2
zϵ
2
2(1 + ϵβk)2
(C.24)
Assuming σz is the same for all firms, the dispersion of MRPK among unconstrained
firms is:1
Vari(lnMRPKUi,t) =ψ1Vari(ei,t) (4.16)
where ψ1 ≡
(
ϵ
1+ϵβl
)2
and i denotes an unconstrained firm i. As can be seen, the dispersion
of MRPK among unconstrained firms is only driven by the cross-section dispersion of the
productivity innovation ei,t.
C.1.5 Capital Demand of Financially Constrained Firms
Using the assumption on the financing sources of capital (4.9), when the borrowing
constraint (4.10) is binding (i.e., λi,t > 0), firm i’s capital demand kCi,t is determined by
its net worth:
kCi,t =
ni,t
1− φ(1− δ) (C.25)
1Alternatively, Vari(lnMRPKUi,t) can be found by substituting lnkUi,t in (4.13) for lnki,t in (4.15).
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Taking logs yields:
lnkCi,t = lnni,t − ln[1− φ(1− δ)] (4.12)
It can be seen from the first order condition with respect to ki,t (C.2) that:
λi,t = Et
[
βk
pi,t+1yi,t+1
ki,t
− (rt + δ)
]
> 0 (C.26)
which implies that the expected MRPK is greater than (rt + δ). It can be shown that
the investment of a constrained firm is determined by its cash flow CFi,t, which is the
revenue net of wage payments, materials costs, and net interest payments on loans, i.e.,
CFi,t ≡ pi,tyi,t − wtli,t − pm,tmi,t − rt−1bi,t−1, assuming that debt is not repaid in each
period but rolled over.2 Using the definitions for net worth (4.8) and cash flow, and
ki,t = ni,t + bi,t (4.9),
ni,t+1 ≡ pi,t+1yi,t+1 − wt+1li,t+1 − pm,t+1mi,t+1 −Rtbi,t + (1− δ)ki,t
= pi,t+1yi,t+1 − wt+1li,t+1 − pm,t+1mi,t+1 − rtbi,t − δki,t + ni,t = CFi,t+1 − δki,t + ni,t
(C.27)
where the firm’s net income is equal to pi,t+1yi,t+1−wt+1li,t+1−pm,t+1mi,t+1− rtbi,t− δki,t,
and cash flow is the sum of net income and the depreciation of capital stock.
Using (C.27) and the binding collateral constraint (C.25),
kCi,t − kCi,t−1 =
1
1− φ(1− δ)(ni,t − ni,t−1) =
1
1− φ(1− δ)(CFi,t − δki,t−1) (C.28)
C.1.6 Dispersion of MRPK within Constrained Firms
Using (4.12) and (C.12), the marginal revenue product of capital of a constrained firm is:
lnMRPKCi,t =
ϵ
1 + ϵβk
lnZi,t − 11 + ϵβk [lnni,t−1 − ln(1− φ(1− δ))]
− ϵβl1 + ϵβk lnwt −
ϵβm
1 + ϵβk
lnpm,t + ln
(
βkβ
ϵβl
1+ϵβk
l β
ϵβm
1+ϵβk
m
)
= ϵ1 + ϵβk
lnZt +
ϵ
1 + ϵβk
lnzi,t +
ϵ
1 + ϵβk
lnzi − 11 + ϵβk lnni,t−1
+ 11 + ϵβk
ln[1− φ(1− δ)]− ϵβl1 + ϵβk lnwt −
ϵβm
1 + ϵβk
lnpm,t
+ ln
(
βkβ
ϵβl
1+ϵβk
l β
ϵβm
1+ϵβk
m
)
(C.29)
where the last step uses Zi,t ≡ Ztzizi,t. Using (C.29) and the AR(1) process for the
idiosyncratic transitory productivity zi,t (4.5), the dispersion of MRPK among constrained
2Apart from the terminal period where the gross interests on debt Rtbt are repaid, assume in all the
other periods, debt is rolled over and only net interests on debt rtbt are repaid.
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firms is given by:3
Vari(lnMRPKCi,t) =ψ1Vari(lnzi) + ψ1Vari(ei,t) + ψ1ρ2Vari(lnzi,t−1) + ψ2Vari(lnni,t−1)
− ψ3Covi(lnzi + ρlnzi,t−1, lnni,t−1)
=ψ1Vari(ei,t) + Vari(ψ
1
2
1 lnzi + ψ
1
2
1 ρlnzi,t−1 − ψ
1
2
2 lnni,t−1)
(4.17)
where ψ1 ≡
(
ϵ
1+ϵβk
)2
, ψ2 ≡
(
1
1+ϵβk
)2
, ψ3 ≡ 2 ϵ(1+ϵβk)2 , and i denotes a constrained firm i.
Using (4.16) and (4.17), it can be seen that:
Vari(lnMRPKCi,t) > Vari(lnMRPKUi,t) (C.30)
since Vari(ψ
1
2
1 lnzi + ψ
1
2
1 ρlnzi,t−1 − ψ
1
2
2 lnni,t−1) > 0.
C.2 Decomposition of the Dispersion of MRPK
Suppose there are Mt firms in a given industry and Nt of them are unconstrained in a
given period t, where Nt 6Mt, and the remaining Mt −Nt firms are constrained. The
distribution of the observed lnMRPK in the data is a mixture of two distributions of
lnMRPKU (for unconstrained firms) and lnMRPKC (for constrained firms). It is shown
below that the variance of lnMRPK across all firms in a given industry and a given period
t can be written in terms of the variances and means over the subgroups (unconstrained
U and constrained C) of firms.
Let Xi,t denote lnMRPKUi,t and Yi,t denote lnMRPKCi,t in a given time period. For
simplicity, the subscripts i and t are suppressed for Xi,t and Yi,t in the following proof.
Order the firms in such a way that the first Nt firms according to the index i are
unconstrained and the rest of firms are constrained (i.e., firms Nt + 1 to Mt). In a given
3Alternatively, Vari(lnMRPKCi,t) can be found by substituting lnkCi,t in (4.12) for lnki,t in (4.15).
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industry-year:
Vari(lnMRPKi,t) = Ei(lnMRPK2i,t)− Ei(lnMRPKi,t)2
= 1
Mt
 Nt∑
i=1
(lnMRPKUi,t)2 +
Mt∑
i=Nt+1
(lnMRPKCi,t)2

−
 1
Mt
 Nt∑
i=1
lnMRPKUi,t +
Mt∑
i=Nt+1
lnMRPKCi,t
2
= 1
Mt
 Nt∑
i=1
X2 +
Mt∑
i=Nt+1
Y 2
−
 1
Mt
 Nt∑
i=1
X +
Mt∑
i=Nt+1
Y
2
=Nt
Mt
1
Nt
Nt∑
i=1
X2 + Mt −Nt
Mt
1
Mt −Nt
Mt∑
i=Nt+1
Y 2 −
Nt
Mt
1
Nt
Nt∑
i=1
X + Mt −Nt
Mt
1
Mt −Nt
Mt∑
i=Nt+1
Y
2
=Nt
Mt
Ei(X2) +
Mt −Nt
Mt
Ei(Y 2)−
(
Nt
Mt
Ei(X) +
Mt −Nt
Mt
Ei(Y )
)2
=Nt
Mt
Ei(X2) +
Mt −Nt
Mt
Ei(Y 2)−
(
Nt
Mt
)2
Ei(X)2 − 2Nt(Mt −Nt)
M2
Ei(X)Ei(Y )
−
(
Mt −Nt
Mt
)2
Ei(Y )2
=Nt
Mt
[
Ei(X2)− Ei(X)2
]
+ Nt
Mt
(
1− Nt
Mt
)
Ei(X)2 +
Mt −Nt
Mt
[
Ei(Y 2)− Ei(Y )2
]
+ Mt −Nt
Mt
(
1− Mt −Nt
Mt
)
Ei(Y )2 − 2Nt(Mt −Nt)
M2
Ei(X)Ei(Y )
=Nt
Mt
Vari(X) +
Mt −Nt
Mt
Vari(Y ) +
Nt(Mt −Nt)
M2
[Ei(X)2 + Ei(Y )2 − 2Ei(X)Ei(Y )]
=Nt
Mt
Vari(X) +
Mt −Nt
Mt
Vari(Y ) +
Nt(Mt −Nt)
M2
[Ei(X)− Ei(Y )]2
(C.31)
where Ei(X) denotes the mean of lnMRPKi,t across all the unconstrained firms i and
Ei(Y ) denotes the mean of lnMRPKi,t across all the constrained firms i in a given period
t. Similarly, Ei(X2) and Vari(X) are defined over the subgroup of unconstrained firms
and Ei(Y 2) and Vari(Y ) are defined over the subgroup of constrained firms.
The last term in (C.31) is the squared difference between the mean values of lnMRPK
within the two subgroups of firms, weighted by the product of the two fractions Nt
Mt
and
Mt−Nt
Mt
, which are the proportions of unconstrained firms and constrained firms respectively
for each industry-year.
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C.3 Production Function Estimation
Once the revenue elasticities (βk, βl and βm) for each two-digit NACE Rev.2 industry are
estimated, the log of revenue-based productivity (TFPR) for firm i in a given industry at
time t is the residual term after subtracting the weighted sum of inputs from ln(pi,tyi,t):
logTFPRi,t ≡ lnZi,t = ln(pi,tyi,t)− βklnki,t − βllnli,t − βmlnmi,t (C.32)
where pi,tyi,t is measured by the nominal revenue, ki,t, mi,t and li,t are measured by the
book value of fixed tangible assets, material costs, and the wage bill, respectively. Wage
bill is used to measure li,t to control for the quality differences of labor across firms,
following Gopinath et al. (2017). Labor and materials are variable inputs, whereas capital
ki,t is the state variable, which is equivalent to ki,t−1 in the model described in Section
4.2.
This paper uses the Wooldridge (2009) estimation-based approach. Wooldridge
(2009) show that the two-step estimation proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) (OP)
and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (LP) can be implemented in one step using GMM, by
applying different instruments to each of the two equations. As he pointed out, there are
two advantages of using the joint GMM estimation compared to the two-step methods.
First, if the variable input (labor) is also determined by unobserved productivity and
state variables, then the coefficient on labor is unidentified in the first-stage estimation
(Ackerberg et al., 2006) and hence two-step estimation does not work in this case. Second,
it is easy to obtain fully robust standard errors using joint estimation.
The capital, labor, and materials coefficients are estimated for each two-digit NACE
Rev.2 industry separately. The use of two-digit industries is to make sure there are
enough observations in each industry to carry out the estimation.4 For each firm i within
a two-digit industry in period t:
ln(pi,tyi,t) = β0 + βklnki,t + βllnli,t + βmlnmi,t + lnZi,t + ςi,t (C.33)
where the sequence lnZi,t is the unobserved revenue-based productivity and ςi,t is a
sequence of shocks that are assumed to be conditional mean independent of current and
past inputs. Under OP and LP, the unobserved productivity is proxied by an unknown
function of capital and investment (under OP) or intermediate inputs (under LP):
lnZi,t = f(lnki,t, lnmi,t) (C.34)
4In most countries, the manufacture of tobacco products (industry 12 from NACE Rev.2 code)
appears to be quite concentrated and the number of firm-year observations is very small, so the revenue
elasticities for this industry are not estimated in those countries. In this paper, at least 200 firm-year
observations are required to implement this method.
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where the log of material costs lnmi,t is the proxy variable. To estimate βk, βl and βm
jointly, Wooldridge (2009) assumes:
Ei(ςi,t|lnli,t, lnki,t, lnmi,t, lnli,t−1, lnki,t−1, lnmi,t−1, ..., lnli,1, lnki,1, lnmi,1) = 0 (C.35)
where t = 1, 2, ..., T . It can be seen that serial dependence in the idiosyncratic shocks
ςi,t is allowed in the above assumption, since past values of ςi,t do not appear in the
conditioning set. The following sufficient condition is used to restrict the dynamics of the
productivity process lnZi,t:
Ei(lnZi,t|lnki,t, lnli,t−1, lnki,t−1, lnmi,t−1, ..., lnli,1, lnki,1, lnmi,1)
= Ei(lnZi,t|lnZi,t−1) ≡ g[f(lnki,t−1, lnmi,t−1)]
(C.36)
where g(.) is an unknown function representing the process of productivity lnZi,t. The last
equality follows from lnZi,t−1 = f(lnki,t−1, lnmi,t−1). The above assumption means that
lnki,t, past outcomes on (lnli,t, lnki,t, lnmi,t), and all functions of these are uncorrelated
with the innovations eZ,i,t = lnZi,t − E(lnZi,t|lnZi,t−1).
Using lnZi,t = f(lnki,t, lnmi,t) and lnZi,t = g[f(lnki,t−1, lnmi,t−1)] + eZ,i,t, the two
equations used to identify βk, βl, and βm are:
ln(pi,tyi,t) = β0+βklnki,t+βllnli,t+βmlnmi,t+ f(lnki,t, lnmi,t)+ ςi,t, t = 1, ..., T (C.37)
ln(pi,tyi,t) = β0 + βklnki,t + βllnli,t + βmlnmi,t + g[f(lnki,t−1, lnmi,t−1)] + ξi,t, t = 2, ..., T
(C.38)
where ξi,t ≡ eZ,i,t + ςi,t. The orthogonality condition on the error term for the first
equation is (C.35), and for the second equation, it is:
Ei(lnξi,t|lnki,t, lnli,t−1, lnki,t−1, lnmi,t−1, ..., lnli,1, lnki,1, lnmi,1) = 0, t = 2, ..., T (C.39)
These two different orthogonality conditions on the error terms for the two equations
imply that different instruments can be used for each equation. For instance, the
state variable (capital lnki,t), any lagged inputs or functions of these variables can be
used as instrumental variables for both equations. In addition, the intermediate inputs
(investment or intermediate inputs lnmi,t) can also be used as instruments for the first
equation.
I use the prodest (Rovigatti and Mollisi, 2016) in Stata to calculate the productivity
measure used in this paper. A third-degree polynomial is used to estimate the unknown
functions f(., .) and g(.), as suggested by Petrin et al. (2004). f(lnki,t, lnmi,t) is approxi-
mated by all polynomials of order three or less, (i.e., (lnki,t)q1(lnmi,t)q2 where q1 + q2 6 3,
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with q1 > 0 and q2 > 0) and can be written as:
f(lnki,t, lnmi,t) ≈ ϑ0 + Γ(lnki,t, lnmi,t)ϑ ≡ ϑ0 + Γi,tϑ (C.40)
where Γi,t ≡ Γ(lnki,t, lnmi,t) is a vector of 1×Q vector of functions (polynomials) and ϑ
is a vector of Q× 1 parameters.5 In addition, g(.) is assumed to be approximated by a
G-degree polynomial in lnZi,t:
g(lnZi,t) = ρ0 + ρ1lnZi,t + ...ρG(lnZi,t)G (C.41)
where G = 1 is used in the prodest package. Substitute the polynomial approximations for
the unknown functions into (C.37) and (C.38) and rearrange to write the two equations
as a vector of residuals Λi,t(θ):
Λi,t(θ) =
ςi,t(θ)
ξi,t(θ)

=
 ln(pi,tyi,t)− α0 − βklnki,t − βllnli,t − βmlnmi,t − Γi,tϑ
ln(pi,tyi,t)− ζ0 − βklnki,t − βllnli,t − βmlnmi,t − ρ1ln(Γi,t−1ϑ)...− ρG(Γi,t−1ϑ)G

(C.42)
where α0 = β0 + ϑ0 and ζ0 are the new intercepts and θ is a vector of coefficients to
be estimated. The assumption of exogenous instruments τi,t gives rise to the following
moment conditions:
Ei[τ ′i,tΛi,t(θ)] = 0 t = 2, ..., T (C.43)
GMM estimation can then be applied to find the vector of coefficients θˆ. All the
instruments for the second equation are also valid for the first equation, while the first
equation has two additional instruments, the contemporaneous values of lnli,t and lnmi,t.
The instruments used are:
τi,t ≡
τi,t,1 0
0 τi,t,2
 , t = 2, ..., T (C.44)
where
τi,t,1 = (lnli,t,Γi,t) (C.45)
τi,t,2 = (lnki,t, lnli,t−1,Γi,t−1) (C.46)
where lnmi,t is included in Γi,t. A key difference in the sets of instruments is that τi,t,2
does not include the contemporaneous values of lnli,t and lnmi,t.
5Wooldridge (2009) assumes that Γi,t includes at least lnki,t and lnmi,t separately to nest the linear
version of f(lnki,t, lnmi,t) as a special case.
175
Table C.1: Revenue Elasticities of Inputs and Correlations
Revenue Elasticities Correlations between ∆lnTFPRi,t−1 and
Country βk βl βm ∆lnSalesi,t−1 ∆logVAi,t−1 ∆lnFTAi,t
CFi,t−1
FTAi,t−2 ∆lnni,t−1
Bulgaria 0.09 0.31 0.44 0.595*** 0.706*** 0.039*** 0.054*** 0.170***
Croatia 0.03 0.28 0.67 0.441*** 0.562*** 0.030*** 0.080*** 0.171***
Czech Republic 0.02 0.34 0.52 0.537*** 0.647*** 0.031*** 0.089*** 0.213***
Finland 0.06 0.40 0.34 0.533*** 0.570*** 0.054*** 0.127*** 0.285***
France 0.04 0.49 0.29 0.530*** 0.547*** 0.054*** 0.110*** 0.285***
Germany 0.04 0.42 0.33 0.689*** 0.410*** 0.058*** 0.066*** 0.186***
Italy 0.06 0.32 0.40 0.525*** 0.569*** 0.046*** 0.102*** 0.158***
Korea 0.02 0.09 0.84 0.403*** 0.634*** 0.046*** 0.086*** 0.198***
Norway 0.02 0.39 0.34 0.577*** 0.601*** 0.047*** 0.092*** 0.233***
Poland 0.04 0.30 0.52 0.552*** 0.651*** 0.045*** 0.079*** 0.243***
Portugal 0.07 0.42 0.39 0.545*** 0.416*** 0.041*** 0.152*** 0.226***
Romania 0.14 0.29 0.45 0.560*** 0.629*** 0.047*** 0.078*** 0.209***
Serbia 0.11 0.26 0.56 0.504*** 0.616*** 0.031*** 0.060*** 0.092***
Slovakia 0.08 0.27 0.55 0.549*** 0.633*** 0.037*** 0.070*** 0.180***
Slovenia 0.06 0.36 0.42 0.476*** 0.542*** 0.031*** 0.034*** 0.112***
Spain 0.04 0.41 0.42 0.502*** 0.358*** 0.045*** 0.115*** 0.193***
Sweden 0.05 0.35 0.33 0.390*** 0.545*** 0.028*** 0.090*** 0.196***
Ukraine 0.11 0.46 0.38 0.579*** 0.628*** 0.025*** 0.076*** 0.115***
United Kingdom 0.04 0.22 0.60 0.491*** 0.663*** 0.060*** 0.106*** 0.226***
Note: The tables shows the mean revenue elasticities of capital, labor and materials (i.e., βk, βl, βm)
calculated using the Wooldridge (2009) estimation-based method, and the correlations between the
estimated lagged productivity ∆lnTFPRi,t−1 and different variables, including the lagged sales growth
∆lnSalesi,t−1, lagged value added growth ∆lnVAi,t−1, net capital investment or capital growth ∆lnFTAi,t,
lagged cash flow CFi,t−1FTAi,t−2 , and lagged net worth growth ∆lnni,t−1. The time period covered is early 1990s to
2015. The exact sample period differs across countries, as can be found in Table 4.1. The stars indicate the
significance of the correlation coefficients. Note that Japan is excluded because material costs are not
available to estimate TFPR.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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C.4 Data Cleaning and Summary Statistics
The following cleaning steps are applied to datasets extracted from the Orbis Historical
Financial database for each country:
• Drop if industry code is missing.
• Consolidation code: only keep C1, U1, U2
• Only keep the entire calendar year: drop if the number of months is not equal to 12
• Accounting year: following Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2015), if the closing date is before
June 1st, then it should be counted as the previous year.
• Basic reporting mistakes: 1) Drop if both operating revenue and sales are missing.
2) Drop negative number of employees, negative fixed tangible assets and negative
sales. Note that operating revenue in Orbis equals the sum of sales, other operating
revenues and stock variations, so operating revenue can be negative.
3) Drop if interest paid, depreciation, long-term debt, short-term debt, employees
cost and material costs are negative.
• Following Appendix A3 of Gopinath et al. (2017), drop if age is negative, where
age is computed as the difference between year and incorporation year plus one.
• Keep only one filing type for each firm throughout the years. Each firm can have a
mixture of two filing types throughout time, i.e., annual report and local registry
filing (majority). I find that annual report is often associated with consolidated
account (C1), whereas local registry filing is often associated with unconsolidated
accounts (U1 or U2). Since empirical analysis looks at within-firm over time
variation, it is important to make sure that each firm only has one filing type or
consolidation code over time. Whenever a firm has a mixture of filing types across
years, the filing type that has more observations is kept. If the two filing types
occur with the same frequency for a given firm, then one filing type is chosen if it
has greater availability of other variables.
• Keep either consolidated or unconsolidated account for each firm throughout the
years. After the previous step, the consolidation code for a firm should be consistent
over time.
• Drop duplicates: each firm can have multiple entries for the same year. Duplicates
are dropped according to several criteria.
1) Accounting years can differ across countries. The month of the closing date that
has the largest observations is the preferred month. Suppose it is 12 (December),
then when dropping duplicates based on month, then month 12 is kept if this also
occurs most frequently within the firm over time, also conditional on firm id, year,
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Ticker and industry code.
2) After the previous step, if there are still duplicates, drop the duplicate entry with
missing Ticker, conditional on firm id, year, industry code, month of the account
closing date, and total assets being the same.
3) After the first two steps, if there are still duplicates, drop the duplicate entry
with missing ISIN number, conditional on firm id, year, industry code, month of
the account closing date, Ticker and total assets being the same.
• The original dataset is in US dollars. Convert the variables (with monetary value)
into domestic currency using the exchange rate variable in the dataset.
• This paper focuses on the manufacturing industry so that the capital stock can be
well measured by the fixed tangible assets. For each country, only the manufacturing
industry (two-digit NACE Rev.2 Code in the range of 10-33) is kept. The description
for each two-digit industry can be found in Table C.5.
• Further cleaning: Missing operating revenue (used to calculate the sales growth)
and missing or zero fixed tangible assets (used to measure capital stock ki,t) are
dropped.6 Firm-year observations with fewer than 3 consecutive years are dropped,
since in the empirical regressions, lagged growth rates are used. Years with fewer
than 50 firms are dropped, which happens in the earlier sample period in some
countries.
• Winsorization: before running regressions for each industry or country, variables
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles in the relevant sample. Variables
that need winsorization include: capital growth or firm investment, sales growth,
value added growth, productivity growth, cash flow over lagged capital stock, net
worth growth, net worth-to-assets ratio, cash-to-assets ratio. Variables such as log
of MRPK and log of total assets do not have high kurtosis and winsorization is not
necessary.
6In Orbis data, the variable ‘operating revenue’ represents the turnover or sales, while the ‘sales’
variable represents the net sales.
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Table C.2: Summary Statistics of Selected Variables for Each Country in the Baseline
Sample
∆lnFTAi,t ∆lnSalesi,t ∆lnVAi,t ∆lnTFPRi,t
Country Mean Median sd Mean Median sd Mean Median sd Mean Median sd
Bulgaria 0.059 -0.026 0.616 0.046 0.047 0.654 0.053 0.048 0.687 -0.009 -0.002 0.403
Croatia 0.010 -0.038 0.717 0.003 0.020 0.652 0.033 0.031 0.692 -0.009 -0.007 0.298
Czech Republic 0.049 -0.026 0.568 0.036 0.034 0.433 0.042 0.035 0.493 -0.002 -0.001 0.221
Finland 0.002 -0.066 0.421 0.017 0.026 0.398 0.027 0.033 0.366 0.005 0.007 0.208
France -0.021 -0.102 0.527 0.028 0.024 0.216 0.029 0.026 0.208 0.003 0.004 0.138
Germany 0.041 -0.033 0.449 0.041 0.012 0.219 0.040 0.038 0.348 0.010 0.009 0.131
Italy 0.023 -0.033 0.505 -0.000 0.020 0.444 0.020 0.026 0.389 -0.007 0.001 0.210
Japan 0.008 -0.024 0.321 0.004 0.009 0.279 0.083 0.018 0.558
Korea 0.154 -0.000 0.670 0.131 0.084 0.483 0.138 0.101 0.557 0.006 0.005 0.130
Norway -0.002 -0.059 0.606 0.051 0.039 0.393 0.051 0.043 0.358 0.014 0.011 0.190
Poland 0.055 -0.019 0.462 0.045 0.048 0.389 0.052 0.052 0.402 0.003 0.003 0.199
Portugal -0.030 -0.074 0.521 0.015 0.012 0.394 0.022 0.019 0.495 -0.004 0.001 0.225
Romania 0.086 -0.003 0.824 0.083 0.108 0.852 0.117 0.137 0.926 0.003 0.003 0.455
Serbia 0.135 -0.008 0.653 0.081 0.095 0.780 0.150 0.130 0.799 -0.002 -0.008 0.425
Slovakia -0.009 -0.053 0.666 0.005 0.027 0.610 0.023 0.033 0.608 -0.007 -0.001 0.306
Slovenia -0.057 -0.060 0.821 -0.018 0.034 0.706 0.045 0.034 0.440 -0.003 0.001 0.220
Spain 0.032 -0.038 0.496 0.011 0.027 0.333 0.022 0.034 0.401 -0.007 -0.000 0.187
Sweden -0.034 -0.077 0.550 0.023 0.031 0.378 0.024 0.031 0.364 -0.006 0.007 0.303
Ukraine 0.023 -0.040 0.619 0.031 0.076 0.899 0.088 0.109 0.853 -0.015 -0.009 0.518
United Kingdom -0.007 -0.039 0.442 0.028 0.030 0.316 0.052 0.050 0.372 0.005 0.005 0.125
Note: The table shows the mean, median and standard deviation for each of the four variables: capital investment or
capital growth ∆lnFTAi,t, sales growth ∆lnSalesi,t, value added growth ∆lnVAi,t, and the productivity growth ∆lnTFPRi,t,
where the productivity is estimated using the Wooldridge (2009) approach. The time period covered is early 1990s to 2015.
The exact sample period differs across countries, as can be found in Table 4.1. Note that TFPR cannot be estimated for
Japan due to the lack of data on material costs.
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Table C.3: Summary Statistics of Selected Variables for Each Country in the Baseline
Sample
CFi,t−1
FTAi,t−2 ∆lnni,t−1 Net worth/Assets Cash/Assets
Country Mean Median sd Mean Median sd Mean Median sd Mean Median sd
Bulgaria 1.403 0.326 4.326 0.176 0.093 0.513 0.388 0.446 0.524 0.196 0.082 0.245
Croatia 1.266 0.313 4.540 0.093 0.046 0.508 0.260 0.269 0.495 0.087 0.032 0.132
Czech Republic 1.148 0.291 3.711 0.109 0.064 0.435 0.356 0.430 0.522 0.157 0.087 0.180
Finland 1.180 0.424 3.350 0.075 0.059 0.459 0.375 0.422 0.469 0.182 0.109 0.196
France 1.621 0.652 4.197 0.083 0.067 0.368 0.328 0.349 0.316 0.177 0.115 0.183
Germany 1.632 0.384 6.184 0.097 0.056 0.452 0.340 0.304 0.257 0.138 0.063 0.171
Italy 0.813 0.284 2.846 0.084 0.041 0.442 0.214 0.182 0.292 0.082 0.028 0.120
Japan 0.269 0.122 0.904 0.051 0.035 0.307 0.185 0.220 0.494 0.203 0.161 0.162
Korea 1.353 0.237 3.984 0.182 0.131 0.480 0.395 0.365 0.270 0.060 0.021 0.094
Norway 1.760 0.414 6.157 0.094 0.068 0.488 0.276 0.285 0.362 0.185 0.111 0.197
Poland 1.250 0.316 4.376 0.103 0.070 0.406 0.434 0.486 0.406 0.103 0.045 0.138
Portugal 0.434 0.254 2.685 0.089 0.053 0.438 0.216 0.268 0.504 0.130 0.058 0.170
Romania 1.289 0.231 5.066 0.193 0.085 0.944 0.047 0.214 0.980 0.112 0.041 0.165
Serbia 0.797 0.250 3.365 0.209 0.116 0.562 0.391 0.368 0.308 0.055 0.017 0.093
Slovakia 0.781 0.267 2.709 0.066 0.045 0.684 0.168 0.277 0.740 0.152 0.073 0.191
Slovenia 1.221 0.298 3.699 -0.011 0.044 0.783 0.478 0.488 0.337 0.104 0.039 0.152
Spain 0.617 0.258 2.210 0.101 0.067 0.366 0.284 0.283 0.363 0.116 0.060 0.142
Sweden 1.384 0.395 4.814 0.077 0.057 0.396 0.422 0.419 0.278 0.180 0.105 0.201
Ukraine 0.717 0.100 5.769 0.090 0.019 0.618 0.338 0.519 0.801 0.073 0.015 0.137
United Kingdom 2.018 0.432 7.571 0.087 0.071 0.529 0.246 0.348 0.657 0.149 0.069 0.194
Note: The table shows the mean, median and standard deviation for each of the four variables: lagged cash flow over
twice lagged fixed tangible assets CFi,t−1FTAi,t−2 , lagged net worth growth ∆lnni,t−1, net-worth-to-assets ratio, and cash-to-assets
ratio. The time period covered is early 1990s to 2015. The exact sample period differs across countries, as can be found in
Table 4.1.
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Table C.4: Correlations between Lagged Sales Growth and Different Variables for Each
Country
Country ∆lnFTAi,t CFi,t−1FTAi,t−2 ∆lnni,t−1 ∆lnVAi,t−1 ∆lnTFPRi,t−1
Bulgaria 0.133*** 0.187*** 0.397*** 0.815*** 0.595***
Croatia 0.122*** 0.166*** 0.333*** 0.727*** 0.441***
Czech Republic 0.091*** 0.156*** 0.329*** 0.759*** 0.537***
Finland 0.102*** 0.167*** 0.322*** 0.872*** 0.533***
France 0.107*** 0.169*** 0.341*** 0.892*** 0.530***
Germany 0.091*** 0.106*** 0.198*** 0.593*** 0.689***
Italy 0.114*** 0.181*** 0.252*** 0.846*** 0.525***
Japan 0.075*** 0.219*** 0.302*** 0.301***
Korea 0.103*** 0.175*** 0.297*** 0.729*** 0.403***
Norway 0.080*** 0.100*** 0.247*** 0.832*** 0.577***
Poland 0.133*** 0.155*** 0.355*** 0.842*** 0.552***
Portugal 0.121*** 0.182*** 0.314*** 0.659*** 0.545***
Romania 0.069*** 0.225*** 0.501*** 0.842*** 0.560***
Serbia 0.166*** 0.197*** 0.346*** 0.736*** 0.504***
Slovakia 0.078*** 0.154*** 0.403*** 0.807*** 0.549***
Slovenia 0.023*** 0.121*** 0.732*** 0.860*** 0.476***
Spain 0.120*** 0.168*** 0.291*** 0.607*** 0.502***
Sweden 0.102*** 0.160*** 0.331*** 0.803*** 0.390***
Ukraine 0.114*** 0.158*** 0.272*** 0.802*** 0.579***
United Kingdom 0.105*** 0.122*** 0.262*** 0.517*** 0.491***
Note: The table shows the correlations between lagged sales growth ∆lnSalesi,t−1
and different variables, including net capital investment or capital growth ∆lnFTAi,t,
lagged cash flow over twice lagged capital stock CFi,t−1FTAi,t−2 , lagged net worth growth
∆lnni,t−1, lagged value added growth ∆lnVAi,t−1, and lagged productivity growth
∆lnTFPRi,t−1, where the productivity is estimated using the Wooldridge (2009)
approach. The stars indicate the significance of the correlation coefficients. Note
that TFPR cannot be estimated for Japan due to the lack of data on material costs.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table C.5: Industry Classification: NACE Rev.2 Code for Manufacturing
Nace Code Descriptions
10 Manufacture of food products
11 Manufacture of beverages
12 Manufacture of tobacco products
13 Manufacture of textiles
14 Manufacture of wearing apparel
15 Manufacture of leather and related products
16 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture
of articles of straw and plaiting materials
17 Manufacture of paper and paper products
18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media
19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products
20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations
22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
24 Manufacture of basic metals
25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products
27 Manufacture of electrical equipment
28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment
29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
30 Manufacture of other transport equipment
31 Manufacture of furniture
32 Other manufacturing
33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment
Note: The table shows the NACE Rev. 2 Code for the two-digit industries in the manufacturing sector and their corre-
sponding descriptions. More detailed industry classification can be found: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/
3859598/5902521/KS-RA-07-015-EN.PDF.
182
C.5 Exogenous Switching Regression Model
The likelihood function Li,t (4.31) of an observation in the exogenous switching regression
model is derived below:
Li,t =f(εC,i,t|εS,i,t > −xS,i,tγS)P (εS,i,t > −xS,i,tγS)
+ f(εU,i,t|εS,i,t 6 −xS,i,tγS)P (εS,i,t 6 −xS,i,tγS)
=
∫∞
−xS,i,tγS f(εC,i,t, εS,i,t)dεS,i,t
P (εS,i,t > −xS,i,tγS) P (εS,i,t > −xS,i,tγ
S)
+
∫−xS,i,tγS
−∞ f(εU,i,t, εS,i,t)dεS,i,t
P (εS,i,t 6 −xS,i,tγS) P (εS,i,t 6 −xS,i,tγ
S)
=
∫ ∞
−xS,i,tγS
f(εC,i,t, εS,i,t)dεS,i,t +
∫ −xS,i,tγS
−∞
f(εU,i,t, εS,i,t)dεS,i,t
=f(εC,i,t)
∫ ∞
−xS,i,tγS
f(εS,i,t)dεS,i,t + f(εU,i,t)
∫ −xS,i,tγS
−∞
f(εS,i,t)dεS,i,t
=f(εC,i,t)P (εS,i,t > −xS,i,tγS) + f(εU,i,t)P (εS,i,t 6 −xS,i,tγS) (4.31)
where f(εC,i,t|.) and f(εU,i,t|.) denote general conditional probability densities and f(.) is
the marginal density. The fourth step uses the assumption that εC,i,t and εU,i,t are each
independent from the error term εS,i,t in the selection equation.
C.6 Robustness Checks
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Table C.6: Capital Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity and Marginal Revenue Product of Capital (MRPK)
Country ∆lnTFPR ∆lnTFPR ∗ d CFFTA CFFTA ∗ d d(MRPK > p70) Within R2 Observations
Bulgaria -0.000 0.037** -0.001 0.024*** 0.380*** 0.0679 62,361
(0.0059) (0.0186) (0.0022) (0.0026) (0.0117)
Croatia 0.003 -0.020 0.005*** 0.021*** 0.420*** 0.0682 76,801
(0.0094) (0.0333) (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0106)
Czech Republic 0.003 0.005 0.006*** 0.017*** 0.409*** 0.0686 106,834
(0.0086) (0.0277) (0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0086)
Finland 0.024*** 0.009 0.010*** 0.005*** 0.287*** 0.0559 107,782
(0.0073) (0.0200) (0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0062)
France 0.040*** 0.007 0.021*** 0.005*** 0.302*** 0.0712 972,611
(0.0043) (0.0118) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0022)
Germany 0.057*** -0.001 0.002 0.011*** 0.285*** 0.0552 60,566
(0.0151) (0.0370) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0098)
Italy 0.031*** 0.007 0.018*** 0.009*** 0.293*** 0.0512 1,198,195
(0.0028) (0.0072) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0021)
Korea 0.099*** -0.065** 0.004*** 0.028*** 0.574*** 0.1074 341,295
(0.0088) (0.0318) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0058)
Norway 0.050*** -0.080** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.374*** 0.0669 73,268
(0.0131) (0.0405) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0096)
Poland 0.030*** 0.000 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.280*** 0.0505 83,927
(0.0110) (0.0293) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0082)
Portugal 0.033*** -0.001 0.007*** 0.012*** 0.304*** 0.0430 252,792
(0.0047) (0.0157) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0045)
Romania 0.016*** 0.066*** 0.005*** 0.013*** 0.381*** 0.0550 336,141
(0.0032) (0.0096) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0047)
Serbia 0.020*** 0.025 0.007*** 0.016*** 0.384*** 0.0642 99,047
(0.0054) (0.0154) (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0084)
Slovakia 0.010 0.067* 0.005 0.026*** 0.444*** 0.0655 42,936
(0.0126) (0.0363) (0.0035) (0.0044) (0.0147)
Slovenia 0.026* 0.069 -0.000 0.045*** 0.375*** 0.0646 43,656
(0.0148) (0.0440) (0.0047) (0.0061) (0.0144)
Spain 0.007*** 0.016* 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.280*** 0.0520 960,187
(0.0026) (0.0097) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0023)
Sweden 0.016*** 0.008 0.014*** 0.004*** 0.308*** 0.0514 183,344
(0.0052) (0.0115) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0058)
Ukraine 0.012*** 0.001 -0.001 0.011*** 0.359*** 0.0413 185,898
(0.0031) (0.0082) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0064)
United Kingdom 0.046*** 0.002 0.021*** -0.003 0.194*** 0.0350 94,157
(0.0134) (0.0330) (0.0034) (0.0036) (0.0067)
Note: The table shows the coefficients from regressing ∆lnFTAi,t on lagged productivity growth ∆lnTFPRi,t−1 and lagged
cash flow over twice lagged fixed tangible assets CFi,t−1FTAi,t−2 , and each of which interacted with a dummy that equals one if lagged
log MRPK is in the top 30% and zero if otherwise. The last column shows the number of firm-year observations used in each
regression. Firm and four-digit industry*year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm-level clustered standard errors
are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table C.11: Switching Regression Model of Firm Investment in Fabricated Metal Products Industry (Without
Firm Fixed Effects)
Unconstrained Regime Constrained Regime
Country ∆lnSalesi,t−1 CFi,t−1FTAi,t−2 ∆lnSalesi,t−1
CFi,t−1
FTAi,t−2 Observations Prob > Chi2 df
Bulgaria 0.021*** 0.007 0.109*** 0.017*** 4,243 0.0000 69
(0.0061) (0.0041) (0.0324) (0.0041)
Croatia 0.031*** -0.004*** 0.222*** 0.016*** 12,652 0.0000 69
(0.0053) (0.0016) (0.0241) (0.0026)
Czech Republic 0.035*** -0.003** 0.150*** 0.021*** 25,421 0.0000 89
(0.0040) (0.0015) (0.0207) (0.0022)
Finland 0.048*** -0.012*** 0.120*** 0.020*** 27,429 0.0000 73
(0.0037) (0.0007) (0.0232) (0.0034)
France 0.169*** -0.002*** 0.358*** 0.021*** 170,850 0.0000 75
(0.0045) (0.0005) (0.0177) (0.0010)
Germany 0.084*** -0.000 0.252*** 0.008*** 12,100 0.0000 91
(0.0094) (0.0008) (0.0404) (0.0023)
Italy 0.032*** -0.012*** 0.233*** 0.028*** 246,989 0.0000 87
(0.0014) (0.0005) (0.0069) (0.0011)
Japan 0.026*** 0.043** 0.138** 0.030 6,830 0.0000 79
(0.0078) (0.0172) (0.0679) (0.0243)
Korea 0.010*** 0.000 0.178*** 0.024*** 55,900 0.0000 53
(0.0017) (0.0007) (0.0138) (0.0022)
Norway 0.044*** -0.003*** 0.189*** 0.018*** 12,676 0.0000 71
(0.0072) (0.0006) (0.0373) (0.0023)
Poland 0.068*** 0.000 0.208*** 0.011*** 13,237 0.0000 75
(0.0059) (0.0014) (0.0344) (0.0025)
Portugal 0.037*** -0.009*** 0.272*** 0.017*** 47,373 0.0000 69
(0.0035) (0.0012) (0.0162) (0.0018)
Romania 0.031*** -0.003*** 0.102*** 0.016*** 44,863 0.0000 75
(0.0023) (0.0004) (0.0088) (0.0012)
Serbia 0.028*** -0.000 0.149*** 0.037*** 12,866 0.0000 67
(0.0033) (0.0012) (0.0207) (0.0044)
Slovakia 0.051*** -0.013*** 0.124*** 0.031*** 10,806 0.0000 75
(0.0063) (0.0018) (0.0267) (0.0050)
Slovenia 0.056*** -0.010*** 0.315*** 0.016*** 12,476 0.0000 59
(0.0065) (0.0014) (0.0335) (0.0035)
Spain 0.049*** -0.004*** 0.270*** 0.027*** 193,141 0.0000 77
(0.0019) (0.0006) (0.0128) (0.0014)
Sweden 0.082*** -0.009*** 0.239*** 0.016*** 56,662 0.0000 71
(0.0041) (0.0005) (0.0176) (0.0015)
Ukraine 0.015*** 0.000 0.144*** 0.009*** 20,782 0.0000 63
(0.0022) (0.0007) (0.0134) (0.0018)
United Kingdom 0.081*** -0.006*** 0.237*** 0.006*** 26,117 0.0000 75
(0.0057) (0.0003) (0.0289) (0.0012)
Note: The dependent variable is firm investment ∆lnFTAi,t. The coefficients for lagged sales growth and lagged
cash flow in two different investment regimes are reported. Four-digit industry and year fixed effects are included in
the switching regression. The last two columns show the p-value for the likelihood ratio test and the degrees of
freedom for the χ2 distribution respectively. A small p-value suggests that the switching regression (less restrictive
model) fits the data significantly better than an OLS regression. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table C.12: The Selection Equation of the Switching Regression in Fabricated Metal Products Industry (Without
Firm Fixed Effects)
Country Age ln(Assets) ln(MRPK) Net worthAssets
Cash
Assets Fraction
constrained
Bulgaria -0.027*** -0.127*** 0.790*** -0.449** 1.531*** 0.41
(0.0063) (0.0417) (0.0602) (0.1784) (0.3521)
Croatia -0.023*** -0.214*** 0.907*** -0.504*** 1.588*** 0.43
(0.0054) (0.0229) (0.0360) (0.1102) (0.3344)
Czech Republic -0.083*** -0.287*** 0.933*** -0.308*** 2.109*** 0.41
(0.0046) (0.0190) (0.0246) (0.0710) (0.1555)
Finland -0.020*** -0.142*** 0.618*** 0.041 0.398*** 0.23
(0.0022) (0.0157) (0.0225) (0.0720) (0.1246)
France -0.014*** -0.331*** 1.032*** 0.196*** 1.186*** 0.28
(0.0008) (0.0094) (0.0122) (0.0468) (0.0615)
Germany -0.006*** -0.345*** 0.789*** 0.222 0.957*** 0.28
(0.0013) (0.0257) (0.0369) (0.1709) (0.2922)
Italy -0.012*** -0.236*** 0.794*** -0.002 1.050*** 0.37
(0.0007) (0.0064) (0.0078) (0.0371) (0.0663)
Japan -0.024*** -0.142*** 0.918*** -0.025 0.879* 0.13
(0.0042) (0.0432) (0.0632) (0.2414) (0.4683)
Korea -0.029*** -0.267*** 0.857*** -0.074 0.148 0.41
(0.0021) (0.0110) (0.0138) (0.0616) (0.1640)
Norway -0.019*** -0.147*** 0.671*** -0.129 0.402** 0.35
(0.0049) (0.0231) (0.0273) (0.1263) (0.1662)
Poland -0.037*** -0.190*** 0.712*** -0.345*** 1.469*** 0.27
(0.0067) (0.0244) (0.0320) (0.0962) (0.2373)
Portugal -0.034*** -0.251*** 1.108*** -0.106* 0.951*** 0.39
(0.0019) (0.0156) (0.0224) (0.0616) (0.1379)
Romania -0.039*** -0.149*** 0.650*** -0.228*** 1.038*** 0.50
(0.0034) (0.0120) (0.0181) (0.0336) (0.1250)
Serbia -0.010** -0.059*** 0.540*** -0.579*** 1.758*** 0.33
(0.0042) (0.0192) (0.0276) (0.1070) (0.3700)
Slovakia -0.073*** -0.453*** 0.858*** -0.381*** 1.534*** 0.43
(0.0075) (0.0294) (0.0393) (0.0943) (0.2681)
Slovenia -0.043*** -0.333*** 0.984*** -0.449*** 1.930*** 0.35
(0.0054) (0.0267) (0.0393) (0.1285) (0.3262)
Spain -0.023*** -0.091*** 0.887*** -0.044 0.740*** 0.27
(0.0011) (0.0072) (0.0089) (0.0298) (0.0634)
Sweden -0.012*** -0.320*** 0.890*** 0.310*** 0.889*** 0.36
(0.0013) (0.0131) (0.0166) (0.0743) (0.0980)
Ukraine -0.016*** 0.039*** 0.494*** -0.246*** 0.289 0.34
(0.0034) (0.0115) (0.0165) (0.0398) (0.1909)
United Kingdom -0.004*** -0.113*** 0.696*** -0.345*** -0.160 0.24
(0.0012) (0.0130) (0.0241) (0.0697) (0.1396)
Note: The table shows the coefficients for the key variables in the selection equation that determines the probability of a
firm being constrained, including age, log of assets, log of MRPK, net worth-to assets ratio, and cash-to-assets ratio, and the
average proportion of constrained firms over the sample period. All variables apart from age are lagged. Four-digit industry
and year fixed effects are included. The last column shows the average proportion of constrained firms over the sample
period, where firms are classified as constrained based on the estimated posterior probabilities. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Figure C.1: Proportion of Constrained Firms and Credit Distortion in Fabricated Metal
Products Industry
(a) Proportion of Constrained Firms Using Different Fixed Effects
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(b) Credit Distortion Using Different Fixed Effects
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Note: In each graph, the corresponding measure is computed across all firms and years using the results
from controlling for different fixed effects in the switching regression model: firm fixed effects partially
controlled using the Hu and Schiantarelli (1998) approach and neglecting firm fixed effects. In both
cases, four digit industry and year fixed effects are controlled. Graph (a) plots the fraction of
constrained firms in industry 25 (manufacture of fabricated metal products) by NACE Rev.2 Code
across 20 countries. Graph (b) plots credit distortion in percent points (i.e., the fraction of the observed
dispersion (cross-section variance) of MRPK that is caused by the presence of constrained firms) in
industry 25, which is computed based on (4.19). MRPK is computed as the nominal revenue divided by
fixed tangible assets.
Data source: Orbis
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Figure C.2: Proportion of Constrained Firms and Credit Distortion in Fabricated Metal
Products Industry
(a) Proportion of Constrained Firms Using Different Proxies
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(b) Credit Distortion Using Different Proxies
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Note: In each graph, the corresponding measure is computed across all firms and years using the results
from applying three different proxies for investment opportunity in the switching regression model:
lagged sales growth, lagged value added growth and lagged productivity growth. Graph (a) plots the
fraction of constrained firms in industry 25 (manufacture of fabricated metal products) by NACE Rev.2
Code across 20 countries. Graph (b) plots credit distortion in percent points (i.e., the fraction of the
observed dispersion (cross-section variance) of MRPK that is caused by the presence of constrained
firms) in industry 25, which is computed based on (4.19). MRPK is computed as the nominal revenue
divided by fixed tangible assets.
Data source: Orbis
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